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Natural hazards and their management are a part of everyday life in New Zealand. The 
country’s geography and climate places the nation at risk from a wide range of adverse events, 
and as a consequence, New Zealand has a strong focus on building resilience. From global to 
national to local levels of governance and decision making, resilience thinking is becoming 
institutionalised in the public and private domains. However, the operationalisation of the 
concept is contested in the literature, with its transition from theory to policy and practice 
leaving significant questions unanswered. The North Canterbury agricultural district of the 
Hurunui in New Zealand has experienced three distinct adverse events over the past decade - 
drought, earthquake and a biosecurity outbreak (Mycoplasma Bovis). This thesis critically 
evaluates how the institutional responses to these three adverse events has affected the social 
resilience of farmers in the Hurunui. 
 
Resilience is a transdisciplinary concept and this is reflected in the range of literature drawn 
upon to inform the study. The transfer of resilience concepts from ecology (its field of origin) 
to the social sciences and policy and practice is contested, with three key challenges identified: 
(i) a loss of nuance in the meaning of the concept due to rapid adoption, (ii), the problem of 
measurement – integration into public bureaucracy is challenging due to a quantitative focus, 
and (iii) an inability to adequately address the normative aspects of social theory. The literature 
has examined multi-capital frameworks as a potential means to address to these challenges. 
This thesis draws upon the New Zealand Government’s Living Standards Framework – a multi-
capital framework – to illustrate how each of the three adverse event responses affected social 
resilience using social and human capital concepts. Perspectives were sought from 53 
stakeholders at three levels – farmers who experienced the events, local and regional 
government and organisations that responded to the events, and national government and 
organisations who organised the response to the events.  
 
Results show that social and human capital concepts can be used to describe important, but 
intangible, factors related to social resilience, which were influenced by the institutional 
responses to each event. Each of the three adverse events provides unique insights into the key 
drivers for positive and negative outcomes from  institutional responses to adverse events. The 
drought response provides an example of a response that drew upon existing social connections 
and local capacity to provide the most effective response to what was described as the most 
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challenging event. The earthquake response examines how establishing connections between 
the affected community and lead response agency is critical for emergent problem solving. The 
M. Bovis response demonstrates how a lack of connection between those affected and the lead 
response agency can inhibit adaptative capacity at both the local and institutional level. The 
Living Standards Framework is shown to be a useful tool which can be used to frame, 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
Resilience thinking is being widely adopted as the global approach to hazard management. 
International policy frameworks – including the United Nations’ Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCC), the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction – are all adopting resilience approaches to build 
capacity to better respond to the escalating losses from disasters around the world. New 
initiatives aimed at boosting the capability and capacity of societies to respond to, and recover 
effectively from, adverse events are supplementing pre-existing foci on reducing the likelihood 
of exposure to damaging events in many contexts (Tanner et al. 2015; Ostadtaghizadeh et al. 
2015). Reducing vulnerability and building resilience are now seen as complementary concepts 
converging towards the improvement of hazard management and societal outcomes (Miller et 
al. 2010, Turner 2010, Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010, Lei et al. 2014, Connelly et al. 2017). 
1.1 – Conceptual overview 
Emerging originally from the field of ecology, resilience is defined as “the capacity of a system 
to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially 
the same function” (Folke 2016). Adaptability is an important factor for resilience and refers 
to the capacity and capability to be able to change as needed in response to external shocks 
(Gunderson and Holling 2002, Walker et al. 2004, Folke 2006). Subsequent resilience research 
has highlighted the importance of understanding the social domain alongside the ecological 
with recognition that ecological systems cannot be understood without also understanding 
human interactions with them (Berkes and Folke 2002). Climate risk, for example, cannot be 
understood without accounting for the anthropogenic factors driving climate change – the two 
are interrelated. This combined field has come to be known as social-ecological systems 
resilience thinking (Gunderson and Holling 2002) and is the theoretical foundation for the 
institutionalisation of resilience concepts (UNISDRR 2015).  
 
Social resilience is conceptually similar to ecological resilience in that it refers to the 
application of resilience concepts to social systems (Berkes and Folke 2012). It can therefore 
be characterised as the ability of a social system to absorb disturbance and reorganise in order 
to retain essentially the same function (Folke 2016, Kwok 2016). Connectivity between people 
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and communities at all levels – individual, family, community, and societal – is an important 
component for achieving resilience in the social domain (Paton and McClure 2013). Another 
advance in the social sciences has been the shift from viewing resilience as a ‘characteristic’, 
to a ‘process’ (Ungar 2018). Resilience is now seen as an outcome – emerging from complex 
and nuanced processes such as economic systems or institutional approaches to governance 
(Almedom 2012). This places the focus on identifying and managing the processes which 
generate and maintain resilience outcomes, rather than defining whether individuals or 
communities might be considered to be resilient or not.  
 
In modern society, institutions play an essential role in facilitating the processes that govern 
our approach to hazard management, and the way these institutional processes are arranged 
affects social resilience (Ungar 2018). Defining what encompasses an institution is complex, 
and includes different definitions in multiple fields. Generally institutions can be seen as 
collectively accepted systems of rules, practices, and procedures which reproduce themselves, 
such as governments, universities, legal systems or the family (Searle 2005, Miller 2007, 
Hodgson 2015). In the context of this research, the institutions examined are those that develop, 
plan, and lead systematised responses to adverse events, primarily through central government 
agencies but also included private sector agencies or organisations which provide support. A 
key challenge for the institutional operationalisation of resilience is how the concepts transfer 
into policy and practice.  
 
Hazard management is a process which aims to maintain the consistent function of such 
institutions (CDEM 2002, UNISDRR 2015). Institutions hedge risk against adverse events by 
devoting considerable resources to mitigating damage, through response preparedness, and 
now resilience. Conceptual frameworks – which are “systems of concepts, assumptions, 
expectations, beliefs, and theories that support and inform [decision-making]” (Maxwell 2005, 
p.33) – guide the ways that institutions approach hazard management. For the last four decades, 
institutional conceptual frameworks have been dominated by neoliberal ideology which is the 
current hegemonic approach to economic management (Harvey 2005). Neoliberal styles of 
public management are now coming under increasing scrutiny and are facing criticism for 
reducing public sector capacity, which in turn affects critical processes such as hazard 
management (Larner 1997, Larner 2000, Mazzucato 2018, Mazzucato 2021). The conceptual 
argument this thesis makes, is that the shift in institutional arrangements through the adoption 
of neoliberal ideology, has affected the processes which generate and maintain social 
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resilience. It is with this is mind that Sjöstedt (2015) argues resilience thinking has not 
adequately accounted for existing literature on institutional change in the social sciences, and 
the impact that this can have on resilience. 
 
Aotearoa New Zealand’s (NZ) geography and climate places the country at risk from a wide 
variety of adverse events; accordingly, hazards and their management are a part of everyday 
life. As a result, the NZ government has a strong focus on building resilience to adverse events, 
and research and investment in the field of disaster risk reduction continues to grow (RNC 
2020B). However, a gap exists in the analysis of how recent governmental and other 
institutional responses to adverse events have affected the people who were impacted. It is 
argued that a better understanding of the influence that institutional responses have on social 
resilience would prepare institutions and government agencies to more effectively support the 
needs of affected people and communities during future adverse event responses.  
 
The Hurunui, an agricultural district in North Canterbury, was chosen as the field site due to 
its experience of three major and distinct adverse events between 2014-2018 – a drought, an 
earthquake, and a biosecurity outbreak (Mycoplasma Bovis). The unique characteristics of each 
event required different responses from a range of agencies that took differing approaches, 
providing a basis upon which institutional responses could be compared, contrasted and 
analysed. 
1.2 – Aims and research questions  
The primary aim of this study is to investigate how the institutional response to each of three 
major adverse events affected the social resilience of the Hurunui community. To achieve this, 
perspectives were sought from those who experienced the events, those who responded, and 
those who organised the response. The second aim of this study is to understand how the 
insights from the research might help operationalise resilience concepts. These two aims 
inform the first two research questions, which cast light on the impacts of the adverse events 
on the Hurunui community and focus attention on how the institutional response affected those 
who had been impacted.  The third research question provides the foundation upon which the 
operationalisation of these insights can be investigated. The questions are as follows: 
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1. What role did social resilience play in the community response to the three hazard 
events in the Hurunui? 
2. What were the institutional responses, and how did they affect the local community’s 
social resilience? 
3. What insights can social and human capital provide for understanding and 
operationalising social resilience in order to improve institutional responses to 
adverse events? 
 
Adverse event responses in New Zealand are affected by recent shifts in institutional 
arrangements which have been phased in through various initiatives and restructuring over the 
last four decades. The restructuring has placed a strict focus on evidence-based policy as well 
as a shift from technical expertise in decision-making structures, to so-called ‘people 
managers’ (Harvey 2005; Mazzucato 2021). The result of these shifts has been an erosion in 
the accounting of sources of value that cannot be directly objectively measured. The inability 
to measure intangible value poses significant challenges for public bureaucracies because 
institutions use legislative instruments such as targets and indicators in order to operationalise 
polices (UNISDRR 2015). Stiglitz (2018, p.13) captures the problem when he says: “What we 
measure affects what we do. If we measure the wrong thing, we will do the wrong thing. If we 
don’t measure something, it becomes neglected, as if the problem didn’t exist.” This thesis will 
demonstrate that key sources of value – such as adaptive capacity and social connection – are 
unable to be adequately objectively measured, resulting in them being unaccounted for in 
structural decision-making processes, which can be linked to the neoliberal shifts in 
institutional arrangements. A key challenge for operationalising resilience concepts is to 
incorporate these intangible sources of value into structural decision-making processes.  
 
The concept of multi-capital frameworks, introduced by the Sustainable Livelihoods 
Approach, has been drawn on to frame the third research question. Multi-capital frameworks 
have been posited in the literature as a way to incorporate intangible value into resilience 
analysis (Tanner et al. 2015; Ostadtaghizadeh et al. 2015; Cutter et al. 2014; Kenney and Phibbs 
2014; Norris et al. 2008; Stokols et al. 2013). The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach emerged 
from a desire to ensure that all people had the opportunity to share in the benefits of a 
sustainable livelihood (Perrings 1994). Multi-capital frameworks were presented as a tool that 
could be used to help identify all of the key factors in a sustainable livelihood (Scoones 1998, 
Morse and McNamara 2013, Frieling 2018). Rather than focusing on objective indicators, 
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multi-capital frameworks delineate all types of value into separate ‘capitals’, which are 
transferable between different contexts. These are:   
1) Natural Capital: All aspects of the natural environment which are required to support 
human life, such as land, water and air quality, favourable climates and biodiversity.  
2) Economic Capital: includes all financial assets such as cash, credit, debt, stocks and 
bonds. 
3) Physical Capital: infrastructure, such as houses, roads, railways, hospitals, factories, 
equipment and vehicles.  
4) Human Capital: the assets that enable people to participate fully in life’s activities 
such as work, study and recreation. It includes knowledge, skills and mental and 
physical health.  
5) Social Capital: encompasses the values and norms that are foundational to society. It 
includes cultural identity, social networks, community, trust, connectedness, 
affiliations, associations, the rule of law, and in New Zealand, the Crown-Māori 
relationship. 
(Scoones 1998; Morse and McNamara 2013; Frieling 2018) 
The ability for capital concepts to transfer between differing contexts was an important feature 
that informed the adoption of multi-capital frameworks for use in this thesis. Capital concepts 
are used as a basis for comparative analysis at different scales, from the coal face in the Hurunui 
to central government decision-making processes. Additionally, as will be discussed further in 
the literature review, multi-capital frameworks and resilience thinking complement one 
another, and few theoretical adjustments are required for their integration. 
 
This thesis primarily incorporates the concepts of social and human capital to describe and 
analyse the intangible factors key to social resilience which are currently difficult to 
operationalise. While all capitals are observed to play an important role in each adverse event 
in the Hurunui, social and human capital are focused on as they provide the means to describe 
key factors which are difficult to measure. Human capital encapsulates knowledge, skills, and 
mental and physical health and is used to demonstrate how these factors can affect core 
resilience concepts such as adaptive capacity and adaptive management. Social capital 
encapsulates the importance of social networks, sense of community and trust. The concept is 
sub-divided into three types – bonding, bridging and linking (Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000; 
Giorgas 2007)  – which are drawn upon to describe the importance of connections between 
individuals and families (bonding), within the local community (bridging), and between the 
community and institutions that provided resources for the response (linking social capital) 
(Aldrich 2015). It should be noted that there are dimensions of all capitals that are difficult to 
measure, however, social and human capital require consideration of social factors that are 
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commonly intangible in nature. Other types of capital, such as cultural capital, also fit within 
this framework and can be conceptualised under or alongside social and human capital. This 
approach is particularly contextually relevant because the New Zealand government recently 
developed and implemented the Living Standards Framework (Treasury 2018), a multi-capital 
framework that aims to better account for policy impacts across the different dimensions of 
wellbeing (Frieling and Warren 2018). In the words of the Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern 
(2018): 
“We want New Zealand to be the first place in the world where our budget 
is not presented simply under the umbrella of pure economic measures, and 
often inadequate ones at that, but one that demonstrates the overall 
wellbeing of our country and its people” (Jacinda Ardern 2018). 
To address all three research questions, this thesis draws upon qualitative interview data from 
three groups of expert knowledge holders who were either impacted by the events (local 
farmers – group one), involved in the emergency response (at the local or regional level – group 
two), or who developed relevant government policy to support those affected by adverse events 
(at the national level – group three). The results of this research describe the range of impacts 
each adverse event had on farmers in the district and the interactions with, and support they 
were offered, by response agencies and other institutions during the response. Perspectives 
from all three groups illuminate key challenges and decisions that led to the unique outcomes 
in each adverse event. 
 
This introductory chapter will next outline the research context, and then detail the researcher’s 
positionality in order to elaborate key influences upon the research design and research 
direction. Finally, the general structure and scope of each chapter in the thesis is outlined. 
1.3 – Research context 
Adverse events have been an omnipresent part of human existence and continue to be one of 
the greatest challenges that societies must contend with (Paton 2006). NZ’s Pākeha (colonial 
European) and indigenous history is replete with examples of significant adverse events (King 
and Goff 2006). The geography and climate of NZ places it at risk from a wide range of hazards 
– from perennial weather-related events which are intensifying due to climate change (MFE 
2020), to geophysical hazards caused by the country’s tectonic setting.   
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NZ is located on the interface between the Pacific and Australian plate boundary which is part 
of the Pacific ‘Ring of Fire’ and is characterised by volcanic and seismic activity (GNS 2020). 
The plate boundary across the South Island is defined by the Southern Alps and the Alpine 
Fault (see Figure 1.1) which generates large (approx. magnitude 8) earthquakes on average 
every 300 years (Berryman et al. 2012). Recent work has revealed that the last major Alpine 
Fault rupture was in 1717AD, 304 years ago (Berryman et al. 2012), and it is estimated that 
there is a 75% chance of the fault rupturing in the next 50 years (Howarth et al. 2021). The 
seismic risk presented by the Alpine Fault poses a significant threat to lives and livelihoods in 
the South Island as well as the New Zealand economy (Orchiston 2013). The damage caused 
is expected to be significant and widely felt across the South Island and lower North Island, 
with cascading environmental effects persisting for up to 50 years (Orchiston et al. 2017). The 
Alpine Fault is just one example alongside a range of other major geological hazards related to 
the plate boundary – such as the earthquakes generated by the Marlborough Fault Zone (Little 
and Jones 1998), the Wellington Fault (Gross et al. 2004), the Hikurangi subduction zone 
(which can also generate devastating tsunamis) (Wallace et al. 2016), and the volcanic fields 
of the central and northern North Island, including active volcanoes surrounding the major city 





Figure 1.1 – The tectonic setting of New Zealand, astride the plate boundary between the 
Australian and Pacific plates (Langridge et al. 2010). 
The field site of the Hurunui district has been recently impacted by two major earthquakes. The 
2010/2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence caused 185 deaths and over 7000 injuries in 
Canterbury (Paton et al. 2013), resulting in peripheral impacts in the Hurunui which is located 
approx. 100 km away. The district was subsequently the epicentre of the magnitude 7.8 2016 
Kaikōura earthquake which caused major damage from the northern part of the district to 
Wellington (over 200km away). Adverse events can also have compounding effects – the 2016 
Kaikōura earthquake was immediately followed by multiple periods of adverse weather which 
negatively affected emergency operations following the event (Cradock-Henry 2019).  
 
The Anthropocene (Crutzen 2000) has given rise to the challenge of slow onset impacts from 
climate change which must also be addressed. Research (IPCC AR5 2015) suggests that 
climate change is already resulting in the intensification of perennial weather-related natural 
hazards such as floods, droughts and tropical storms. Climate has and will continue to have a 
significant impact on New Zealand (MfE 2020). While the country has always been prone to 
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periods of drought, floods and wildfires (MFE 2020), the frequency and intensity of climatic 
hazards will increase as the global effects ramp up over time (IPCC AR5 2015). These impacts 
are expected to be unequal across New Zealand, and the Ministry for the Environment (MfE 
2017) states that shifting patterns of rainfall and weather mean that regions will have to account 
for different challenges – some regions may become more susceptible to flooding, or drought, 
or both. The Hurunui was impacted by a significant drought between 2014-2017 that was 
declared a medium scale event, resulting in significant impacts for businesses and families. 
This drought was also compounded by the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake, which occurred during 
the drought’s apex in November 2016. 
 
Biosecurity is considered a biophysical hazard, and its inclusion in this research alongside 
climatic and geophysical hazard events is due to the Hurunui being impacted by the 
Mycoplasma Bovis (M. Bovis) outbreak, which was first discovered on 21st July 2017 (MPI 
2020). M. Bovis is a bacterium that primarily affects cattle causing a range of serious conditions 
including mastitis, arthritis, pneumonia and late-term abortions. It poses no risk to human 
health (MPI 2020IF). Unwanted diseases and pests pose a significant threat to the New 
Zealand’s environment, economy and way of life – the Ministry for Primary Industries keeps 
a list of 15,000 unwanted plant, animal and marine diseases and pests (MPI 2020IA). 
Significant current concerns are the Brown Marmorated Stink Bug (MPI 2020IB), African 
Swine Fever (MPI2020ID) and Queensland Fruit Fly (MPI2020IC) – outbreaks of which have 
been controlled in the past. The Mycoplasma Bovis outbreak is novel for New Zealand, though 
it is endemic in all other countries apart from Norway. The outbreak required a large-scale 
institutional response that led to significant impacts on the local farmers, cost $349.5 million 
to date (Kelly 2020), and paid out an additional $187.5 million in compensation to farmers 
(MPI2020IF). Biosecurity incursions will remain a significant threat to New Zealand for the 
foreseeable future, and resilience to such incursions is in the national interest (MPI 2020IE).  
 
New Zealand’s economy is the third most vulnerable in the world (as a percentage of GDP) to 
the impact of adverse events (Lloyds Global Underinsurance Report 2012). According to the 
Insurance Council of New Zealand (2014), adverse events cost the country an average of 1% 
of its GDP in any given year. Estimates place the cost of the 2011 Christchurch earthquake at 
over NZD$40 billion - making it the fifth largest insurance event in the world since the 1950s 
(Deloitte Access Economics 2015). While low frequency yet high consequence rapid onset 
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events such as earthquakes are the costliest, climate related hazards also make a significant 
contribution to total insurance costs (Insurance Council for New Zealand 2017).  
 
These contexts of significant geologic, climatic, and biosecurity hazard risk have spurred the 
New Zealand government to invest significantly in enhancing the nation’s capability and 
capacity to understand, prepare for, respond to, and recover from such events. This is codified 
into emergency management policy structured around the four Rs – Reduction, Readiness, 
Response and Recovery (National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy 2008). In 
2019, a new National Disaster Resilience Strategy (NDRS) (NDRS 2019) was adopted which 
outlines the vision and long-term goals for the National Emergency Management Agency to 
increase New Zealand’s resilience to disasters. The NDRS “is intended to provide a common 
agenda for resilience that individual organisations, agencies, and groups can align with for 
collective impact.” (NDRS 2019 p.10). To operationalise this vision, the NDRS incorporates 
the Living Standards Framework to advance its whole-of-government wellbeing and resilience 
agenda. Furthermore, the New Zealand government’s obligations to the Sendai Framework, 
and therefore its approach to resilience, is explicitly linked to the Living Standards Framework 
through the NDRS and a series of technical papers discussing the Living Standards Framework 
(New Zealand Treasury 2018) in relation to risk and resilience (Frieling and Warren 2018), 
social capital (Frieling 2018), and human capital (Morrisey 2018) among others.  
 
Additionally, to enhance the value of scientific research, the New Zealand Government 
announced a set of eleven National Science Challenges in 2014 which aimed to tackle the most 
significant science-based issues and opportunities facing New Zealand. Providing a new way 
of funding scientific research, the challenges are mission-led with a focus on research 
excellence, collaboration between researchers, stakeholders and the public, and Vision 
Mātauranga to incorporate indigenous research excellence (MBIE 2021). Resilience to 
Nature’s Challenges (RNC) is a National Science Challenge that focuses on “enhancing New 
Zealand’s ability to anticipate, adapt and thrive in the face of ever-changing natural hazards” 
(MBIE 2021A). RNC’s mission is to enhance New Zealand’s resilience to adverse events 
through innovative and collaborative research and focus on strong relationships with key 
stakeholders and end users (RNC 2021). This doctoral programme was funded by the 
Resilience to Nature’s Challenges National Science Challenge, with a broad remit to focus on 
investigating social and community resilience in rural North Canterbury.   
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The Hurunui, an agricultural district in North Canterbury, is an ideal site to investigate how 
institutional arrangements affected social resilience due to its experience of three major adverse 
events between 2014-2018 – a drought, an earthquake, and a biosecurity outbreak 
(Mycoplasma Bovis). With a population of approximately 12,000 people, the local economy is 
primarily made up of agribusiness (dairy, sheep and beef farming), forestry and tourism. The 
study area is explored in detail at the end of the methodology chapter. Discussions in the 
literature review surrounding the neoliberal restructuring of New Zealand provide important 
context to explain how the Hurunui, and rural areas in general, have been transformed, affecting 
their experience of past hazard events, including through broader exposure to market factors 
such as global commodity prices. The neoliberal restructuring also entailed significant 
institutional reform which indirectly affected the Hurunui’s experience of institutional 
responses to the adverse events. Illustrating how this restructuring reshaped institutions and 
rural life in New Zealand provides an important foundation upon which the study area can be 
examined in detail.  
1.4 – Researcher positionality 
Addressing my own positionality in this research situates the research design, as well as the 
approach taken to generating the research questions. As noted in the Methodology (part 3.1), 
in a qualitative epistemological research investigation the researcher is a part of the knowledge 
collection and their experience should influence hypothesis generation, data collection and 
analysis (Strauss and Corbin 1989). This section covers how my own experiences have 
influenced the topic that was chosen and the way the research was approached. 
 
I have always been interested in people, why we do what we do, which led to an undergraduate 
degree in sociology and an education in mixed (qualitative and quantitative) research methods. 
Following this, I worked at the Social Research Centre in Melbourne, Australia, where I was 
employed as an interviewer on many large university and government research projects. During 
this employment, I came to two realisations which have influenced this research project. 
Firstly, while conversing with people during interviews I came to the realisation that the 
quantitative data being collected for decision-making purposes rarely conveyed the actual 
experiences and outcomes it was seeking to understand. I was continually explaining to people 
why they had to reduce their lived experiences down to a number on a Likert scale, which they 
felt did not accurately represent their experience. Secondly, interviews were conducted at 
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multiple scales. Often, I would speak to someone who was impacted by certain policies, then 
with someone who had implemented those policies, and also sometimes those who had 
designed and developed those policies. These conversations led me to realise that there was a 
severe disconnect between those who made policy, those who implemented policy and those 
who experienced policy outcomes. Together, these two realisations reshaped my interests from 
the micro to the macro, from people, to the systems we create for ourselves, and how these 
systems generate outcomes.  
 
I should also note that during my time at the Social Research Centre I was embedded within 
the societal systems we create for ourselves. In addition to getting a systemic perspective while 
working, I also had a personal or ethnographic perspective of how the systems we create deal 
with uncertainties, unknowns, or intangible factors. 
 
My interest in systems thinking led to an exploration of economics (with the root definition of 
the economy referring to the careful management of resources, originally in the context of 
organising one’s household) and politics. Returning to university, my honours investigated the 
impact of neoliberalism on tertiary education which illustrated the institutional context in 
which decision-making structures operated. The doctoral programme funding this research 
gave me a broad remit to investigate social and community resilience in rural North 
Canterbury, and when beginning my literature review of resilience research, I realised that 
resilience concepts directly addressed some of the problems I had become aware of while 
working at the Social Research Centre and had observed personally. Holling’s (1973) paradigm 
shift in resilience thinking, which will be discussed in part 2.1, illustrates the importance of 
qualitative analysis over quantitative measures for managing the long-term persistence of 
complex adaptive systems (i.e., human society). This supported my view formed at the Social 
Research Centre that the quantitative data collected by governments and universities did not 
convey everything that was important.  
 
When brainstorming how to approach this doctoral project, my personal interests in these 
systemic problems played a part in the initial research design. An inductive approach was 
adopted in order to ascertain if it was realistic to investigate whether a pattern of institutional 
neglect of intangible value was playing out in New Zealand’s disaster responses. As will be 
discussed in the methodology, the approach taken was one of observation, and careful attempts 
were made to manage my own biases during the interview programme. The research design 
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targeting those who experienced the events, those who responded to them, and those who 
organised the response, was also influenced by my work at the Social Research Centre, which 
emphasised the importance of understanding the perspectives of all involved resulting in a 
vertical analysis rather than a horizontal one. 
 
Respondents were asked to describe their experiences of the events as well as the responses, 
and their answers to those questions guided the direction of the interview. Extensive experience 
in conducting interviews at the Social Research Centre was drawn on in order to ensure that 
the participants led the direction of the interview, with guiding questions from me to ensure 
the research objectives were met. My prior interviewing experience also included working on 
many sensitive projects which helped ensure a respectful approach, and that care was taken 
around sensitive topics as many farmer respondents had experienced significant trauma and 
challenges. In many interviews, the need to be objective and careful was rendered moot as 
participants began enthusiastically describing exactly what had not been accounted for in 
adverse event responses. A significant number of participants also described the structural 
factors involved in the negative outcomes, such as the influence of neoliberal ideology on 
decision-making processes.  
 
The next section lays out the structure of this thesis.  
1.5 – Thesis Structure 
The next chapter, the Literature Review, explores the key theories on which this study is 
grounded; social resilience, multi-capital frameworks, social and human capital concepts, and 
how institutional responses to adverse events are enacted in New Zealand. Social-ecological 
systems resilience thinking forms the theoretical foundation of the thesis, and the first part of 
the literature review covers resilience thinking from its initial ecological conceptualisation by 
Holling (1973) to its transfer into the social sciences. Adaptability, transformation and a focus 
on qualitative analysis all emerge as important factors in this discussion. The second part of 
the literature review covers resilience thinking in the social domain, noting the advantages of 
conceptualising resilience as a process and drawing attention to the importance of engagement 
between all levels – individual, family, community and society.  
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However, as resilience thinking transferred into the social domain and policy and practice, a 
number of theoretical, conceptual and practical challenges arose. The third part of the literature 
review covers the key challenges that social-ecological systems resilience thinking faces for 
operationalisation in policy and practice – nuance, measurement, and norms. Multi-capital 
frameworks, such as the Living Standards Framework, have been posited as a potential solution 
to these challenges (Tanner et al. 2015) and part four describes the Sustainable Livelihoods 
Approach, from which multi-capital frameworks emerged, and examines social and human 
capital concepts in relation to social resilience. Finally, the institutional context in which 
adverse event responses occur in New Zealand is described, with specific attention paid to how 
neoliberal ideology has shifted institutional dynamics through The New Public Management 
approach.  
 
Chapter three details the methodological approaches adopted, describing the reasons for the 
selection of critical realist and constructivist paradigms of inquiry alongside traditional 
qualitative methods for data collection and analysis. Participant selection, data collection, data 
analysis, and the ethical considerations are described. Finally, the study area and context are 
detailed, providing the context for the results chapter. 
 
Chapter four presents the results of this research. The first three parts detail the impacts of each 
adverse event on the Hurunui community – drought, earthquake, and M. Bovis – and how the 
responses to each event subsequently affected the local community. The first part describes 
how responses to the drought were considered the most effective by farmers, despite being the 
most challenging event, due to effective communication and existing capacity and capability 
amongst response agencies. The second part describes how the earthquake response initially 
faced challenges due to difficulties experienced in establishing a connection between the lead 
response agency and the Hurunui community, which were subsequently solved, leading to good 
outcomes. Part three describes how the M. Bovis response from MPI was dictatorial with a 
strong disease control approach and little focus on farmer welfare. The lack of effective 
communication between MPI and affected farmers led to negative outcomes, and interviews 
with MPI respondents describe the challenges they faced during the response. The fourth and 
final part synthesises the overarching themes that emerged from the responses and examines 
how neoliberal restructuring impacted adverse event response capacity at the institutional level. 
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The Discussion Chapter analyses the results in context of the literature. The first part 
summarises and synthesises the results, demonstrating how social and human capital can be 
used to describe the intangible sources of value that were often unaccounted for in the adverse 
event responses. Next, the results are discussed in context of both social and ecological 
resilience insights, noting how social and human capital can be used to describe adaptability 
and the importance of connections between different scales. Finally, the Living Standards 
Framework is incorporated to examine how social and human capital concepts can help address 
the three challenges resilience faces for operationalisation – nuance measurement, and norms. 
 
The Conclusion directly addresses the research questions, summarises the key learnings from 
the thesis, examines the implications for research, policy and practice, and offers some final 
reflections.  
 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
This chapter explores the key theories of social resilience, multi-capital frameworks, social and 
human capital concepts, and how institutional responses to adverse events are enacted in New 
Zealand. The transdisciplinary role that SES resilience plays has led to the concept being 
described as a boundary object or bridging concept (Baggio et al. 2015) between different 
disciplines (Berkes and Folke 2000; Adger et al. 2005; Folke 2016). Accordingly, resilience 
insights entail a holistic focus (Alexander 2013) which inherently incorporate diverse fields of 
study related to the research context. Social-ecological systems (SES) resilience thinking forms 
the theoretical foundation of this thesis and chapter, which is enriched by an examination of 
multi-capital frameworks and institutional processes.  
 
Part one outlines the intellectual genesis of SES resilience thinking from its introduction in 
Holling’s (1973) seminal paper to the inclusion of the social domains at the turn of the 
millennium. These developments primarily occurred within the field of ecology. Part two 
details the inclusion of the social dimension into resilience thinking with particular focus on a 
separate psychological strand of research which delivered unique insights. The combination of 
the social and ecological interpretations of resilience were then incorporated adopted in the 
field of disaster risk reduction and are now becoming institutionalised through international 
frameworks such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDRR 2015).  
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However, as social-ecological systems resilience thinking transferred into the social domain 
and policy and practice, key challenges for operationalisation have emerged. One of the central 
issues identified in social science literature has been the inability for resilience concepts to 
adequately account for and address politics and power relationships. Part three describes three 
interlinking operational challenges for resilience: (i) loss of nuance in the meaning of the 
concept due to rapid adoption, (ii) the problem of measurement – integration into public 
bureaucracy is challenging due to a quantitative focus on targets and indicators, and (iii) an 
inability to adequately address the normative aspects of social theory, specifically those that 
originated in the qualitative domain such as structure, agency and power relationships.  
 
Multi-capital frameworks have emerged in the literature as a potential means to address the 
operational challenges that resilience thinking faces (Tanner et al. 2015; Ostadtaghizadeh et al. 
2015). Additionally, the New Zealand government has recently adopted a multi-capital 
framework called the Living Standards Framework in an attempt to move beyond narrowly 
defined economic metrics for considering policy. Part three of the literature review describes 
the development of multi-capital frameworks, theoretically examines social and human capital 
concepts, and outlines how neoliberal ideology has reshaped public sector governance in New 
Zealand. 
 
The academic discourse surrounding resilience concepts has expanded rapidly in recent years 
(Folke 2016) – accordingly, rather than an exhaustive review, a summary of the key debates is 
presented 
2.1 – Resilience thinking 
Accurately defining what resilience thinking entails is a key challenge identified in the 
literature. Part one examines the academic exploration of what resilience means, and the 
intellectual genesis of SES resilience thinking provides key insights into its theoretical nature. 
2.1.1 – Multiple stable states 
The modern concept of resilience first emerged in ecology with Holling’s (1973) seminal paper 
‘Resilience and the Stability of Ecological Systems.’ Ecology, up until this point, had been 
dominated by the stable equilibrium framework or maximum sustainable yield paradigm. 
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These theories posited that there was a natural equilibrium to which nature would always return 
following disturbances or external shocks (Folke 2006). These theories, however, did not 
reflect reality, with Holling (1973, p.2) arguing that they provided “little insight into the 
transient behaviour of systems that are not near the equilibrium”.  In a rejoinder to this 
paradigm, Holling (1973) argued that rather than just a single stable state to which nature 
always returned, there were instead multiple stable states with fundamentally different 
characteristics and thresholds between them (Holling 1973, p.2). This was a radical idea when 
first proposed (Folke 2016). In this context resilience represented the ability of an ecological 
system to “absorb change and disturbance while still maintaining the same relationships” 
(Holling 1973, p.14). Fundamentally, the initial conceptualisation of resilience was about 
maintaining a preferred stable state without transitioning into an undesirable one due to 
external influence. 
 
An example is provided by Scheffer et al. (2001) who, in a synthesis of evidence for 
catastrophic shifts in ecosystems, described one case example where previously pristine 
shallow lakes with large amounts of biodiversity experienced sudden large algal blooms due 
to increased nutrient loading from agriculture. This shifted the water from clear to turbid and 
had a significant negative impact on the flora which relied upon the pristine clarity of the water. 
This in turn impacted the fauna which relied upon the flora. The effects were catastrophic and 
destroyed the conditions required for the ecosystem to persist over time. The stable state shifted 
from one which was desirable (clear pristine water), to another which was not (algal blooms), 
due to outside influence (nutrient loading).  
 
This provides an important example of how thresholds function in resilience thinking. Often 
there was no gradual build-up of effects to give warning about state change. By the time it was 
noticeable, the process was irreversible (Scheffer et al. 2001). This illustrates the concept of 
hysteresis, which in ecology refers to the fact that once a critical threshold has been passed and 
the state has changed, shifting the ecosystem back into the original stable state is more complex 
than reversing what caused the initial state change (Figure 2.1; Ludwig et al. 1998). In the 
above example, lowering the nutrient content of the water to just below the threshold that was 
just passed was not sufficient to return the ecosystem to its original state. The plants that 
ensured the clarity of the waters previously required clear water in order to survive, 
accordingly, in order for them to regrow nutrient levels had to be lowered significantly to 
negate algal blooms. Only then could the flora regrow and then the fauna return, which began 
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maintenance of the original stable state again (Scheffer 2001). In this context, resilience is 




Figure 2.1 – An illustration of multiple stable states (Tervonen et al. 2015). 
2.1.2 – Quantitative vs qualitative approaches 
The second paradigm shift involved changing from a quantitative view emphasising the 
consistency of ecosystems to a qualitative approach focused on the long-term persistence of its 
relationships (Holling 1973). Holling (1973, p.1) explained the differences in terms of 
engineering resilience and what came to be known as social ecological systems resilience.  
If we are examining a particular device designed by the engineer to 
perform specific tasks under a rather narrow range of predictable external 
conditions, we are likely to be more concerned with consistent non variable 
performance in which slight departures from the performance goal are 
immediately counteracted. A quantitative view of the behaviour of the 
system is, therefore, essential…But if we are dealing with a system 
profoundly affected by changes external to it, and continually confronted 
by the unexpected, the constancy of its behaviour becomes less important 
than the persistence of the relationships. Attention shifts, therefore, to the 
qualitative and to questions of existence or not. [emphasis added] 
The static stable equilibrium paradigm was seen as representative of a quantitative engineering 
resilience orientation which failed to provide insights into real world ecosystem dynamics and 
change over time (Holling 1996). In a later paper, Holling (1996) fleshed out the differences 
between these two ways of thinking about resilience, drawing attention to what Alexander 
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(2013) later called the tensions between the opposing concepts of efficiency and persistence, 
constancy and change and predictability and unpredictability (Table 2.1).  
 









Table 2.1 – Tensions between engineering resilience and social-ecological interpretations of 
resilience (Adapted after Holling 1996) 
The key distinction is that a quantitative framework focuses on achieving constancy by 
accounting for all variables in a system. However, Holling (1973, 1988, 1996, 2005) argues 
that this is problematic because ecosystems (human and natural) are constantly in a transient 
state due to uncontrollable variables that create surprise, uncertainty, and changing external 
conditions. The world is complex and constantly changing, accordingly, there will always be 
variables that have not been adequately quantitatively accounted for. Therefore, a theoretical 
approach to ecosystems that relies upon all variables being accounted for with the goal of 
maintaining constancy is inherently fallible. Ruminating on this topic, Holling (1973) 
discussed how traditional analysis in ecology had largely been inherited from developments in 
classic physics. He reflected that the quantitative approach that had been taken until now “may 
simply reflect an analytic approach developed in one area where it was useful and then 
transferred to another where it may not be.” (Holling 1973, p.2). This observation is useful, 
and section 2.2.4 will refer to it in reference to a similar pattern playing out in social science 
regarding the adoption of resilience thinking. 
 
It is important to note that while SES resilience emphasises the qualitative, it does not do so at 
the expense of the quantitative approaches. Gunderson and Holling (2002) argue that the static 
view of ecosystems is not inherently incorrect, it is simply incomplete. It is primarily useful in 
contexts in which all external variables can be accounted for, where there is no uncertainty or 
unpredictability. On the other hand, engineering resilience is a suitable approach to managing 
systems which can be quantitatively accounted for, and where efficiency, constancy and 
predictability are important. SES resilience is being applied in this research because it is 
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relevant to the field of disaster risk reduction, a field constantly confronted by uncertainty and 
the unexpected (Hewitt 2013, Sword-Daniels et al. 2016).  
 
Operational approaches that only account for tangible or measurable phenomena are 
problematic. This can be illustrated by reflecting back to the example of shallow water lakes 
which suffered algal blooms following high nutrient loading. Prior to an in-depth 
understanding of the way in which nutrient loading can trigger algal blooms and ecosystem 
devastation, a management approach based on quantitative measurements of constancy would 
be unable to deal with the sudden state change. The water was clear and pristine until suddenly 
it was not. Quantitative approaches cannot successfully manage the uncertainty and 
unpredictability associated with the change process until an adequate understanding and 
quantification of the system is gained. Until this occurs, qualitative approaches, such as 
experiential knowledge of similar cases elsewhere, are more useful for ecosystem management. 
This paradigm shift, and the tensions between these opposing concepts (Table 2.1) are key to 
this research and will be discussed throughout the thesis. 
2.1.3 – Resilience, adaptability, transformation and panarchy 
As the theoretical foundations of resilience thinking developed, it became clear that a wider 
understanding of systems and how they change was required. A key evolution was the 
realisation that ecological systems could not be understood without understanding how humans 
influenced them (Berkes and Folke 1998) – which required incorporating social analysis into 
ecological systems. Thus, the concept branched out of ecology, becoming transdisciplinary, 
and the focus shifted to social-ecological systems, of which resilience was a part. The first 
discipline incorporated was economics (Constanza 1993) with collaboration between the Beijer 
Institute and the University of Florida in 1991 (Folke 2016). This collaboration produced 
significant works through what was then named the Resilience Network. This later morphed 
into the Resilience Alliance in 1999 (Folke 2016) which became, and remains to this day, a 
repository for transdisciplinary resilience research and learning (Resilience Alliance 2020).  
 
Major syntheses of work in this domain started appearing around the turn of the millennium 
(Berkes and Folke 1998; Scheffer et al. 2001; Gunderson and Holling 2002; Carpenter et al. 
2003, Folke et al. 2004, Berkes and Folke 1998) which expanded the focus from resilience to 
a broader understanding of social ecological systems (SES), of which resilience was a part. 
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Resilience shifted from being at the centre of the description, to being a part of a much wider 
array of interlinked co-dependent concepts. In addition to resilience and SES, these concepts 
include transformation, panarchy, adaptive management, adaptive capacity, and the adaptive 
cycle. Specific attention was paid to feedbacks, nonlinearity, unpredictability, scale, renewal 
cycles, drivers, system memory, disturbance events, and windows of opportunity (Berkes & 
Ross 2012).  
 
The umbrella term of SES emerged in 1998 in a book by Berkes and Folke, titled ‘Linking 
Social and Ecological Systems: Management Practices and Social Mechanisms for Building 
Resilience’. Until this point, human and ecological systems had mostly been treated as separate 
in the literature. Berkes and Folke (1998) laid out the foundations for bridging this gap between 
disciplines in an integrated approach to understanding the social alongside the ecological. 
Pointing out that “the delineation between social and natural systems is artificial and 
arbitrary” Berkes and Folke (1998, p.4) argued that humans are embedded in the biosphere, 
and that either could not be adequately understood or described without understanding the 
impact they had on each other. This aspect of SES resilience thinking can be understood as 
panarchy, which is described below, and emphasises both its holistic nature, and its 
transdisciplinary approach.  
 In essence, the social-ecological approach emphasizes that people, 
communities, economies, societies, cultures are embedded parts of the 
biosphere and shape ecosystems, from local to global scales, from the past 
to the future. At the same time people, communities, economies, societies, 
cultures are fundamentally dependent on the capacity of the biosphere to 
sustain human development. 
(Folke 2016) 
 
While the concept of resilience emphasises maintaining a preferred stable state over an 
undesirable one, a qualitative approach that accepts change as a constant can make this seem 
somewhat paradoxical. Resilience is not about maintaining constancy, change is inherent. It’s 
about managing change while maintaining desirable system characteristics (Folke 2016). There 
are three concepts that help explain how this occurs; transformation, adaptive management and 
adaptive capacity (Walker et al. 2004; Folke 2006). Transformation is a fundamental feature 
of SES resilience thinking and involves fundamental change. Walker and Salt (2006) describe 
this as: "the capacity to create a fundamentally new system when ecological, economic, and/or 
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social conditions make the existing system untenable." For example, a changing climate may 
make the existing system untenable, such as a farm becoming more drought prone over time. 
The function which they provide (producing food) is an important output, and transformation 
in this context would entail a farm system which has fundamentally changed in order to 
maintain its desired characteristics (production of food).   
 
Transformation, however, is not always required. Adaptability is increasingly important in a 
world driven by climate change and other adverse events where individuals, communities and 
institutions must deliberately change in response to, or anticipation of, external pressures  
(Folke 2006). Walker et al. (2004) define adaptability as: “the capacity of actors in a system 
to influence resilience”. Adaptive management is  a tool to identify uncertainties, chart new 
trajectories and learn about system function (Folke et al. 2002, Gunderson and Holling 2002). 
Adaptive capacity is the capacity of a system to achieve these ends (Walters 1986, Lee 1993). 
The concept of transformability has similar connotations but takes the idea of adaption one step 
further and states that if the current status quo becomes untenable, then actors should seek 
novel paths through transformative change (Walker 2004). Adaptability, and the related 
concepts of adaptive management and adaptive capacity will play an important role throughout 
the rest of this thesis. As section 2.4.4 will elaborate, these concepts are considered to be an 
important dimension of social and human capital in the context of this research. 
 
Bringing these ideas together, is a model of the adaptive cycle (Figure 2.2). Traditional models 
previously emphasised a dichotomy between exploitation and conservation but work done by 
Holling et al. (2002a, 2002b) added two additional functions; release and reorganisation. There 
are four distinct parts of the adaptive cycle, which occur in two phases. The four parts are: (i) 
growth or exploitation, (ii) conservation, (iii) collapse or release, and (iv) reorganization 
(Holling et al 2002a). These four parts are broken down into two phases, the first of which is 
called the fore loop, from exploitation to conservation. This phase is a long period of time 
where following a prior rapid reorganisation, new system characteristics are explored and begin 
to be exploited by resident populations. The length is denoted in the figure by small arrows. 
The second phase, referred to as the back loop, is a rapid phase of release, leading to 
reorganisation (Holling et al 2002b). This occurs after a system has been exploited beyond its 




Figure 2.2 – The Adaptive Cycle (Gunderson and Holling 2002) 
Building on the adaptive cycle, panarchy emphasises the importance of scale. The biosphere is 
one interconnected system made up many interconnected processes which can each be viewed 
as individual systems in their own right (Folke et al. 2011). Gunderson and Holling (2002) 
describe these multiple scales that must be accounted for in SES resilience as nested sets of 
adaptive cycles (Figure 2.3). All systems feature an interacting set of processes which function 
differently at each scale and all systemic interactions are important to understand the whole. 
The adaptive cycle itself does not have direct implications for this research, but the concept of 
panarchy draws attention to the importance of cross scale interactions and the impacts complex 
systems and their component parts have on each other. 
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Figure 2.3 – Panarchy (Gunderson and Holling 2002) 
The final component is resilience. While the concept of resilience has been addressed in an 
ecological sense, its definition within SES resilience thinking has evolved. In early SES 
framings, resilience is described a property of systems, which is their capacity to tolerate 
disruptive events. Where a system is resilient, disturbance is more easily tolerated without 
collapsing into an alternate undesirable stable state. When a system lacks resilience, it is more 
vulnerable to disturbances, and more likely to collapse into an alternate stable state (Gunderson 
and Holling 2002). As noted by Scheffer et al. (2001), once this occurs, reversion back to the 
previous stable state is often expensive, complex or even impossible. This and other associated 
concepts enable and expand resilience thinking. Following the exploration of these concepts, 
Folke (2016) provides a more comprehensive definition of resilience. 
Resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize 
while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, 
structure and feedbacks, & therefore identity, that is, the capacity to 
change in order to maintain the same identity, i.e., resilience is a dynamic 




Defining resilience is complex. Since the turn of the millennium, resilience research has 
exploded in popularity and been adopted by many disciplines (Folke 2016), resulting in 
fragmented and dispersed discourses. What is arguably one of the last pure SES resilience 
syntheses (Biggs et al. 2012) captured seven principles for building resilience. These are: “1) 
maintain diversity and redundancy, 2) manage connectivity, 3) manage slow variables and 
feedbacks, 4) foster complex adaptive systems thinking, 5) encourage learning, 6) broaden 
participation, and 7) promote polycentric governance systems” (Biggs et al. 2015). These 
principles reveal some key themes which are important to take forward. The first principle can 
be seen as a reflection of the tension between efficiency and persistence, as discussed in section 
2.1.1. Principles two, six and seven draw on the importance of social connection. Principles 
three and four refer back to the adaptive cycle and the importance of maintaining capacity, or 
human capital, for this type of analysis.  
 
The purpose of the first part of this literature review has been to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the concept of resilience and how it relates to SES. The two paradigm shifts 
described – an emphasis on qualitative analysis, and the shift to multiple stable states – provide 
a key foundation upon which the results can be analysed. The wider ecosystem of ideas around 
SES resilience thinking, transformation, adaptive management, adaptive capacity, the adaptive 
cycle and panarchy all provide important context. The concept of adaptability, specifically 
adaptive capacity and management feature throughout the results and discussion. Panarchy, 
and its implications, provide additional justifications for the vertical scale of inquiry which 
seeks to understand cross scale interactions. The following section describes the transfer of 
resilience thinking into the social domain, and the insights and challenges that entails. 
2.2 – Social Resilience 
Resilience thinking’s transfer into the social domain drove its adoption in a wide variety of 
disciplines (Folke 2016). This section examines what is entailed by ‘social’ resilience to 
adverse events within both theory and practice, and draws upon the disciplines of psychology, 
disaster risk reduction, sociology and geography in order to outline the key debates.  
 
In psychology a parallel strand of resilience research offers useful insights and complementary 
ideas to SES resilience. Berkes and Ross (2012) integrated psychology and SES theory, which 
was then used to frame debates in disaster risk reduction and climate change adaption (Ungar 
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2018). Current literature on social resilience now uses the combined insights to illustrate the 
social, economic and cultural conditions that preconfigure disaster-related outcomes on local, 
national and global scales (Kelman et al. 2015, Aitsi-Selmi et al. 2016, Zaidi 2018). 
 
The language and terminology of SES resilience has also increasingly permeated policy and 
practice through the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDRR 2015). The 
Sendai Framework is a 15-year voluntary non-binding agreement signed by 187 UN member 
states which aims for “the substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods 
and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, 
businesses, communities and countries.” (UNISDR 2015). Employing resilience concepts 
throughout, the framework explicitly draws upon the SES framing of resilience emphasising 
the need to reduce losses, minimise harm, and address the underlying social conditions which 
are barriers to resilience. It provides a suite of targets, indicators and legislative instruments to 
guide implementation and emphasises shared responsibility for disaster risk reduction amongst 
all stakeholders, including local and national governments and the private sector, to promote 
action.  
 
However, there remains some contention about how resilience thinking should be viewed 
within the social sciences (Brown 2014, Tanner et al. 2015, Cote & Nightingale 2012, 
Davidson 2010, Olsson et al. 2015). A major concern is that the way resilience thinking has 
been developed within ecology has the tendency to obscure dynamics related to power and 
politics, removing them from adequate consideration or rendering them invisible. Additionally, 
factors relating to inequality, oppression, discrimination and how these generate social 
outcomes are also not adequately explored within resilience concepts. Overall, there is a lack 
of consensus on how resilience thinking should be applied (Ungar 2018), with arguments that 
it is problematic or only part of the solution. Definitional issues provide challenges and 
theoretically, its role as a boundary object can be problematic because resilience thinking in 
and of itself explains little – rather it tends to provide the tools for explanation using other 
theories (Alexander 2013). Social theorists primarily argue that resilience does not adequately 
account for the qualitative or normative dimensions (Cote & Nightingale 2012, Cretney 2014, 
Brown 2014), which is driven in part by two additional challenges linked to policy and practice 
(i) the rapid adoption of resilience has led to a loss of nuance in its theoretical interpretation, 
and (ii) the problem of measurement – integration into public bureaucracies is challenging due 
to a quantitative focus.  
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2.2.1 – Early insights from psychology 
Etymologically, the word resilience has a long and varied history (Figure 2.4). In academia, 
Holling (1973) is credited with coining the term as it currently exists, but the word has been in 
use for millennia (Alexander 2013). As a concept, resilience has been present in the social 
sciences since at least the 1950s, originally predominantly in the field of anthropology 
(Herskovistz 1952), and then migrated to psychology in the 1970s (Alexander 2013). The 
development of the concept within psychology occurred during the same time period as 
Holling’s (1970-2000) initial exploration, but the two fields of research remained entirely 
separate until the turn of the millennium (Berkes and Ross 2012). Despite this separation, there 
have been similarities between the two conceptualisations from the beginning. This section 
traces three key developments within the psychological conceptualisation of resilience – the 
importance of the community dynamic, the convergence between SES and psychological 
conceptualisations, and viewing resilience as a process rather than a property, the role stress 
plays in inhibiting good decision making, and a systemic bias that occurs as a consequence. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 – Schematic diagram of the evolution of the term ‘resilience’ (Alexander 2013) 
In psychology, the concept of resilience was initially used to explore why some children had a 
greater ability to withstand and recover from adverse circumstances than others (Garmezy 
1973, Garmezy et al. 1984). This strand of research evolved primarily within health, 
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developmental psychology, community development, and later on, within disaster risk 
reduction literature. One of the major differences compared to the SES conceptualisation is the 
focus on the individual level, as opposed to the system level. Early work attempted to 
understand why some individuals had a better capacity to cope with major disturbances than 
others (Buikstra et al. 2010). It focused on people’s agency, and their ability to prepare for, 
respond to, recover from adverse events and other challenges in their life. As research in this 
area progressed, however, attention shifted from being primarily on the individual, to a greater 
focus on understanding the community and social dynamic (the system level). It became 
apparent that fundamental to an individual’s resilience was the community and social dynamic 
within which they were a part (Paton and Johnson 2001, Berkes and Ross 2012, Paton and 
McClure 2013). In this light, Timmerman (1981, p.20) viewed the concept of resilience as the 
buffering capacity of society against external shocks such as natural disasters.  
 
The distinct silos in which these complementary fields of resilience research operated inhibited 
combined insights until a number of authors attempted to bridge the divide (Adger 2000, 
Ommer 2007, Brown and Westaway 2011, Berkes and Ross 2012, Alexander 2013). The focus 
on community within both SES and psychological resilience is what led Berkes and Ross 
(2012) to call for an integrated approach between the two. When ecological resilience began 
incorporating the social dimension into the analysis, community dynamics became an inherent 
and fundamental part of the system level analysis (Berkes and Folke 1998).  Notably, both 
disciplines investigated resilience from opposing levels. While psychology was concerned 
about the individual, SES resilience focused on the overarching system. However, both fields 
subsequently converged on the importance of community resilience.  
 
Another distinction between psychological and SES resilience theories was how the former 
considered resilience as the outcome of a process, whereas the latter as a property of a system 
(Holling 1973, Folke 2006, Ungar 2018). A core idea within the psychological discipline, is 
that development of resilience is an ongoing process which can be viewed as an outcome, rather 
than a static characteristic of a system (Masten 2014, Ungar 2015a, b, Martin et al. 2016, Ungar 
2018). Resilience as a process involves continual personal development and adaptation in the 
face of adversity (Luthar & Cichetti 2000, Almedom et al. 2007). According to Ungar (2011), 
rather than describing a person, community or society as resilient, it is the human system in 
question that is resilient, because the “system is engaged in a continuous process of acquiring 
and sustaining the resources required to function well under stress” (Ungar 2018).    
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These two conceptualisations of resilience can be further clarified through accepted definitions. 
The SES conceptualisation of resilience concerns itself with the the capacity of a system to 
absorb disturbance and reorganize or transform while undergoing change so as to still retain 
essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks (Walker et al. 2004). In this 
context, resilience is seen as a property, a trait of the system. In contrast, Magis (2010, p410) 
defines community resilience as ‘‘existence, development and engagement of community 
resources by community members to thrive in an environment characterized by change, 
uncertainty, unpredictability and surprise.” In this context, developing the resilience of people 
and communities is seen as a process, of which resilience is an outcome.  
 
Community resilience can therefore be understood as the capacity of a community’s social 
system to come together to work towards a common goal, requiring a continual process of 
adaptation (Berkes and Ross 2012). While the definitions of these two strands of resilience 
research have much in common, the way they approach the concept differs. Psychology built 
its theory by looking at the underlying drivers of individual and community resilience, which 
include stress, adaptation, wellbeing, resource dynamics (Norris et al. 2008, Ungar 2008), 
community resources, collective action, and strategic action (Magis 2010, Ungar 2012). These 
are factors not consistently discussed by SES theorists. Likewise, factors that are lacking 
emphasis in the psychology strand are adaptive cycles, transformability, nonlinearity and the 
multiple levels of functioning – including the ways in which resilience at one level can directly 
impact resilience at other levels. As Alexander (2013, p.2712) notes:   
It does appear that lack of resilience at one level (from the individual to the 
world) can undermine resilience at other levels, but it is not easy to scale up 
psychological resilience to the various social levels, especially community 
resilience. In synthesis, community and societal resilience do not exactly 
amount to the sum of people’s inner resistance. 
Two important insights from psychology literature are elaborated by Kahneman (2012), a 
psychologist and economist notable for his work on decision-making and judgement. The first 
is further clarification on the role stress plays during adverse events. Psychologically, stress 
can impact people’s abilities to think rationally and make good decisions, which is especially 
important in a disaster context. This is referred to as executive functioning. As Shields et al. 
(2016, p.1) note: “Core executive functions such as working memory, inhibition, and cognitive 
flexibility are integral to daily life. A growing body of research has suggested that acute stress 
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may impair core executive functions.” Kahneman (2012) describes two systems of thinking, 
called system 1 and system 2. System 1 is “fast, automatic, frequent, emotional, stereotypic, 
unconscious”, whereas system 2 is “slow, effortful, infrequent, logical, calculating, 
conscious”. During highly stressful periods such as adverse events, we default to using system 
1 thinking (Kahneman 2012). This response evolved in order to keep humans safe during 
periods of high danger, such as animal attacks, for survival. But for adverse events which 
require critical thinking as well as adaptive capacity and management system 2 thinking is 
more valuable.  
 
The second insight from cognitive psychology also comes from Kahneman (2012) where he 
describes human biases and their effect on judgements and decision-making. A general trait 
shared by all humans is a systemic bias that Kahneman calls ‘what you see is all there is.’ When 
faced with a decision, the human mind generally only considers what it knows, and rarely 
considers what it does not know. This concept is akin to that of known knowns, known 
unknowns, and unknown unknowns which emerged in cognitive psychology (Luft and Inghan 
1955) and was popularised by Donald Rumsfeld (2002). This insight plays an important role 
in describing the outcomes of certain institutional decision-making processes. 
 
This section has presented two separate views of resilience and demonstrated that they are 
complementary (Berkes and Folke 2012). The distinctions and similarities provide important 
insights which will be used to inform the analysis and discussion of this research. The focus 
on community is reflected in the methodology, and the distinction between resilience as a 
characteristic and as the outcome of a process emphasises the important role institutional 
responses play in adverse event outcomes. The next section will explore the field of disaster 
risk reduction, which looks at the way in which institutions, such as governments and private 
organisations, interact with the population they represent, and how this has significant 
implications for the behaviours of those populations, and therefore their resilience. 
2.2.2 – Disaster risk reduction: theory 
Societies around the world are exposed to natural processes that present a risk to life and 
livelihoods (Paton and McClure 2013). Governments spend significant amounts of money 
supporting risk reduction efforts with the intention of improving preparation to mitigate 
disaster risk (Paton and Johnson 2001). However, research findings show that despite these 
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efforts, levels of preparation at the individual and community scale remain below levels 
commensurate with investment (Lindell and Whitney 2000). Significant work has been 
undertaken to understand why this occurs, and how to enhance preparedness (Paton and 
Johnston 2001). Subsequent research from Paton and McClure (2013) draws attention to the 
psychological factors that influence our ability and intention to prepare, and note the 




Figure 2.5 – Multiple scales impacting disaster preparedness (Paton and McClure 2013). 
Figure 2.5 illustrates that negative outcome expectancy, denial, or fatalism at the individual 
level can cause people to neglect important protective factors at multiple scales such as the 
family, community and societal level, which negatively impacts on their preparedness for 
adverse events (Paton and McClure 2013). Conversely, traits such as positive outcome 
expectancy, self-efficacy, critical awareness and responsibility means that they engage in 
certain activities at the family, community and societal level which positively impact their 
preparedness for adverse events (Paton and McClure 2013). This is an example of how 
psychological and SES resilience converge – psychology focuses on understanding and 
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accounting for cognitive traits at an individual level but does not adequately deal with the 
broader societal system. Conversely, SES resilience focuses on the system level, but does not 
adequately describe the individual level factors. Both converge on the community dynamic as 
a key area of importance (Alexander 2013), which allows for unique insights at all scales to be 
integrated for a holistic approach to resilience.  
 
Multiple studies have tested how preparedness differs depending on cultural characteristics 
(Paton and Johnston 2001, Paton et al. 2004, Paton et al. 2010, Paton and McClure 2013). 
These studies found that while differences between individualistic and collective cultures 
played some role in preparedness, it was engagement with different scales (family, community, 
society) that was the primary driver for positive preparedness outcomes (Paton and McClure 
2013). Particularly relevant to this research, Paton et al. (2010, p.778) note that: 
Whether or not people can advance their preparedness planning will then 
be a function of the quality of the relationship with the wider society, 
particularly with regard to the ability and willingness of civil defence and 
emergency management agencies to interact with communities in ways that 
empower them rather than imposing solutions upon them. 
This is consistent with a recent shift in SES resilience thinking that emphasises a participatory 
turn – an emphasis on co-producing knowledge – to bridge the gap between science and policy 
(Vallance 2014; Kwok 2016; Cradock-Henry 2019). A number of recent studies have relied on 
participatory and qualitative methods to obtain ‘thick information’ about local conditions 
(Young et al. 2010; Naess 2013; Cradock-Henry et al 2018) and effective engagement with all 
stakeholders is seen as key to delivering good outcomes.  
 
Cutter (2008; 2014; 2016) attempted to develop quantitative measures of community disaster 
resilience in the United States in order to operationalise resilience concepts. She noted the 
relationship between social vulnerability and community resilience and used the social 
vulnerability index as a proxy for community resilience. However, her findings suggest that 
while there is a correlation between high levels of social vulnerability and low levels of 
resilience, high levels of social vulnerability do not necessitate low levels of resilience. This 
serves to illustrate a critical point - that what makes one community resilient does necessarily 
not transfer easily to others through techniques reliant upon quantitative measurement. Context 
is vital – the engagement between different scales within communities is an important 
determinant of preparedness (Paton and McClure 2013) and social resilience (Aldrich 2015) – 
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but is intangible, not easily measurable. Public bureaucracies use metrics, quantifiable ‘results’ 
of interventions and investments as a mechanism to demonstrate accountability and good 
decision-making (Hallegate and Engle 2018). However, this is a blunt instrument for measuring 
social resilience, and fails to take into account a myriad of intangible factors that play an 
important role in community resilience, such as sense of community and place, trust, 
connectedness, shared experience and cultural factors (Carpenter et al. 2001; Arbon et al. 2016; 
Cretney 2016; Kaika 2017). 
 
The inability to measure key factors related to social resilience presents significant challenges 
which are described as ‘the problem of measurement’ and addressed directly in the section 
2.3.2. The next section describes how resilience concepts are being adopted in policy and 
practice.  
2.2.3 – Disaster risk reduction: policy and practice 
The primary aim of this research is to understand how the institutional responses to recent 
adverse events in the Hurunui have impacted farmers social resilience. Using the foundation 
of social resilience theory described above, attention is now drawn to the institutional response, 
which requires an application of SES resilience in the social domain. Increasing losses from 
natural hazard events worldwide have accelerated the development of policy aimed at reducing 
risk and vulnerability while increasing resilience (Cutter et al. 2015). Multiple international 
policy frameworks – including the United Nations’ Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCC), the Sustainable Development Goals, and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction – now all use the language and terminology of resilience to frame and guide action 
towards global sustainability as part of the wider development agenda (Hajer et al. 2015, 
Ocampo and Gómez-Arteaga 2016). Resilience concepts are used to manage the impacts and 
implications of natural hazards, drawing attention to the social, economic and cultural 
conditions that influence disaster-related outcomes locally, nationally and globally (Kelman et 
al. 2015, Aitsi-Selmi et al. 2016, Zaidi 2018). Most importantly, reducing vulnerability and 
building resilience are now seen as occurring in parallel, rather than as competing concepts, 
converging towards the improvement of societal outcomes (Miller et al. 2010, Turner 2010, 
Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010, Lei et al. 2014, Connelly et al. 2017).  
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The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction provides a focal point for governments to 
align efforts on disaster risk reduction (UNISDR, 2015). It has rapidly accelerated research to 
address the social, economic and environmental conditions that preconfigure disaster (Kelman 
et al. 2015). A 15-year voluntary non-binding agreement, the Sendai Framework has been 
signed by 187 UN member states (UNISDR 2015), including New Zealand, and its stated aim 
is: “the substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in 
the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, 
communities and countries” (UNISDR 2015). The framework emphasises shared responsibility 
for disaster risk reduction across different systems and scales, with local and national 
governments, the private sector, and other stakeholders all having significant roles to play 
(Aitsi-Selmi et al. 2015). It also explicitly links reducing losses and minimising harm with the 
need to address underlying social conditions, and includes targets, indicators and legislative 
instruments to guide implementation.  
 
However, translating resilience thinking into practice continues to challenge policy makers. 
Targets, indicators and legislative instruments as mechanisms for practical implementation in 
policy and practice do not account for the qualitative approaches that are integral to SES 
resilience thinking. Additionally, as will be examined in section 2.4.5, ideological shifts have 
entailed a focus on quantitative metrics to inform evidence-based policy development. The 
consequences of this have resulted in three core interlinked issues for operationalising SES 
resilience thinking. These three problems - nuance, measurement, and an inability to 
adequately incorporate the normative aspects of social theory – are discussed next.  
2.3 – Challenges for operationalising social resilience 
The new emphasis on resilience within the public sphere, due to its inclusion within Sendai 
and other high level international strategy initiatives, has prompted critical reflection from 
practitioners, policy makers and academics on the significance (Pimm et al. 2019), value 
(Salomon et al. 2019) and practical application of resilience concepts (Liu 2014, Bronen 2015, 
Cradock-Henry et al. 2019, Wither et al. 2021). This thesis, and therefore this section, focuses 
on the operational difficulties associated with resilience thinking. However. the three problems 
outlined provide practical examples which help illustrate the theoretical problems social 
scientists raise related to power and political dynamics as well.  
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2.3.1 – Nuance 
Resilience concepts provide unique insights and powerful tools to analyse the dynamic 
interactions between the natural environment and human activity. However, the practical 
application of resilience thinking presents some fundamental challenges, the first being that the 
rapid, and in some cases uncritical, adoption of resilience thinking into mainstream policy and 
practice has led to a simplified version of the concept achieving mainstream dominance. For 
example, the Sendai Framework defines resilience as: 
The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, 
absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a 
timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and 
restoration of its essential basic structures and functions (Sendai 
Framework 2015). 
This definition of resilience has become normalised, and it overemphasises the importance of 
‘bouncing back’ to the previous state, while overlooking the importance of ‘bouncing forward’, 
i.e., to consider adaptive or transformative pathways to change as outlined in part one (Walker 
2006; Brundiers and Eakin 2018; Folke 2016). This tension between bouncing back, or 
bouncing forward, illustrates the simplification of what resilience thinking entails within the 
policy and practice domains. The simplification of resilience concepts can be related to both of 
the key paradigm shifts examined in the first part of this chapter. Bouncing back implies a 
return to normal or equilibrium, in contrast to the world of multiple stable states described in 
section 2.1.1. This is somewhat semantic, as the Sendai definition does not preclude the 
possibility, but there is little discussion of the nuance behind resilience, and so prevailing 
notions, such as natural equilibrium theory, win out over important but not well recognised 
theoretical advances, such as a world of multiple stable states. The second paradigm shift 
provides a more accessible example and leads into the second challenge for implementing 
resilience into practice – the problem of measurement. Holling’s (1973; 1996) initial distinction 
between engineering resilience and SES resilience emphasised qualitative approaches over 
quantitative. Engineering resilience focuses on efficiency, constancy, certainty and 
predictability, whereas SES emphasises persistence, uncertainty, unpredictability and change 
(Table 1). This distinction is of particular importance to the field of disaster risk reduction, a 




Holling’s (1973, p.1) observation that “this orientation may simply reflect an analytic approach 
developed in one area because it was useful and then transferred to another where it may not 
be,” illustrates the problem. The dominant paradigm in ecology, natural equilibrium theory, 
had been influenced by scientific methods in classical physics (Holling 1973), however, due to 
differing fundamental assumptions about external conditions (predictable vs unpredictable, 
constancy vs change etc), applying ideas from physics to ecosystems was ill-founded (Holling 
1996). In the field of disaster risk reduction, approaches to resilience thinking in policy and 
practice through the targets and indicators emphasised by the Sendai Framework are more 
reminiscent of engineering resilience. As section 2.3.5 will discuss, this is the dominant 
approach to institutional governance, yet it is not effective within a disaster context. In disaster 
risk reduction, an SES resilience approach that focuses on long-term persistence by dealing 
with uncertainty and change (Table 1) is likely to be more effective than a quantitative approach 
focused on predictability. This nuance and the complexity surrounding resilience thinking is 
conspicuously absent in the simplified definitions that are rapidly becoming embedded in 
policy and practice. For resilience thinking to be an effective antidote to negative outcomes of 
disaster, it is important for intangible sources of value to be accounted for in institutional 
decision-making structures. 
2.3.2 – Measurement 
The problem of measurement is the second challenge for resilience thinking in policy and 
practice (Carpenter et al. 2001; Arbon et al. 2016; Kaika 2017; Pimm et al. 2019; Salomon et 
al. 2019). As discussed in relation to Cutter’s (2008) early work in disaster risk reduction, 
integrating resilience thinking into existing governance mechanisms in the face of climate 
change and other disruptive hazard events is difficult (Dovers and Hezri 2010, Nalau and 
Handmer 2015, Adger et al. 2018). Evidence that demonstrates effective decision making is 
required for accountability, and most often requires measurable indicators (Hallegatte and 
Engle 2019). However, such metrics fail to account for context and the intangible aspects of 
resilience (Cutter et al. 2014). Paton (2013) and Kwok et al. (2016) have developed indicators 
for community resilience in the New Zealand context (Table 2.2), using participatory methods 
with relevant stakeholders. Kwok et al. (2016) divided community resilience indicators into 
two separate categories: structural and cognitive. Cognitive factors tend to be characteristics of 
the individual and their worldview, such as personal attributes, cultural factors, and community 
engagement. Structural factors tend to refer to institutional and infrastructure arrangements, 
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such as educational attainment, language competency, health care capacity and transportation 
access.  
 
Structural Indicators Cognitive Indicators 
Educational attainment Outcome expectancy 
Pre-retirement age Action coping/self-efficacy 
Transportation access Critical awareness 
Communication capacity Responsibility 
(English) Language competency Trust 
Food provisioning capacity Place attachment 
Non-special needs Sense of community 
Health insurance coverage Community Participation 
Health care capacity Empowerment 
 
Table 2.2 Social Resilience Indicators (Adapted after Kwok et al. 2016) 
Structural indicators of resilience, such as educational attainment and health insurance 
coverage, are easily measured, in contrast with cognitive indicators which require a deep, 
qualitative and contextual consideration to be fully understood (Kwok et al. 2016). The Sendai 
Framework encourages adoption through quantitative instruments such as targets, indicators 
and legislative instruments, which has the perverse outcome of negating the importance of 
intangible indicators of resilience. While Carpenter et al. (2009) emphasised the importance of 
avoiding the trap of measuring what is easy, rather than what is important, the adage ‘what gets 
measured, gets done’ suggests that if something cannot be measured, it is frequently ignored. 
This is the point made by Stiglitz et al. (2018, p.13), who stated: “What we measure affects 
what we do. If we measure the wrong thing, we will do the wrong thing. If we don’t measure 
something, it becomes neglected, as if the problem didn’t exist.” The key point, which will be 
drawn upon throughout this thesis, is that there is fundamentally important value that is 
intangible, which gets neglected due to challenges in measuring it.   
 
Universally quantifiable indicators for resilience are imperfect due to their complexity and 
context dependant nature (Hallegatte and Engle 2019), especially for subjective measures such 
as trust or sense of community (Berkes and Ross 2013). Scales to measure these concepts do 
exist, but interpretation and attribution is complex, contextual, and not readily transferrable 
(OECD 2013). Proxy indicators can provide a partial solution however these can lead to 
significant pitfalls and perverse incentives (Carpenter et al. 2001, Birkmann 2007, Dakos et al. 
2015). Goodhart’s law (Strathern 1997) states: “When a measure becomes a target, it ceases 
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to be a good measure.” Hallegate and Engle (2018) suggest an approach involving co-creation 
of process-based indicators for intangible phenomena. For example, a priori development of 
quantitative indicators for trust could be built into the policy design phase to ensure it is 
adequately accounted for, rather than during ex post outcome evaluations. However, this would 
not be a solution in isolation, and must be part of a broader set of measures. Ultimately, social 
resilience cannot be reduced down to simplistic indicators or targets. The impacts and 
implications of disruptive events are not readily transferable across multiple domains and 
contexts. 
2.3.3 – Norms 
This leads into the third challenge for resilience thinking – an inability to account for the 
normative dimensions of social theory (Cote and Nightingale 2012, Olsson et al. 2015, Tanner 
et al. 2015 Calderón-Contreras and White 2019). Social theorists argue that resilience thinking 
fails to account for questions related to structure, agency, power and justice, and they argue for 
a qualitative approach that accounts for these intangible factors (Bahadur and Tanner 2014, 
Cretney and Bond 2014, Taubenböck and Geiß 2014). While early SES literature did consider 
the effectiveness of different governance arrangements (Adger 2004) – often in the context of 
managing common pool resources – there was little accounting for the social processes that 
shaped and influenced local conditions. Walker (2006), for example, acknowledged that some 
systems may only be desirable for a subset of the population and undesirable for another, but 
did not examine the social inequalities, rights or power relations that shaped it. As resilience 
becomes more widely applied in policy and practice, the need for critical reflection on its 
relevance for addressing social issues becomes more pronounced. 
 
Brown (2014) argues that the concept of resilience has been co-opted by the elites as a 
mechanism for maintaining the status quo and Tanner et al. (2017, p.17) states that resilience 
has “become a tool through which neoliberal ideas and discourses are perpetuated and 
embedded in particular governance systems.” Another way to address this problem is by 
asking the question ‘Resilience to what? For whom?’ (Cretney 2014, Cutter 2015, p.1). This 
question draws attention to the fact that resilience is contextually dependent, and not 
necessarily always positive. For example, intergenerational cycles of violence and poverty are 
extremely resilient (Cutter 2008), but not positive. In response to these criticisms, there is 
evidence for a social turn in resilience thinking (Brown 2014), and greater attention on not just 
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what we do, but how and why (Kaika 2017). More emphasis is now being placed upon ‘co-
creating’ resilience solutions, and on public participation in disaster recovery processes, 
including academic research in post-disaster contexts (Cretney 2016). Research is becoming 
less something that is done ‘for’ people and instead being done ‘with’ people (Vallance 2015, 
Kwok et al. 2016, Kaika 2017, Cradock-Henry et al. 2019, Gaillard and Peek 2019). As the 
Sendai Framework states, shared engagement amongst all stakeholders is vital (UNISDR 
2015). However, questions still remain about the notion of value, and how it can be adequately 
accounted for systemically.  
 
Finally, it must be noted that the three challenges discussed in this section are all interlinked. 
The transition of resilience from ecology into the social sciences was rapid and uncritical. 
Existing institutional processes have led to a quantitative focus for disaster resilience, the 
problems with which are illustrated in the earliest work on the subject (Holling 1973). The 
quantitative approach has resulted in an inability for resilience concepts to adequately address 
the normative aspects of social theory and problems of measurement – a failure to account for 
subjective or not easily quantifiable value in society such as trust, connection or sense of 
community.  
2.3.4 – Insights from recent rural resilience literature in New Zealand 
Recent literature examining social resilience in rural New Zealand engages with many of the 
challenges and insights presented so far in this chapter (McManus et al. 2012; Pomeroy 2016; 
Fielke et al. 2017; Payne et al. 2018; Pomeroy 2019; Payne et al. 2021). McManus et al. (2012) 
emphasise the importance of robust engagement between farmers and the wider community 
for resilience, while Pomeroy (2016) highlights the important role intangible cultural heritage 
plays in resilience. Pomeroy (2019, p.1) specifically notes how government development 
programmes and legislation have privileged established interests in rural areas while neglecting 
“Māori economic growth, the participation of women, and non-farm sectors of rural society, 
to the detriment of all.” Payne et al. (2018; 2021) describe attempts to quantitatively assess 
resilience, noting that quantitative measurement is required for policy operationalisation, yet 
results show difficulties finding non-context specific measures – consistent with the problem 
of measurement. Many of the most recent papers now reference multi-capital frameworks and 
capital concepts to describe resilience, especially the intangible aspects related to social 
resilience (Pomeroy 2016; Fielke et al. 2018; Payne et al. 2021).  
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Examples described in these papers support the findings of this literature review. For example, 
Fielke et al. (2018) investigated four case studies in New Zealand using a capital-based 
framework to benchmark community resilience. A resilience framework which considered 
social, cultural, economic, institutional and environmental dimensions was used to analyse the 
results. Results showed that the dimensions most impactful on resilience depended on the 
cultural makeup of the community. The population of one of the cases, Wairoa, was 60% 
indigenous Māori, and resilience traits were markedly different in this community compared 
to communities with a higher proportion of Pākeha (European) residents.  
“In Wairoa, the broad social, cultural and institutional dimensions were 
found to be increasingly important to the overall resilience of the region. 
The economic dimension, however, despite indicating significant decline, 
became less of a focal point for the researchers as the region seemed to be 
resilient in spite of declining economic indicators” (Fielke et al 2018, 
p.330).  
This finding highlights the importance of the cultural context of a community, which is 
observed to influence resilience through social and cultural dimensions to a much greater extent 
than traditional economic indicators. Cutter (2008) explicitly draws attention to the problem of 
measurement, highlighting the challenges associated with identifying standards and metrics for 
measuring disaster resilience across multiple communities. 
 
Multi-capital frameworks are becoming adopted as a tool to address the challenges for 
operationalising resilience concepts. The next section examines multi-capital frameworks, and 
the institutional context in which they arose.  
2.4 – Multi-capital frameworks & Neoliberalism 
A key aim of this research is to illustrate the affects that institutional arrangements have on 
social resilience, using the case study of adverse events in the Hurunui. The literature review, 
until now, has focused on illuminating the concept of resilience – both what it means, as well 
as some of the key challenges. As noted previously, one of the major criticisms resilience 
thinking faces is that it does not adequately account for the roles that politics and power play 
in society. Given that politics and power are important components of institutional 
arrangements, a framework that accounts for these dimensions in a resilience context is 
necessary. Identifying and incorporating a framework that fits this purpose required fulfilling 
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two key criteria; firstly, it had to be compatible with resilience thinking, and secondly it had to 
be able to transfer between multiple contexts.  
 
This research investigates how institutional arrangements affect the social resilience of farmer 
households in the Hurunui from the perspectives of those who experienced it, those who 
responded, and those who organised the response. Accordingly, the framework selected to 
analyse institutional arrangements needs to be able to analyse and provide an explanatory basis 
for factors occurring in both institutional decision-making structures as well as their outcomes 
at the coalface. There are, for example, alternative literatures in rural research that focus on 
rural community formation, the cultural politics of rural areas as well as how myriad third 
sector organisations help to provide meeting-places and ‘glue’ for the community (Scoones 
1998). While these literatures may offer relevant articulations of resilience at the local level, 
they do not provide compelling explanations of institutional arrangements. Equally, there are 
many theoretical frameworks that explain institutional arrangements, but these do not transfer 
easily to the local level and are not always compatible with resilience thinking. The Living 
Standards Framework, a multi-capital framework, was selected for use in this thesis because it 
most suitably fits the criteria required. Multi-capital frameworks are compatible with resilience 
thinking with no theoretical adjustments required, and they are also transferable between 
multiple contexts and can be used to analyse both institutional arrangements as well as the farm 
-level impacts of institutional responses. 
 
Multi-capital frameworks emerged from the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach and the 
literature suggests that they can be used as a tool to help describe and analyse resilience 
concepts (Tanner et al, 2015; Ostadtaghizadeh et al. 2015). Originally conceptualised in 
development studies (Morse and McNamara 2013), multi-capital frameworks use economic 
concepts of wealth creation, ‘capital’, to describe the key factors for sustainable livelihoods. 
Compared to resilience thinking, a multi-capital approach places greater emphasis on the 
different needs of people in different contexts, which allows for normative factors such as 
structure, agency, empowerment and trust to be incorporated into the analysis (Tanner et al. 
2015). While multi-capital frameworks show potential in combination with resilience theory, 
these links have not yet been widely explored (Tanner et el. 2015; Zhao et al. 2019). 
 
The final part of this chapter will explore how multi-capital frameworks emerged from the 
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach and describe the Living Standards Framework. The Living 
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Standards Framework is a multi-capital framework designed by the New Zealand government 
to better account for all sources of value in policy design and is aligned with National Disaster 
Resilience Strategy (2019) to help analyse resilience outcomes. The final section will outline 
the New Zealand institutional context and elaborate on how neoliberal restructuring that began 
four decades ago, provides critical context for understanding how institutional arrangements in 
New Zealand affect social resilience during and after adverse events.  
2.4.1 – Precipitating context for the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach 
Cowen and Shenton (1998) describe two basic forms of development that take place – 
immanent development and intentional development. Immanent development, or ‘what people 
are doing anyway’ describes emergent development that occurs generally through 
advancement in a wide variety of fields such as science, medicine and the arts. In contrast, 
intentional development is a focused and directed process where institutions such as 
governments and NGOs set out to pursue specific development goals (Morse and McNamara 
2013, p.15). These development processes are reflected in disaster risk reduction, where 
immanent development continues to occur alongside focused intentional development now 
guided by the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. 
 
The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) originated in the field of development studies 
and is generally conceptualised within the sphere of intentional development (Morse & 
McNamara 2013). Intentional development is a relatively new concept and Morse and 
McNamara (2013) argue that it became a significant type of development following World 
War II. The establishment of the Bretton Woods agreement paved the way for Western powers 
to aid developing nations with their scientific and technical expertise through newly created 
institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
 
However, it is argued that in the shadow of the Cold War interventionist development through 
global institutions became a tool to promote capitalism and prevent countries from adopting a 
communist economic outlook (Pieterse 1998; Schuurman 2000; Matthews 2004; Toner and 
Franks 2006). In this context, Escobar (1992, p.413) described intentional development as the 
“ideological expression of the expansion of post-World War II capitalism.” Aiding the 
disadvantaged residing in countries experiencing intentional development was relegated to a 
secondary role (Morse and McNamara 2013).  
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The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach was developed in response to this context, where 
intentional development through global institutions did not adequately address or account for 
negative development outcomes (Morse and McNamara 2013). To address these challenges, 
the SLA developed multi-capital frameworks as a tool to help institutions account for all 
factors, tangible and intangible, relevant to sustainable livelihoods in their decision-making 
processes. This thesis adopts multi-capital frameworks as a tool to describe and analyse how 
institutional responses to adverse events (which can be classified as intentional development) 
have affected the social resilience of farmers in the Hurunui, particularly with regard to the 
intangible factors that are not easily quantifiable.  
2.4.2 – The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach 
The concept of the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach originated in the 1992 Earth Summit 
held in Rio, specifically within the Agenda for the 21st Century. One of the key goals of Agenda 
21 was to ensure that all people “had the opportunity to earn a sustainable livelihood” 
(Perrings 1994). While this event was key in formulating the term SLA, the development of 
the concept has involved gradual refinement as it became better understood (Perrings 1994). 
Like SES resilience thinking, it is a complex body of work that has grown organically around 
a key idea (Morse and McNamara 2013). The SLA seeks to make the intentional development 
process more effective with a key focus on helping the disadvantaged, and therefore tends to 
be applied and best understood within developing countries. This, as will be discussed further 
in section 2.4.4, entails some challenges for the New Zealand context. SLA interventions can 
take place in many forms and significant attention is paid to solutions that involve 
strengthening resilience to economic, environmental or social stresses (Morse and McNamara 
2013). Like resilience, precisely defining the SLA is somewhat difficult. Carney (1998) 
provides a simple definition:  
A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses 
and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now 
and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base. 
This definition is particularly useful as it illustrates some of the parallels between the SLA and 
the concept of resilience and demonstrates the emphasis on maintaining capabilities despite 
external shocks. However, Carswell (1997, p.10) argues that these types of definitions are 
“unclear, inconsistent and relatively narrow”, which he describes as problematic because it 
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adds to the conceptual muddle. Chambers and Conway (1992, p. 7), offer a more 
comprehensive SLA definition that has been adopted by the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID), as well as the Institute for Development Studies (IDS), which states: 
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims 
and access) and activities required for a means of living; a livelihood is 
sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, 
maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable 
livelihood opportunities for the next generation; and which contributes net 
benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the short 
and long-term.  
This definition draws attention to key capabilities and assets which is important for two 
reasons; (i) it draws attention to capacity for action, such as adaptive capacity (discussed in 
section 2.1.2), and (ii) it reemphasises the key shift away from viewing livelihoods through a 
primarily economic lens. Instead, significant emphasis is placed upon a holistic approach which 
seeks to understand the broader social, environmental and structural factors. These key assets, 
known as the five capitals, are foundational to the SLA framework and summarised by Scoones 
(1998), Morse and McNamara (2013) and Frieling (2018) as: 
 
1) Natural Capital: All aspects of the natural environment which are required to support 
human life, such as land, water and air quality, favourable climates and biodiversity.  
2) Economic Capital: includes all financial assets such as cash, credit, debt, stocks and 
bonds. 
3) Physical Capital: refers to infrastructure, such as houses, roads, railways, hospitals, 
factories, equipment and vehicles.  
4) Human Capital: the assets that enable people to participate fully in life’s activities 
such as work, study and recreation. It includes knowledge, skills and mental and 
physical health.  
5) Social Capital: encompasses the values and norms that are foundational to society. It 
includes cultural identity, social networks, community, trust, connectedness, 
affiliations, associations, the rule of law, and in New Zealand, the Crown-Maori 
relationship. 
These capital concepts form the foundation of multi-capital frameworks and take a holistic 
view of what is required for livelihoods to persist sustainably over time – including specific 
focus on the social dimension and valuing intangible factors (King et al. 2018). The list of 
capitals above is not exhaustive, for example cultural capital is not present explicitly, but is 
nested within social capital (New Zealand Treasury 2018). In this respect the framework has 
flexibility to deal with a wide range of contexts and scales of analysis.  
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Scoones (1998) elaborates on the wider context in which the SLA was developed, focusing on 
key factors for sustainable rural livelihoods in developing contexts (Figure 2.6). Specific 
attention is paid to the importance of context and institutional processes which provides 




Figure 2.6 – A framework for analysing sustainable rural livelihoods (Scoones 1998, p.4).  
Applying Scoones’ (1998) framework, adverse events would come under the contexts and 
conditions column on the left of Figure 2.6, which are then analysed through capital stocks 
which influence and are influenced by institutional processes. It should be noted that this 
diagram is created for use in developing countries, so not all of the factors relevant to the New 
Zealand context are accounted for. It does, however, provide general signposts for what is 
important to look at, such as robust institutional processes for rural livelihood outcomes 
analysed through multiple capital stocks.  
 
Scoones (1998) was initially sceptical about the value of SLA because of the focus on short 
term adaptation rather than transformation at the system level (Scoones 2009). Additionally, 
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(O’Laughlin 2002) argues that the framework fails to adequately account for the local, 
institutional, and historical context. Scoones (2015) revisits these critiques, stating he is “more 
convinced of the need to firmly embrace a political perspective that sees local and wider 
structural change as part of the same analysis” (Scoones 2015, p.xvi). Additionally, he notes 
a greater understanding of the political economy is required. This thesis uses resilience 
concepts to describe the local, institutional and historical context and incorporate a greater 
understanding of the determining structural political economic factors. Multi-capital 
frameworks are incorporated as a tool to describe and analyse of the relevant factors of 
resilience, tangible and intangible.  
 
There are significant parallels between the SLA and SES resilience thinking. Some of the key 
similarities include: (i) both are situated within complex systems theory and take a holistic 
approach to understanding all of the key factors that relate to their intended purpose; (ii) each 
approach considers long term persistence, the SLA is explicitly focused on the livelihoods of 
people whereas resilience thinking is more generalised to the wider system; and (iii) Different 
scales of analysis, such as individual/household/region, are seen as critical context (Scoones 
1998). The key difference between the SLA and SES resilience thinking is that the SLA 
focused on the effective operationalisation of intentional development to improve livelihood 
outcomes, while SES is focused on theoretically describing resilience concepts that influence 
the long-term persistence of systems. The multi-capital approach offers significant advantages 
for operationalisation, and the similarities between the two approaches mean that multi-capital 
frameworks can inform and guide SES resilience thinking without significant theoretical 
adjustments. 
 
The next section presents a detailed analysis of social and human capital concepts. 
2.4.3 – Social and human Capital 
Multi-capital frameworks represent value using different types of capital including natural, 
financial, physical, social and human capital. This thesis primarily draws upon the concepts of 
social and human capital, and it is important to establish the reasons behind this focus. The 
purpose of this thesis is to understand how institutional responses to adverse events have 
affected social resilience using the Hurunui as a case study. The results will illustrate that the 
current institutional arrangements in New Zealand do not adequately account for intangible 
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sources of value or capital in their decision-making structures, which negatively impacts  
factors related to social resilience. It is important to acknowledge that all capital concepts are 
observed to play an important role in livelihoods and resilience, including some, such as 
cultural or political capital, which are not explicitly described in the Sustainable Livelihoods 
Approach. Social and human capital are drawn on explicitly in the context of this research 
because they provide the primary means to describe and address the intangible factors which 
are unaccounted for in institutional decision-making structures. One of the primary factors in 
selecting these two capitals was their relevance to the rural, agricultural context of the Hurunui 
district. Fielke et al. (2018), for example, highlighted the importance of cultural capital when 
presenting an analysis of four different case studies. The selection of cultural capital as a 
specific focus was justified by the contexts in which the research was undertaken i.e. diverse 
communities where some had a significant indigenous population. The Hurunui context 
required a focus on the social dimensions of resilience where social and human capital were 
the most appropriate concepts to apply. 
 
This section examines the theory underlying the concepts of social and human capital.  
 
The concept of social capital was introduced by Tocqueville (1863) who saw the strength of 
America’s democracy lying in the tendency of its citizens to pursue their common goals by 
forming civil associations. He argued that these associations had a positive impact on their 
education, collaboration and public awareness, fostering solidarity which helped maintain civil 
society (Tocqueville 1863, p.130). Durkheim (1893), a prominent social theorist, had similar 
thoughts and saw the groups that people formed as an antidote to the “social anomie and self-
destruction” that followed the industrial revolution. However, many authors (Ferragina 2012, 
Frieling 2018, Giorgas 2007) note Lyda Hanifan (1916) as one of the first true proponents of 
the concept. Hanifan was the state supervisor of rural schools in West Virginia, and he used 
social capital to explain why community involvement was important for successful schools.  
I do not refer to real estate, or to personal property or to cold cash, but 
rather to that in life which tends to make these tangible substances count 
for most in the daily lives of people, namely, goodwill, fellowship, mutual 
sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families 
who make up a social unit… If he may come into contact with his 
neighbour, and they with other neighbours, there will be an accumulation 
of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his social needs and which 
may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of 
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living conditions in the whole community. The community as a whole will 
benefit by the cooperation of all its parts, while the individual will find in 
his associations the advantages of the help, the sympathy, and the 
fellowship of his neighbours. 
Hanifan 1916, pp.130-131 
 
Despite these initial forays into social capital as a concept, the idea lost prominence and 
remained out of the public conversation until the 1980s. Since then, the seminal works from 
authors such as Pierre Bourdieu (1985), James Coleman (1988) and Robert Putnam (2000) 
have revived the concept of social capital - creating modern foundations for this research to 
draw upon. Bourdieu (1985) defined social capital as: 
...the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition...which provides 
each of its members with the backing of collectively-owned capital (1985, 
p.248).  
The most useful insight this research gains from Bourdieu is his argument that social capital is 
not independent of other capitals, but fundamentally linked to them (Giorgas 2007).  
 
Coleman’s work on social capital is grounded in functionalism and draws upon both 
sociological and economic theories. Coleman (1988) was particularly interested in 
understanding the relationship between educational achievement and social inequality, making 
family relationships his primary area of interest. Coleman (1988) uses three examples to 
illustrate social capital. Firstly, in the wholesale diamond markets of Brooklyn, New York, 
Jewish diamond merchants will exchange their wares (sometimes worth hundreds of thousands 
of dollars) with other merchants for them to inspect at their own leisure. This is done without 
any formal insurance against fraud or theft. It is the family connections, sense of community 
and religious affiliations that ensure honourable conduct among these merchants. This is an 
example of how social networks, trust and cultural identity can be seen as a form of social 
capital. 
 
The second example uses South Korean radical activists as an example of what came to be 
known as bonding, bridging and linking social capital. These South Korean radical activists 
formed ‘study groups’ with strong ties due to growing up in the same hometown/school/church. 
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However, the groups were also ‘bridged’ and ‘linked’ by appointed representatives who 
facilitated connections between different isolated study groups through trusted representatives 
ensuring the clandestine nature of their political dissent. In the third example, Coleman (1988) 
describes the difference in social capital between a suburb of Detroit and Jerusalem. A mother 
of six children had moved to Jerusalem as she felt safer letting her young children travel across 
town in order to go to the park - something which she was not comfortable doing in Detroit. It 
is normative for adults to look after unattended children in Jerusalem, in direct contrast to 
metropolitan America where no such norms exist. This example illustrates how social norms 
function as social capital.  
 
Robert Putnam (2000) conceptualised social capital in his acclaimed book ‘Bowling Alone: 
The Collapse and Revival of American Community’. Putnam is credited with bringing social 
capital into the realm of public policy with local and national government, as well as into 
organisations such as the World Bank (Giorgas 2007, p.209). Putnam is similar to Bourdieu 
and Coleman, in that he sees social networks, norms and trust as central to social capital. He 
also placed great emphasis on the notion of reciprocity. In Bowling Alone he states that 
trustworthiness promotes “the kinds of interaction which reinforce norms of generalised 
reciprocity all of which are central to social capital” (Putnam 2000, p.21). Reciprocity 
therefore becomes a generalised social norm of good will to other people, even those that you 
do not know, which “facilitate[s] coordination and collaboration between individuals and 
stimulates civic and socially minded behaviour, leading to better government performance, a 
better function economy and safer and more caring communities” (Frieling 2018, p.7). For the 
purposes of this research, reciprocity can be seen as a form of trust.  
 
Putnam (2000) describes two types of social capital, bonding and bridging, and Woolcock 
(2001) adds a third, linking social capital (Field 2016). Bonding social capital occurs within 
groups of like-minded people (such as families), which promotes homogeneity and strong ties 
between group members. This can be both a positive and a negative, because while strong 
bonds encourage mutual care such as in family relationships, it can also foster groupthink and 
conformity which undermines social connections with those outside these groups (Field 2016). 
Bridging social capital is more distant than bonding, and refers to the connections people have 
between different groups and social divides, which tend to be weaker than bonding ties 
(Giorgas 2007).  
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Woolcock (2001) proposes a third type of social capital – linking – that exists alongside these 
two concepts. He sees the previous two concepts as horizontal, and adds a third vertical 
dimension. Linking social capital refers to relationships with those who are outside of the wider 
community that can enable access to a wider range of resources (Woolcock 2001). These 
relationships often involve people in dissimilar situations and tend to involve connection to 
people who hold a certain type of power, often political. This connection goes both ways, as 
people may gain benefits (social capital) from being in close contact to those who hold power, 
and vice versa. The strengths of these ties lie in the diversity of social connections, which 
allows for the development of links to external assets and therefore greater amounts of 
information. Linking social capital is especially important in a disaster context because 
disasters often require external support to aid response and recovery. Aldrich (2012, 2015) 
discusses how linking social capital between disaster impacted communities and the 
government response can have a significant impact on the quality of outcomes. He highlights 
the critical role that social capital plays in resilience to adverse events, and argues that policy 
and practice emphasise physical infrastructure centred approaches despite growing evidence 
that social, not physical, infrastructure drives resilience.  
 
In a disaster context, social capital is increasingly being used as a descriptive tool to capture 
certain types of unmeasurable value (Aryal and Wilkinson 2019; Kwok et al. (2019). 
Muringani et al. (2021) investigated economic growth data in 190 regions in Europe, and 
findings indicated that bridging social capital were correlated with higher levels of economic 
growth, while bonding social capital was associated with lower rates of economic growth 
where bridging social capital was not present. However, it is important to emphasise that not 
all literature regards social capital uniformly positively. Referred to as social capital’s ‘dark 
side’, strong group ties, such as described in the bonding variety, can in some instances lead to 
negative outcomes for groups (Durlauf 1999). 
 
Human capital is not theorised with the same depth and nuance as social capital. Rather, it is 
broadly conceptualised as “the stock of habits, knowledge, social and personality attributes 
(including creativity) embodied in the ability to perform labour so as to produce economic 
value” (Goldin 2016). Morse and McNamara’s (2013) theorisation of human capital provides 
a more useful definition, referring to it as: “people’s physical and mental health, as well as their 
skills and knowledge.” In the NZ context, the LSF describes human capital as: “the capabilities 
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and capacities of people to engage in work, study, recreation, and social activities. Includes 
skills, knowledge, physical and mental health.”  
 
This thesis draws on human capital as a concept throughout, and it is therefore necessary to 
clarify how the term is used and applied in the context of this research. Adaptive management 
and adaptive capacity play a significant role in disaster response across all levels of governance 
as well as within the affected community. Knowledge, skills, and physical and mental health 
are factors that can influence adaptive capacity and adaptive management, and these factors 
specifically are described as human capital. For example, stress can negatively affect physical 
and mental health, which can then translate into negative impacts on decision-making capacity 
(Shields et al. 2016). Additionally, neoliberalised governance structures can affect adverse 
event responses by impacting on the capacity of officials to respond effectively, which will be 
discussed in section 2.4.5 and demonstrated in section 4.3.4). In this thesis, human capital is 
used to describe how factors related to knowledge, skills and physical and mental health can 
affect adaptability, and therefore influence social resilience. However, it is also important to 
acknowledge that factors related to all other capitals, such as linking social capital, can also 
affect adaptability.  
 
The next section describes the New Zealand context and how capital concepts are used in the 
Living Standards Framework.   
2.4.4 – The New Zealand Context  
The mainstreaming of resilience into policy and practice in New Zealand has been informed 
by parallel developments focused on multi-capital frameworks – both of which are a part of 
the New Zealand Governments approach to wellbeing. The New Zealand Treasury has been 
interested in livelihoods and wellbeing for some time, however the change of government four 
years ago placed a renewed focus on embedding wellbeing into government policy. The Prime 
Minister openly called for the Treasury to start looking at how to account for the social, human 
and environmental value that exist alongside economic value (Coughlan 2018).  
"We want New Zealand to be the first place in the world where our budget 
is not presented simply under the umbrella of pure economic measures, and 
often inadequate ones at that, but one that demonstrates the overall 
wellbeing of our country and its people." 
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(Ardern 2018)  
 
The NZ Treasury provides leadership on economic and financial issues for central government. 
Among its recent initiatives is the New Zealand Treasury's Living Standards Framework (LSF) 
which provides a practical tool for conceptualising integrated approaches for economic, 
environmental and social policy. The LSF is a flexible framework that prompts thinking about 
policy impacts across the different dimensions of wellbeing. The framework takes into account 
12 domains of current wellbeing outcomes; four capital stocks that support wellbeing now and 
into the future; and risk and resilience (Figure 2.7). The LSF is designed to be internationally 
and intertemporally comparable, suitable for developed countries, while specifically 
accounting for what is uniquely important to New Zealanders (New Zealand Treasury 2018). 
 
 
Figure 2.7 - Living Standards Framework (New Zealand Treasury 2019) 
The LSF is also incorporated into the National Disaster Resilience Strategy (NDRS), which is 
New Zealand’s official response to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (NDRS 
2019). The NDRS outlines the vision and long-term goals for Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management, and the objectives to be pursued to meet these goals. It provides the strategic 
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direction and vision for objectives and priorities to increase New Zealand’s resilience to 
disasters. The NDRS “is intended to provide a common agenda for resilience that individual 
organisations, agencies, and groups can align with for collective impact.” (NDRS 2019 p.10). 
To operationalise this vision, the NDRS uses the Living Standards Framework (LSF) to 
advance its whole-of-government wellbeing and resilience agenda. In the foreword, then-
Minister of Civil Defence and Emergency Management Hon Kris Fa’afoi emphasised “The 
Strategy has a strong focus on wellbeing. It incorporates the Treasury’s LSF and considers the 
types of resilience needed to protect and grow our wellbeing” (NDRS 2019, p.1). Furthermore, 
the New Zealand government’s obligations to the Sendai Framework, and therefore its 
approach to resilience, is explicitly linked to this framework through the NDRS and a series of 
technical papers discussing the LSF (New Zealand Treasury 2018) in relation to risk and 
resilience (Frieling and Warren 2018), social capital (Frieling 2018), and human capital 
(Morrisey 2018) among others.  
 
Institutional processes and organisational structures play an important role in influencing 
access to livelihood and wellbeing resources (Scoones 1998; Figure 2.6). Multi-capital 
frameworks emerged as a tool to improve the livelihood and wellbeing outcomes of 
international aid distributed through global institutions. In New Zealand, an ideological shift 
in the 1980s dramatically reshaped institutional processes, which affected livelihood and 
wellbeing outcomes. The next section details the institutional arrangements which precipitated 
the emergence of the Living Standards Framework. 
2.4.5 – Institutional Arrangements and Neoliberalism 
Resilience thinking and it’s role as a boundary object and a bridge between disciplines (Baggio 
et al. 2015) has been detailed throughout this chapter. The final topic to be examined is 
institutional arrangements. Sjöstedt (2015) argues that resilience thinking has not adequately 
engaged with the substantial literature that exists on institutions and governance within the 
social sciences. Much of the existing literature on institutional change is compatible with 
resilience thinking, drawing upon path dynamics and non-linear change (North 1990, Streeck 
and Thelen 2005, Ostrom and Basurto 2011) in the same way that the early ecological 
conceptualisation of resilience did (section 2.1). Broadly speaking, the challenges to the 
conceptualisation of resilience thinking in this institutional context mirror those outlined in 
section 2.3 – the challenges of nuance, measurement and norms. Most importantly for this 
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section, Sjöstedt (2015) argues that resilience thinking should recognise the inherent political 
nature of institutions and shift from a primary focus on external sources of change, to an 
approach that better acknowledges and draws upon endogenous change and informal dynamics.  
 
This section details how an external global economic crisis resulted in the neoliberal 
restructuring of institutional arrangements, which – this thesis will argue – has affected social 
resilience in New Zealand. 
 
Neoliberal ideology has resulted in rapid structural change in NZ over the past few decades, 
especially in the rural and agricultural context in which this research is situated. During the 
1970s-80s, the previous hegemonic ideology, Keynesianism, had led to an economic crisis – 
stagflation (Harvey 2005). Neoliberalism was seen as an antidote, and desperate to end these 
crises, the US, UK and New Zealand all implemented what were then seen as radical economic 
reforms (Harvey 2005). As Kelsey (1995) notes, the implementation of neoliberal ideology in 
New Zealand occurred with a speed, breadth and depth that was unparalleled in the developed 
world.  
 
Harvey (2005, p.2) defines neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property 
rights, free markets, and free trade”. The spread of Neoliberalism around the world was 
facilitated by the same global institutions that were responsible for intentional development 
through international aid. Problematic to this shift was the fact that these reforms did not occur 
purely ideologically but were corrupted by entrenched interests (Larner 2003). Neoliberal 
ideology, along with the way it has been implemented in New Zealand and worldwide, has 
fundamentally changed the way public institutions operate. This section draws upon David 
Harvey’s (2005) conceptualization of creative destruction to examine how neoliberal ideology 
has manifested in New Zealand, with a focus on how it has shifted institutional practices.  
 
It is generally accepted that the state has some role to play in managing and responding to 
hazard risks. This is somewhat incompatible with neoliberal ideology, which involves vastly 
limiting the role of the state.  
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The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework 
appropriate to…guaranteeing private property rights, individual liberty, 
free markets and free trade. The state has to be concerned, for example, 
with the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, 
defence, police and juridical functions required to secure private property 
rights and to support freely functioning markets. Furthermore, if markets 
do not exist (in areas such as education, healthcare, social security or 
environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if 
necessary; but beyond these tasks the state should not venture. 
(Harvey 2005, p145) 
 
Harvey (2005) views neoliberalism through two related processes, creative destruction, which 
in turn leads to accumulation by dispossession. Creative destruction is an important process to 
understand in a disaster risk reduction context. Prior to the implementation of neoliberal 
ideology, governments held a much greater sway in everyday life, creating institutional 
frameworks and powers in order to fulfil these obligations. Harvey (2005, p145) uses examples 
such as divisions of labour, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of 
life and attachments to the land to exemplify areas in which the state previously held influence, 
yet under neoliberalism it must withdraw. However, as the role of the state narrowed Harvey 
(2005) described how it must therefore act to destroy these institutional frameworks that were 
ideologically incompatible with neoliberalism – private businesses would instead fulfil these 
responsibilities through a burgeoning free market. The ‘creative destruction’ of ideologically 
incompatible institutional frameworks provides important context for this research. As the 
results will show, institutional responses to adverse events in New Zealand have been affected 
by the disestablishment of key support organisations (section 4.3.4). 
 
This leads to the second process Harvey (2005) that describes as a key part of neoliberalism – 
accumulation by dispossession. There are four processes by which this occurs: privatisation, 
financialization, management and manipulation of crises, and state redistribution. Privatisation 
and financialization are most relevant to this research, and they are discussed next.  
 
The privatization of what were once public assets plays an important role in the context of rural 
New Zealand, spaces that were previously protected by state ownership were opened up as for-
profit markets. Harvey (2005) uses public utilities, social welfare provisions and public 
institutions (such as education, health and prisons), as examples of areas that have transferred 
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from the state sector to the private sector through privatisation and marketisation (Harvey 2005, 
p.153). In New Zealand, this included the disestablishment of key public services for rural 
regions such as farm advisory services, as well as restructuring of government agencies to be 
more efficient (Wilson 1995; Larner 2003). The commodification of public resources shared a 
similar process – following the introduction of neoliberal policy there has been a systematic 
rolling back of the regulatory frameworks that were designed to protect labour and the 
environment, which has resulted in renewed focus on the environment in New Zealand, 
specifically impacting agriculture (Kelsey 1995). 
 
The privatisation of public assets has been enabled by the financialisation of everything, which 
has altered how public institutions are run. This has generated what is known as ‘The New 
Public Management’, which came to the fore alongside neoliberalism and entailed rigorous 
accountability and managerialism (Hood and Scott 2000, Hood and Lodge 2006, p.186-187). 
Managerialism resulted in two key shifts; (i) a reprioritisation from subject matter and technical 
experts in decision-making structures to ‘people managers’, under the assumption that decision 
makers only needed to know how to manage people (Harvey 2005; Hood and Lodge 2006), 
and (ii), in order to demonstrate results, public bureaucracies had to utilise key performance 
indicators and other metrics to ensure accountability and a strong customer focus. The general 
idea was to ensure that public servants were responsive to those who use their services, while 
also being accountable for outcomes (Hood and Lodge 2006). The managerialist 
transformation is the foundation of the problem of measurement and the inability to account 
for normative factors within policy and practice. The implementation of neoliberal ideology 
and managerialism have entailed a focus on the quantitative (tangible), at the cost of the 
qualitative (intangible).  
 
The neoliberal shift has fundamentally affected institutional structures and processes in New 
Zealand, which in turn has influenced institutional responses to adverse events.  
2.5 – Chapter Summary  
This thesis is interested in how institutional responses to adverse events have affected the social 
resilience of farmers in the Hurunui. The review of the literature provides the theoretical basis 
for addressing the research questions. Core concepts that have been investigated are social 
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resilience, multi-capital frameworks, social and human capital concepts, and how institutional 
responses to adverse events are enacted in New Zealand. 
 
To illustrate the concept of resilience, social-ecological systems resilience thinking was 
examined. The initial conceptualisation of SES resilience in its field of origin, ecology, drew 
attention to the importance of adaptability, multiple stable states and the importance of 
qualitative analysis. The transfer of resilience concepts into the social domain revealed a 
number of important insights; (i) social connections, across both horizontal and vertical scales, 
emerged as a key determinant of resilience, (ii) resilience is more usefully conceptualised as 
the outcome of a process rather than a characteristic of a system, (iii) stress can have negative 
impacts on decision-making capacity, affecting adaptability, and (iv) cognitive biases affect 
decision-making processes by prioritising known information, while disregarding known 
unknowns.  
 
SES resilience thinking, however, faces three key challenges for operationalisation in policy 
and practice – nuance, measurement, and norms. The rapid transition of resilience thinking 
from ecology into the social sciences, and then into policy and practice through the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction has resulted in simplified definitions of the concept 
being propagated. The mechanisms for operationalisation presented within the Sendai 
Framework include a focus on targets, indicators and other legislative instruments. However, 
as this literature review demonstrates, key sources of value are intangible and are neglected in 
these implementation frameworks. This is the problem of measurement, which also illustrates 
the inability for resilience concepts to adequately account for the normative aspects of 
resilience, which are intangible, and most often described in the social sciences.  
 
Multi-capital frameworks are described as a potential solution to resilience thinking’s 
operational challenges (Tanner et al. 2015). The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA), 
from which multi-capital frameworks emerged, originated as a tool to help institutional 
decision-making processes account for all sources of value, tangible and intangible. Capital 
concepts, such as social, human, natural and physical capital, are used to account for all factors 
important for sustainable livelihoods, quantifiable and unquantifiable. The New Zealand 
government has adopted a multi-capital framework, the Living Standards Framework (LSF) to 
help policy makers capture intangible value that contributes to wellbeing and aid in the 
operationalisation of resilience. The similarities between the SLA and SES resilience thinking 
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mean that multi-capital frameworks can be adopted by resilience thinking without theoretical 
adjustments. This thesis uses the LSF as a tool to describe and analyse the intangible aspects 
of social resilience using social and human capital concepts. Finally, neoliberalism was 
identified as an ideology which has reshaped New Zealand’s institutional processes over the 
preceding four decades, which provides critical insight into the context in which institutional 
responses to adverse events manifest. 
 
The next chapter outlines the methodological approach.  
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
The previous chapter examined the literature which provides the foundation upon which the 
research questions can be investigated. This chapter details the inductive approach adopted to 
understand how the impact of the institutional response to adverse events in the Hurunui 
affected social resilience of farmers. Perspectives were sought from; (i) those who experienced 
the events and the responses (local farmers), (ii) those who responded at the local and regional 
level – including government agencies, public and private support agencies, and private farmer 
advocacy organisations, and (iii) those who organised the response at the national level – 
including government agencies and farmer advocacy organisations such as Beef + Lamb.  
 
This chapter details the methodological approach taken and is divided in three parts. Part one 
describes the ontological, epistemological and methodological considerations applied in the 
study, which are discussed in the context of the paradigms of inquiry adopted – critical realism 
and constructivism. Part two outlines the process involved in participant recruitment, ethics 
and data collection and analysis. The final part describes the study area and how neoliberalism 
has impacted the local context. 
3.1 – Paradigms of inquiry 
Ontology, epistemology and methodology form the foundation of a research inquiry. Guba and 
Lincoln (1994) outline three fundamental questions based on these concepts that should be 
examined in order to determine the appropriate research paradigm. Considering these questions 
forms a conceptualisation of reality within which the research questions can be investigated. 
The ontological question explores the nature of reality and what can be known about it, the 
epistemological question examines the relationship between the knower, and what can be 
known, and the methodological question assesses how the inquirer can go about finding out 
what they believe can be known (Guba and Lincoln 1994).  
 
These three questions are inextricably linked (Guba and Lincoln 1994). In order to understand 
the relationship between the knower and what can be known – epistemology – it is crucial to 
understand what can be known – ontology. Considering the best approach to investigating the 
research question – methodology – requires an understanding of both what can be known – 
 60 
ontology – as well as the relationship between what can be known and the knower – 
epistemology.  
 
Examining different paradigms of inquiry helps to illustrate the ontological, epistemological 
and methodological considerations. Four research paradigms have emerged most commonly in 
the social sciences – positivism, post-positivism, critical theory and constructivism (Guba and 
Lincoln 1994; Atkinson and Delamont 2010; Denzin and Lincoln 2017; Tolich and Davidson 
2018). Positivism posits reality as the true state of affairs (ontology) which exists independent 
of human experience (epistemology) and can be ascertained by quantitative research 
approaches (methodology) (Atkinson and Delamont 2010). Post-positivism retains the claim 
that reality exists independently of human experience but distinguishes itself by arguing that 
reality cannot be fully comprehended purely through objective measurement (Guba and 
Lincoln 1994; Atkinson and Delamont 2010). In this context, objective understanding is an 
idealistic goal, but not one which is achievable (Guba and Lincoln 1994). Critical theory 
assumes that reality can be apprehended, but over time knowledge of reality (such as history) 
is reshaped by various social, political, cultural and economic factors. Finally, a constructivist 
paradigm of inquiry views reality as socially constructed through a relational process which 
links human beings with their perceived world (Atkinson and Delamont 2010).  
 
Methodologically, positivism espouses a quantitative approach, while post-positivism, critical 
theory and constructivism all require a qualitative methodological approach, at least in part 
(Guba and Lincoln 1994; Atkinson and Delamont 2010; Denzin and Lincoln 2017; Tolich and 
Davidson 2018). At its most basic, the distinction between qualitative and quantitative research 
is the use of numbers. Quantitative research approaches analyse tangible data through methods 
of quantification, therefore requiring key concepts to be distilled down into numbers for 
statistical analysis (Punch 1998). In contrast, qualitative data describes phenomena that can be 
observed, but not adequately measured or quantified, such as experiential data, which requires 
descriptive analysis and research techniques such as thematic coding (Alasuutri et al. 2008; 
Denzin and Lincoln 2017; Tolich and Davidson 2018). 
 
There is a significant epistemological distinction between quantitative and qualitative research 
approaches. If objective or quantitative knowledge is considered the only ‘real’ knowledge, 
then the relationship between the investigator and what can be known relies upon only what 
can be objectively known, which means that the researcher should aim to eliminate any 
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subjective influence over the research process. Conversely, in a qualitative epistemological 
approach, the researcher is a part of the knowledge collection, and their experience should 
influence hypothesis generation, data collection and analysis (Strauss and Corbin 1989).  
 
These epistemological, and therefore methodological, differences can be illustrated by 
referring back to the quantitative vs qualitative debate at the heart of SES resilience thinking. 
Holling’s (1973, p.2) assertion that quantitative approaches to ecosystem analysis “may simply 
reflect an analytic approach developed in one area where it was useful and then transferred to 
another where it may not be” describes how ecosystem analysis in ecology began questioning 
the true nature of reality (ontology), entailing epistemological and methodological adjustments. 
Resilience concepts inherently require qualitative analysis to illustrate the intangible aspects 
described by social and human capital. Resilience thinking emphasises the importance of both 
qualitative and quantitative analysis (section 2.1.2; Table 2.1), which theoretically justifies the 
adoption of a post-positivist paradigm of inquiry. However, the research focus alongside the 
emphasis on qualitative analysis (Holling 1973; Carpenter et al. 2001; Cretney 2016; Folke 
2016; Kaika 2017; Salomon et al. 2019) for capturing the intangible concepts related to social 
resilience, has resulted in the adopted of a constructivist paradigm of inquiry as well.  
 
Post-positivism provides an important distinction between the ‘real’ world and the ‘observable’ 
world. Critical realism – a post-positivist paradigm of inquiring adopted by this research – 
argues that our understanding of the world is drawn from our perspectives and experiences, 
and there exist unobservable (intangible) structures which generate observable (tangible) 
events which can only be elucidated by describing and analysing the unobservable structures 
(Bhaskar 1975, Bhaskar 2002). This insight is a crucial foundation for this research, key 
sources of value are intangible (social and human capital) but neglecting them through the 
problem of measurement has real, tangible, outcomes (section 2.4.1). In this context, 
neoliberalism can be described as an unobservable structure which generates tangible 
outcomes. 
 
Constructivism is the second paradigm of inquiry which is drawn upon in this research. 
Atkinson and Delamont (2010) view constructivism as highly contextual, which views reality 
as “a local and specific mental construction formed by a person and multiple mental 
constructions collectively exist regarding reality (relativism). Therefore, the knower is 
subjectively and interactively linked in relationship to what can be known” (Atkinson and 
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Delamont 2010, p.18). In this context, neoliberalism can be described as a specific mental 
construction held by a large number of people (a hegemonic ideology), which subjectively 
reshapes human action. Post-positivism complements this view of neoliberalism, allowing for 
it to then be described as in conflict with ‘actual reality’ due to an inability to account for the 
intangible structures (such as itself) which generate tangible outcomes. A constructivist, 
relativist, approach is taken to understand neoliberalism (an unobservable structure), which 
implies that the specific mental construction can be modified to better incorporate unobservable 
structures (intangible value) in institutional decision-making processes.  
 
An inductive qualitative research methodology was adopted, which was informed by similar 
studies using participatory and qualitative methods to obtain ‘thick information’ about local 
conditions (Young et al. 2010, Naess 2013, Cradock-Henry et al. 2018). Traditional qualitative 
research methods such as semi-structured interviews, focus groups and snowball sampling are 
used to gather data and identify important actors, networks and organisations involved in the 
response. The next section details the methodological process.  
   
3.2 – Participant selection, data collection, analysis and ethics 
The aim of this research is to understand how institutional arrangements affected farmers’ 
social resilience, specifically how responses to adverse events in the Hurunui impacted social 
and human capital. SES resilience emphasises the importance of a qualitative approach that 
takes into account these perspectives. To understand the effect of the institutional responses to 
adverse events in the Hurunui, and how those responses unfolded, three groups of participants 
were identified and interviewed – those who experienced the events and the responses, those 
who responded, and those who organised the response. Table 3.1 lists the organisations 
interviewed but omits certain small scale advocacy organisations in order to preserve 
respondent confidentiality.  
 
Groups Types of organisations 
Group 1 – Farmer households Farmers 
Group 2 – Local and regional 
government agencies, public and private 
support agencies, and farmer advocacy 
organisations 
Rural Support Trust, Local councils, Regional 
councils, Civil Defence Emergency 
Management, and farmer advocacy 
organisations  
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Group 3 – National government and 
farmer advocacy organisations 
MPI, Treasury, NEMA (formerly MCDEM), 
Beef and Lamb NZ, DairyNZ, Federated 
farmers 
Table 3.1 – Organisations interviewed 
The relatively small size of the NZ science and policy communities provided a unique 
opportunity for greater interaction and insight into the ways in which academic concepts such 
as resilience are operationalised at local, regional and national decision-making scales. This 
was enhanced by the multiple adverse events discussed, which allowed for an effective 
comparison and contrast of the effectiveness of multiple types of adverse event response.  
3.2.1 – Data collection 
Research participants were identified using purposive and snowball sampling methods. 
Existing networks were used to identify two key informants at each level prior to data 
collection, who were interviewed first, and each participant was asked to provide a list of 
people whom they thought would be relevant to the research. Two local contacts who were 
‘friends of friends’ provided an introduction to the Mayor, as well as a number of farmers prior 
to fieldwork commencing. Academic colleagues provided introductions to their colleagues in 
groups 2 and 3, which was supplemented by snowball referrals from group one participants. 
Those whose names were mentioned frequently and emphasised by others, were selected for 
interviews. Referrals to others were often across scales. For example, contact with one farmer 
participant led to contact with a regional expert, which then led to a central government official, 
which in turn led to a key informant at the highest levels of government. Many key informants 
at all levels were identified from snowballing at the local level. This sampling approach was 
effective – many informants would not have been accessible through formal channels and the 
data gathered was much enriched by going ‘bottom up’ rather than ‘top down’.  
 
Interviews were conducted in five distinct phases, with four field trips and one final phase of 
interviews over zoom. The first field trip focused on local farmers in the Hurunui, the second 
followed up with additional local farmers identified from the first trip, and also included some 
local and regional government and organisation representatives in the district. The third field 
trip focused on regional government and organisation representatives in Christchurch and 
included two final farmer interviews. The fourth trip was to Wellington and focused on national 
level government and organisation representatives. The final zoom phase was following up 
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highly recommended informants who lived in places outside of the field areas. Interviews were 
conducted between August 2018 and March 2019. 
3.2.2 – Interview data  
Semi-structured interviews (n = 47) and one focus group (n = 9) provided the majority of the 
data. The focus group was made up of farmers, some of whom were also local government 
representatives – including Winton Dalley, the Mayor of the Hurunui (who consented to be 
named). Five of the focus group participants were subsequently interviewed on an individual 
basis. The total number of research participants was 52. All interviewees had some experience 
with disruptive events in the Hurunui and were broadly categorised into three groups: (i) local 
farmers who experienced the events and responses, (ii) local and regional level government 
agencies, public and private support agencies, and farmer advocacy organisations, and (iii) 
national level government agencies and farmer advocacy organisations. 
 
Many participants were part of more than one group, for example, local government 
representatives were often farmers as well. Some regional experts often played significant roles 
in central government decision-making processes. Participants were often assigned to multiple 
groups in order to account for this, meaning that the total number of participants in the table 
below does not add up to the actual number of participants (Table 3.2). Participants were also 
categorised as either public or private sector, with 27 classified as public sector and 24 as 
private. Farmers were considered private sector. The primary role adopted during interviews 
determined the public or private label where both were relevant. Careful attempts were made 
to interview women farmers in order to obtain a diversity of perspectives, since gender has 
been highlighted as a significant factor in other research on rural issues (Davidson 2016). The 
gender distribution for farmers was five women (25%) and 15 men (75%). The total gender 
distribution was 24 (40%) women, and 35 men (60%).  
 
Groups Number of Participants 
Group 1 – Farmer households 20 (includes focus group) 
Group 2 – Local and regional government and organisations 28 
Group 3 – National government and organisations 23 
 
Table 3.2 – Distribution of interviewees 
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New Zealand is a multi-cultural nation, with a partnership between the Crown and indigenous 
Māori, formalised by Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Treaty of Waitangi), a founding document 
signed in 1840. During the planning process careful consideration was given to how to engage 
with Māori. The population of the district is predominantly NZ European ‘pākeha’ (approx. 
92% of the total population), and the focus was on in-depth, vertical analysis to obtain insights 
into the specific issues associated with the three case examples. Due to time and resource 
constraints then, there was no specific Māori engagement, but it is acknowledged that in NZ 
Māori have significant rural interests, commercial agribusiness and forestry which may be 
exposed to a range of hazards.  
3.2.3 – Interview attribution 
Data is attributed to interviewees throughout the chapter using codes which denote certain non-
identifying information. Codes used for all interviewees are presented in Table 3.3. To explain 
how the coding system works, an example is: K2/231P. The ‘K’ stands for Key Informant, the 
first number of the code denotes a unique identifier for each participant that ranges from K1 – 
K47, where the number reflects the interviewing order, i.e., K1 was the first interview, K47 the 
last. The second part of the code, separated by a slash (/), refers to the group numbers each 
participant represented, where 1 = farmer/local, 2 = regional and 3 = national. The order in 
which those numbers are displayed starts with the group number most associated with the 
knowledge shared by the participant. Subsequent numbers denote experience at other group 
levels. The P denotes that the participant had considerable public sector knowledge, either 
through current employment or previous employment, and that the knowledge they imparted 
during the interview related specifically to their past (or current) public sector experience. FG 
refers to the focus group, which occurred between K2 and K3. 
 
K1/1 K9/21P K17/321P K25/23P K33/2 K41/3 
K2/231P K10/1 K18/2 K26/2P K34/1 K42/3p 
K3/1 K11/3 K19/2P K27/23P K35/2P K43/3 
K4/1 K12/32 K20/2P K28/2 K36/2P K44/3P 
K5/1 K13/32 K21/2P K29/2P K37/3P K45/3P 
K6/1 K14/21 K22/2P K30/32 K38/3P K46/3P 
K7/1 K15/32 K23/132 K31/3P K39/32P K47/32P 
K8/1 K16/321P K24/2P K32/123 K40/3P FG/12 
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Table 3.3 – Codes of interviewees 
The coding scheme can be exemplified using Winton Dalley (K2/231P), Mayor of the Hurunui 
who gave permission for his name to be attributed to the data he provided. K2 is his unique 
identifier code which shows that he was the second person interviewed. /231P shows that he 
primarily spoke from a group 2 perspective, in this case meaning local government. He also 
spoke authoritatively on engagement with group 3, spending much time with people in those 
positions which places the 3 next. Finally, he is also a farmer with long experience in the 
Hurunui, he did not often speak from this perspective, which means that the 1 comes last. The 
P indicates that he spoke as a public sector employee. Another example, K47/32P denotes the 
47th interview, a national level perspective with some regional experience working in the public 
sector. Additional relevant information will also be described in locations where appropriate, 
such as this respondent being a representative from the Ministry for Primary Industries. The 
identity of organisations is not linked to individual codes due to privacy and ethical concerns. 
The relationship between K47 and MPI is used as an example because there are no privacy or 
ethical concerns in this particular instance. 
 
Some topics discussed in the results chapter are sensitive and contain information which, if 
traced back to the respondent, could cause harm. In sections where this is deemed possible, 
codes are removed, and no attribution is presented. This occurs either when participants are 
speaking about something particularly sensitive, or when identifying information might be 
revealed by association with other comments made by the same person. Codes were also often 
removed in discussions where sensitive information is present – an abundance of caution is 
used in order to ensure that no harm is done.  
3.2.4 – Interview approach 
Rather than a simple comparative analysis of experience of adverse events within the local 
farming community, a vertical analysis that would illuminate perspectives from all levels was 
undertaken. A vertical analysis was chosen because SES resilience thinking emphasises the 
importance of a holistic approach in which a wide range of key stakeholders are accounted for. 
Interviews were conducted in the Hurunui, Christchurch (the hub for the region of Canterbury), 
and Wellington (the capital city) in order to capture data from a range of key informants across 
a number of agencies. Specific locations of data collection are not disclosed for confidentiality 
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reasons. Interviews were approached inductively – a broad understanding of the local context 
was gained prior to interviewing, but the intent was to let farmers set the scene for the research, 
and build upon the experiences and outcomes they described.    
 
Key themes identified from initial interviews were then used to solicit information from local, 
regional and national representatives to build an understanding of the major events from the 
perspectives of those who experienced it, those who responded to it, and those who organised 
the response. The interview guide involved semi-structured questions, and the conversation 
was allowed to flow in the direction set by the participant. Guiding questions were used to 
bring the interview back on track if required. The interview guide for farmer participants had 
three specific topics to prompt, which were then iterated on reflexively for subsequent 
interviews, including at different scales. The topics covered are described below, and a copy 
of the initial skeleton is provided as an appendix. The first question asked participants to 
describe what recent hazard events they had experienced, and how it had impacted them on a 
personal level, a farm level, and a community level. This prompted participants to begin by 
talking about what events had impacted them the most. If any of the three major events that 
were considered were not mentioned (drought, earthquake, M. Bovis), the interview was guided 
towards these topics. The second prompt subsequently asked how government and 
organisational responses to those events impacted them personally, on the farm, and as a 
community. Questions probed for the things that worked well, and what needed more work 
with a specific focus on identifying barriers and enablers to social resilience, with emphasis on 
indicators of social and human capital. The third series of prompts questioned how farmers 
experiences of adverse events influenced their ability to prepare for, respond to and recover 
from future unknown adverse events, and whether their experiences of adverse event responses 
had affected their preparedness for future events.  
 
The literature highlighted the connection between stress and adaptive capacity (Kahneman 
2012; section 2.2.2). If participants described experiencing increased stress levels during the 
adverse events, a supplementary question probed what effects their increased stress had had on 
them personally and professionally. As mentioned, the interview approach was inductive and 
intentionally broad, and could be deviated from as long as the topic of conversation remained 
relevant to the research.  
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Interviews questions for groups two and three were more targeted. Participants were often 
experts in one particular hazard response, and so these events were discussed in depth. They 
were, however, often able to refer to participants who were knowledgeable in other response 
contexts. Each of the three disruptive events had multiple participants providing empirical 
evidence at each level. Topics brought up by regional and national level participants were 
frequently noted to align with issues that local level respondents had also described, which 
effectively provided triangulation of important response issues. Often participants were aware 
of the issues, but sometimes there was a disconnect between local experience and regional and 
national level understanding. Interviews were targeted to ensure that there were no gaps in the 
evidence of the major events discussed at any level. Finally, there were two questions that were 
asked of every participant at the end of each interview. These were the only questions that were 
asked verbatim to every participant and focused on ‘trust’ and ‘sense of community’ which 
were drawn from the cognitive indicators presented by Kwok (2016) in Table 2.2. The 
questions asked were: “In context of all that we have discussed here today, what does trust 
(question one)/sense of community (question two) mean to you?”. The intent of this question 
was to gain a broad understanding of how trust and sense of community were perceived by all 
participants, regardless of what group or context they were familiar with.   
 
All semi structured interviews and the focus group were recorded, and transcribed. 
Transcription focused on areas directly related to the research questions – often interviews 
contained significant amounts of material that were contextually relevant but were not 
specifically related to the research questions. As a result, selective transcription was undertaken 
for parts of the conversations that were subsequently analysed. An example would be 
freshwater regulation, and how the government was approaching that. Many farmers talked 
about this and related it back to adverse event responses. While some of this material provided 
high-level insight into how the government interacted with farmers, parts that were specifically 
focused on examples of government regulation were not transcribed. Government participants 
sometimes spent significant time describing adverse events that were not included in this study, 
and thus it was not transcribed because it was directly relevant to addressing the research 
questions. 
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3.2.5 – Data analysis 
Data was inductively analysed to identify key themes and narratives (Alasuutri et al. 2008; 
Denzin and Lincoln 2017; Tolich and Davidson 2018). Thematic analysis involves identifying, 
illustrating and interpreting patterns of meaning within qualitative data (Braun and Clarke 
2006). Narrative analysis focuses on the stories that are told in the context of the research 
questions (Allen 2017). The analysis process was inductive, reflexive, and iterative. Top level 
codes were developed to capture data categorised by event (drought, earthquake and M. Bovis) 
and by social and human capitals. Subsequent themes emerged inductively. As Braun et al. 
(2019) suggest, coding is “an organic and open iterative process; it is not fixed at the start of 
the process.”  
 
There were three phases of analysis for the full dataset. The first phase occurred during 
transcription, where top level codes were identified in the word document, and notes taken 
during interviews were combined with the transcripts. The second phase involved importing 
the transcripts into NVivo and coding the data into multiple categories (such as each major 
hazard event, and social and human capital) as well as identifying key themes associated with 
each event. During this process a total of 25 codes emerged, however they were too non-
specific for addressing the research questions, and the third sweep of the data categorised all 
codes into what have formed chapter headings in the results (Table 3.4). The general themes 
discussed are often applicable in each event, but are attached to the adverse event which best 
exemplified the issue. All data which did not fit neatly into a single hazard event was 
categorised as impacts on social and human capital and are summarised in part four of the 
results chapter. Table 3.4 shows the unique thematic codes – each event also had a ‘impact’ 
and ‘response’ code which is omitted from the table. 
 
Drought Earthquake M. Bovis Miscellaneous 





Drought Committee Road closure Capacity and The 
Rural Policy Unit 




Local knowledge  The New Public 
Management 




 The Churn 
 70 




Table 3.4 – Final interview codes 
3.2.6 – Ethics 
Significant consideration was given to the ethical approach taken with this research. There 
were two primary ethical issues that needed to considered. Due to the possibility of psycho-
social consequences of the compounding hazard events in the Hurunui, farmers and local 
government/organisations representatives were considered ‘vulnerable participants’. For 
example, negative memories of the earthquake and drought might have generated emotional 
responses from farmers, including anguish, anxiety or stress. Recalling stressful events, 
together with the possibility of existing mental health issues (which are known to be 
widespread in the farming community across the country) meant that care needed to be taken 
to ensure participants felt safe during the interviews. The necessary level of care was taken 
with all the participants, especially with farmers. Participants were assured of their right to 
withdraw from the interview should they experience discomfort at any stage. 
 
The second ethical issue pertained to the small size of the communities from which participants 
were being drawn. The nature of these groups meant that despite standard anonymization 
procedures, participants might be aware of ‘who said what’. This issue was addressed by 
allowing participants to view the transcriptions from their own interviews to ‘fact-check’, and 
by providing information and consent forms with a full outline of the research approach and 
ethical considerations. Participants were offered the opportunity to opt out of the research if 
they were uncomfortable. The ethical concerns related to the small size of the groups 
interviewed occurred at all levels, because, as participants described, rural communities tend 
to be tight knit and everyone knows everyone else. For regional and national level government 
and organisations, the caution pertained to the small circles that they operated in.  
 
In order to account for these ethical considerations, a Category A ethical approval was sought 
and gained from the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. 
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3.3 – Study area and context 
New Zealand provides a rich empirical context for studying the impact of adverse events and 
their responses (Figure 3.1). The country, located on the boundary of two tectonic plates, is 
seismically active and has a long history of damaging earthquakes, most recently including the 
2010/2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence and the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake (Potter et al. 
2015; Stevenson et al., 2017). The Hurunui district is a small, developed economy in the region 
of Canterbury, which was affected by both recent earthquake disasters. In addition, it is also 
exposed to frequent damaging hydrological and climatic events with cascading and 
compounding impacts, such as ex-tropical cyclones, drought and snowstorms. In the largely 
rural context within which this research is situated, such events lead to disruption of farming 
practices through drought, animal welfare issues and infrastructure damage (Whitman 2014; 




Figure 3.1 – Location of the Hurunui District and surrounding major towns and cities 
The Hurunui District is located in the South Island of NZ (Figure 3.1). Encompassing an area 
of 8646 km², the Hurunui is due north of the South Island’s main urban centre, Christchurch 
and the local economy is primarily made up of agribusiness (dairy, sheep, and beef farming), 
forestry, and tourism. The 2018 (Statistics New Zealand 2021) census describes a population 
of 12,558 people who can be categorised in a number of heterogenous groups. Ethnically, the 
Hurunui population is primarily European (92%) and 8.6% identify as Māori. For comparative 
purposes 70% of New Zealander’s identify as European and 16.5% as Māori (Statistics New 
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Zealand 2021). Within the farming sector there are two primary types of farms; sheep and beef, 
and dairy farms, though a number of farmers have diversified their farming operations and run 
both dairy and sheep and beef cattle. 
 
There are significant differences between sheep and beef farms and dairy farms. Dairy farming 
has increased significantly in New Zealand over the past four decades, with the number of dairy 
cattle doubling from 3 million in 1990, to approximately 6 million in 2020 (Statistics New 
Zealand 2021b). Dairy farms are more intensive on the land requiring more inputs and labour 
when compared with sheep and beef farms (Copland and Stevens 2012). The farm labour 
employed by dairy farms is often migrant or Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) worker 
based and made up of Pacific and Asian ethnic groups. Census data reveals the number of 
people identifying as Pacific in the Hurunui increased from 0.4% in the 2006 census to 1.1% 
in 2018 census, while the Asian share of the population rose from 0.7% in the 2006 census to 
3.9% in the 2018 census. In contrast, sheep and beef farms tend to be family owned, often 
through generations, and require far less inputs compared to dairy (Pomeroy 2019). The 
differences between these two types of farming mean that adverse events can have unique 
affects in each context from both a physical and regulatory (e.g. water quality, intensification) 
standpoint.  
 
While the Hurunui is a diverse region made up of different sectors, the respondents interviewed 
in this research were mostly homogenous .  Sheep and beef farmer households were the primary 
focus for interviews, though some mixed dairy in as well for diversification. None of the farm 
households spoken to were primarily dairy farms. The homogeneity at the ground level was by 
design and resulted from the vertical focus of the research. As noted previously (section 3.2.1), 
the vertical focus of the research involved investigating the perspectives of local farmer 
households who experienced the adverse events, which were then compared and contrasted 
with views from those representing local, regional and national institutions who were involved 
in the government response to the disruptive events. The intent was to focus on a relatively 
homogenous group of farmers at the local level, in contrast to a horizontal research approach 
that might have sought to understand the differing experiences of the adverse events between 
the local groups in the district. In this research, the view was taken that including diverse groups 
at the local level would have unnecessarily complicated the data gathered. Therefore, it should 
be emphasised that the results presented in the next chapter primarily capture the perspectives 
of sheep and beef farmers.  
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The Hurunui was selected for this research because of its exposure to multiple adverse events 
in recent years (Figure 3.2), which provide a useful comparative basis upon which the impact 
of different types of response activities can be compared and contrasted. Three recent adverse 
events are the focus of this analysis; a significant drought (2014-2017), a major earthquake in 
2016, and Mycoplasma Bovis (M. Bovis), a bacterial disease affecting dairy and beef cattle that 
was first detected in the country in 2017 resulting in a major biosecurity hazard and response. 
The temporal extent of these adverse events is illustrated in Figure 3.2, including historical 
political and economic reforms of the 1980s that were influential for rural communities like 
the Hurunui. In addition to the major events focused on, participants also often referred to the 
lasting legacy of the Canterbury earthquake sequence, and multiple weather-related events 
including floods, snow and windstorms. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Timeline of major events in the Hurunui District   
The timeline shows the overlapping nature of the adverse events. The bars depicting the length 
of each of the three adverse events are the official amount of time the response to each adverse 
event lasted. It should be noted that for some participants, the infrastructure damage from the 
earthquake may have had longer lasting impacts. The neoliberal reforms are included in the 
figure to reinforce the underlying context in which the institutional responses to the adverse 
events occurred. 
 
In 2018, a quantitative survey conducted by allright.org.nz (2018) provided key quantitative 
insights into the psychosocial outcomes on farmers and the wider community following the 
drought, earthquake and the beginning of M. Bovis. All Right? is a Canterbury based social 
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marketing company which focuses on normalising conversations around wellbeing and mental 
health (All Right? 2018b). While the study focused on impacts following the Kaikōura 
earthquake, the drought was also discussed.  
 
With an N of 150 in the Hurunui, key findings showed that 15% of respondents considered life 
was worse after the earthquake, 66% the same, and 19% better. The impacts of the earthquake 
were wide ranging, with 66% stating their neighbourhood was damaged, 55% saying their own 
home was damaged, but 80% were confident in their ability to manage repairs to their house 
and property. Respondents were overwhelmingly more aware of the need to focus more on 
their own wellbeing (95%) and the importance of knowing their neighbours (91%). With regard 
to recent adverse events, 15% of respondents reported they were still struggling following the 
earthquakes, and 30% were still struggling with the impacts of the drought. 39% of respondents 
were worried about another big earthquake, and 34% about another drought. While most 
respondents (83%) were understanding of the time it takes for things to go back to normal, 
many (50%) reported feelings of concern about the loss of community control over decision-
making, and 44% reported feeling angry about the decisions made by ‘the powers that be’. 41% 
felt the community is less independent than it used to be (All right? 2018). The results from 
the allright study paint a picture of a community that has been through significant adverse 
events, with many who voiced their concerns about how the adverse event responses were 
managed, which provides some useful context for the current research.  
3.2.1 – Rural economic context 
In addition to physical hazards, structural changes and the legacy effects of economic 
restructuring over the last thirty years (section 2.3.5) have had a considerable impact on 
agricultural practices and rural communities in New Zealand. In 1984, nearly 40% of the 
average income of New Zealand’s sheep and beef farmers came from government subsidies 
(Burton and Peoples 2014). Within 12 months this was reduced to almost zero (Federated 
Farmers 2001).  As described by Kelsey (1995, p.11): “The mission of New Zealand’s change 
agents [was] to initiate and entrench the ‘right’ policies, not to secure socially acceptable 
outcomes. According to their theories, the two would ultimately coincide.” These were 
ideological, neoliberal free market policies with key changes for farmers including the removal 
of all agricultural subsidies, removal of minimum price schemes on wool, beef, dairy and sheep 
products, reduced tariffs, and deregulated finance markets (Kelsey 1995). Throughout the 
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1980s and 1990s, neoliberal reforms led to the privatisation of rural extension and consultancy 
services which had previously been provided at no cost (Cloke 1996). The restructuring of the 
economy during this time followed a financial crisis, ushering in an emphasis in NZ on 
evidence-based policy making which required quantifiable indicators to judge policy 
implementation and effectiveness. 
 
International analyses of NZs neoliberal reforms are mixed, with many considering them to be 
broadly positive (e.g., Vitalis 2007), However, local experiences were markedly different, with 
views emerging in the interviews that illustrate a number of negative consequences. What 
remains beyond question is that significant changes across NZ’s agricultural system exposed 
farmers to market forces in a way in which they never had been before. Today, a lack of 
environmental regulation combined with significant intensification has led to complex social, 
economic and environmental issues that have had lasting effects on rural communities (Barnett 
and Pauling 2005; Jay 2007; Gray and Le Heron 2010). As will be discussed in the next chapter, 
these reforms had significant impacts on both farmers experiences of adverse events, as well 
as the capacity of institutions to respond to them. 
3.4 - Chapter Summary 
This chapter detailed the methodological approach taken by this study. Two complementary 
paradigms of inquiry were adopted – critical realism and constructivism. Critical realism 
argued that there exist unobservable (intangible) structures which generate observable 
(tangible) events which can only be elucidated by describing and analysing the unobservable 
structures (Bhaskar 1975, Bhaskar 2002). Critical realism is drawn on as a paradigm of inquiry 
to describe neoliberalism as an unobservable structure which generates tangible outcomes.  
 
Constructivism is a highly contextual paradigm of inquiry which views reality as a collective 
mental construct that is relative to the knower (Atkinson and Delamont 2010, p.18). In this 
context, neoliberalism can be described as a specific mental construction held by a large 
number of people (a hegemonic ideology), which subjectively reshapes human action. A 
constructivist, relativist, approach is taken to understand neoliberalism (an unobservable 
structure), which implies that the specific mental construction can be modified to better 




To investigate the three research questions, an inductive qualitative research methodological 
approach was adopted. Traditional qualitative research methods such as semi-structured 
interviews, focus groups and snowball sampling were used to gather data and identify 
important actors, networks and organisations involved in the response. The final section 
described the study area and local context, drawing upon neoliberalism as outlined in the 
Literature Review (section 2.4.5) to examine how this has reshaped rural communities in NZ, 





Chapter 4 – Results  
The results of this research are presented in this chapter. The first three parts of the chapter 
describe each of the major adverse events that have impacted the Hurunui in the last decade – 
drought, earthquake and M. Bovis. Each part begins by outlining the physical impacts of each 
event, followed by a description of the social and community impacts. Next, the institutional 
response to each event is discussed from the perspectives of local farmers as well as the lead 
response agencies and other organisations that played a role during the response. This is 
supplemented by perspectives from those who organised the response at the national level, 
providing important context about how specific decisions were taken. Finally, part four takes 
a high level view of institutional responses and details a number of overarching themes that 
emerged in all adverse events.  
 
Throughout this chapter, key aspects of the results are connected to resilience concepts, and 
where relevant, the connection to social or human capital is also highlighted in brackets. The 
intent here is to link similar themes from disparate events using the capital framework to show 
how intangible phenomena can be systemically categorised across a range of contexts. 
 
A note on mental health 
 
Many of the impacts discussed in this chapter cover issues related to mental health and well-
being. Interviewing occurred when farmers were under considerable stress, both from the 
outcomes of the cascading and compounding adverse events impacts they faced, as well as 
through other sources of stress, such as emerging government regulation over water quality in 
agribusiness. Mental health has become a key part of the national conversation for farmers, and 
the findings of a systematic literature review conducted by ACC (2014) showed that farmers 
experience a high rate of suicide compared to the general population. Influencing factors 
include the institutional setting, such as the regulatory environment, and uncontrollable events 
such as drought, disease, mental illness, and peak work periods. 
 
Before interviews began, a reconnaissance trip was taken to the field area where an event about 
farmer resilience and dealing with mental health challenges was being hosted in the township 
of Cheviot. During this event one of the farmers, male, and surrounded by other male peers, 
stood up to ask how, when times were tough, he could “make the bad thoughts stop”. The 
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presenter had no easy answer to that question. Seeing this farmer speak about his struggles in 
a public forum with the support of his peers was a powerful moment. Later, during the 
interviews with farmers, I observed many non-verbal gestures and behaviours that reflected the 
struggle farmers were having to find the words to convey just how much of an impact the 
disruptive events, and the institutional responses to them, have had on their lives. The quote 
below is taken from my interview notes with a farmer, who was trying to articulate how he had 
been personally affected by the drought. 
There’s no way to convey how hard it was for [the participant] to talk 
about this whole paragraph. So much more information is in what’s not 
said, or in the silences, than in what’s written here. 
Often the most important communication was not vocalised, but was observed as non-verbal, 
body language. At times, rather than talking about their own lived experience directly, many 
of the farmers (especially males) would more easily describe how the impacts had been felt 
within the community around them, and they did this in objective terms. A good example of 
this came from K8/1, who said “on a personal level, it was very stressful for households. Lot 
of sleepless nights for a lot of farmers.” Female participants, in contrast, were more likely to 
engage in open discussion about the subjective impacts of the events.  
 
Regional and national level respondents often discussed how farmers communicated mental 
health challenges and some attempted to explain how to interpret farmer behaviours and 
responses. For example, K23/132 suggested “Farmers are a different beast. When you sit down 
with a farmer and his wife, the first thing is, sometimes you have to lead them a bit. Because 
they are not used to speaking out, and they’re certainly not used to talking about their 
feelings.” Overall, while these conversations were challenging, there was also a significant 
degree of willingness to engage, and to push past the difficulty. For some farmers, it seemed 
they felt a sense of duty to describe and acknowledge the mental health impacts that adverse 
events had on farmers, in line with the public conversation and sector campaigns about 
recognising these issues. They often referred to memorabilia, or visible paraphernalia from 
mental health programmes such as ‘Farm Strong’, which is a national well-being programme 
for rural communities (Farm Strong 2020). Their responses also reflected frustration and anger 
about how some of the adverse event responses had been experienced in their community.  
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The data and quotes from farmers presented throughout this chapter should be viewed in this 
context.  
 
The poem below – written by an Australian farmer named Murray Hartin and titled Rain from 
Nowhere – was mentioned to me by a farmer when he spoke of drought. It is a poignant, but 
fitting, beginning to this chapter.  
His cattle didn’t get a bid, they were fairly bloody poor, 
What was he going to do? He couldn’t feed them anymore, 
The dams were all but dry, hay was thirteen bucks a bale, 
Last month’s talk of rain was just a fairytale, 
His credit had run out, no chance to pay what’s owed, 
Bad thoughts ran through his head as he drove down Gully Road. 
Geez, great grandad bought the place back in 1898, 
Now I’m such a useless bastard, I’ll have to shut the gate. 
Can’t support my wife and kids, not like dad and those before, 
Crikey, Grandma kept it going while Pop fought in the war. 
With depression now his master, he abandoned what was right, 
There’s no place in life for failures, he’d end it all tonight. 
There were still some things to do, he’d have to shoot the cattle first, 
Of all the jobs he’d ever done, that would be the worst. 
He’d have a shower, watch the news, then they’d all sit down for tea 
Read his kids a bedtime story, watch some more TV, 
Kiss his wife goodnight, say he was off to shoot some roos 
Then in a paddock far away he’d blow away the blues. 
But he drove in the gate and stopped – as he always had 
To check the roadside mailbox – and found a letter from his Dad. 
Now his dad was not a writer, Mum did all the cards and mail 
But he knew the writing from the notebooks that he’d kept from cattle sales, 
He sensed the nature of its contents, felt moisture in his eyes, 
Just the fact his dad had written was enough to make him cry. 
Son, I know it’s bloody tough, it’s a cruel and twisted game, 
This life upon the land when you’re screaming out for rain, 
There’s no candle in the darkness, not a single speck of light 
But don’t let the demon get you, you have to do what’s right, 
I don’t know what’s in your head but push the bad thoughts well away 
See, you’ll always have your family at the back end of the day 
Murray Hartin – Rain from Nowhere 
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4.1 – Drought 
The Hurunui drought of 2014-2017 was unusual for New Zealand. It persisted through two 
winters, making it one of the longest droughts in recent history (and the worst since 1998-99).  
Local precipitation fell from an average of 200+ mm per year, to 60mm; grass growth slowed, 
and the cost of supplemental feed rose dramatically due to increased demand. Due to feed 
shortages, farmers substantially reduced animal numbers, and in some instances completely 
destocked (Mol et al. 2017). The drought created significant challenges in all aspects of farmers 
lives – financial, business and interpersonal. Alongside the financial implications, the 
significant impact on animal welfare, personal and household stress, and well-being issues 
intertwined to create a complex set of challenges.  
 
The next section details the impacts of the drought on farmers, beginning with financial 
implications and then covering the personal and community dimensions. Next, the response to 
the drought is outlined, with the Rural Support Trust and Drought Committee playing 
instrumental roles. Finally, two themes that resonate throughout the rest of the chapter are 
examined, (i) the cascading and compounding nature of the hazards, and (ii), the implications 
of stress on social resilience. 
4.1.1 – Impact 
This section covers the range of impacts that drought had on farmers in the Hurunui, including 
financial impacts, mental health, the impact of preparedness and stress. The most commonly 
cited impact of the drought was financial. Most respondents began the discussion here. 
It was the drought over 3 years, I mean, that cost everybody hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. You don’t just… you never catch that up (K3/1). 
For the drought, from a business perspective it’s been a financial thing. It’s 
been quite a cost on the business (K8/1). 
So… the drought.. there’s the obvious economic effect that you get. In the 
most severe year, our income was 10% of what it would normally be. So 
you go through this horrible time where you have no income for a year. 
Because you know there’s nothing on the place. So… it cost us [number 
removed, low 6 figures], that drought. Basically. That’s actual income loss 
(K7/1). 
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A regional level respondent described the nature of the financial stress farmers faced during 
the drought from a mid-level perspective. 
The drought was extremely challenging financially. It affected people 
severely in terms of their bottom line, and the progression of their career. 
When someone has a farming career, they start with lots of debt initially, 
and then over time they pay off that debt. And probably spend the last few 
years of their farming career debt free and doing what they want to do. And 
consolidating the money they want to retire. When you have something like 
a drought, it sets them back half a million dollars. It might not seem like 
that much in the context of a high performing dairy farm system, but in the 
context of these dryland farming systems [in the Hurunui], it’s actually a 
really quite a bit. When a farm might be worth $2-3 million, even though 
it’s quite a large farm, losing half a million dollars will set them back 5-10 
years in terms of their overall life program (K22/2P). 
Farmers also described how the financial impacts weren’t just concentrated during the event 
itself, but were continuing to be felt when interviewing occurred. Two farmers who were 
particularly impacted described the long term nature of the financial impacts both on and off 
farm. K7/1 explained that “If your pasture is getting on a bit, and then you get hit by 3 years 
of drought, it basically dies. And then you are just growing weeds. So it looks green, but it’s 
just growing weeds.” She went onto to explain the complex impacts this had on long term 
production. 
The production isn’t what it was before, it’s starting to build up slowly, but 
you have to get your fertility back in the soil…and your pasture has to be 
renewed. Until they are renewed, we have paddocks that aren’t growing 
much of anything anymore. You have to systematically go through and start 
again. Planting up. Which means that while you do that, you’re not 
carrying quite the same stock as what you would normally (K7/1). 
There were second order effects as well. K8/1 described how a lack of cashflow impacted other 
operations on farm. “Things got prolonged during that time, the business went without some 
maintenance, vehicle didn’t get replaced. Which is purely just financial.” He went onto 
describe how second order effects then created off-farm impacts as well, stating that the 
drought “…had a huge flow on [impact on] the community because people stop spending 
money.” Hurunui Mayor Winton Dalley (K2/231P) discussed this problem as well, observing 
that “So these things [adverse events] cascade…they’re not confined [on farm]. We felt the 
stress of the drought for three years, and that stress reduced spending.” He went on to describe 
several examples of how this translated throughout the district in terms of business spending, 
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as well as on essential services such as health and education. The financial impacts of the 
drought were such that many farmers didn’t want to know how bad it really was. K7/1 
observed:  
I think a lot of farmers don’t really know what the economic impact of the 
drought is on their farm, because they don’t sit down and do the math, as 
they’re too scared of what it’ll look like (K7/1). 
While the financial implications of the drought were significant, they were also linked to 
negative impacts on personal wellbeing. K8/1 described how “it was very stressful for 
households, lots of sleepless nights for a lot of farmers” and K8/1 identified negative issues 
for community wellbeing: “And negativity in the community as well, a lot of negativity 
around”. Discussions with farmers revealed how the financial impact on the business flowed 
into the social dimensions, causing human impact.  
3 ½ years of drought has taken a fair toll on economics and general 
wellbeing of the animals and the people that are managing them and 
looking after them. It was an exceptionally tough time, you’re just in the 
middle of everything, and you have to make decisions as they come along. 
It was not good. But you know… it took a major toll financially, and then 
that flows through to people and how they respond. Farming staff, all the 
families, and that. They all get fairly down, it affects everything (K5/1). 
The drought had significant implications for farmer well-being and mental health, issues that 
were previously not openly discussed, but have recently become a part of the public 
conversation in New Zealand. Mental health and well-being can be conceptualised as a part of 
human capital, and the quotes below should be read in context of the note on mental health at 
the beginning. 
I mean, you get a 3 year drought, and it just does your head in. It really 
does. You wonder what the hell you are gonna do next, and 90% of farmers 
love their stock, they really wanna look after them. And when you have just 
day after day of bloody nothing…. It does do your head in. No doubt about 
it (K3/1). 
Well, a drought is a fairly insidious ongoing one, so it’s always in the top 
of your mind. It doesn’t happen overnight, the likes of snowstorms, floods  
or earthquakes. It’s here and now, and it’s frightening, and you’re 
protecting what you’ve got really. And your animals, and looking after 
their welfare, and the staff. Have to be pretty careful, as people can get 
fairly… can do some unusual things (K5/1). 
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Yes we were [affected by the drought]. Pretty badly actually. We sold all 
our cattle and had our younger sheep away grazing. And it was pretty 
expensive – it was officially a drought for three years, it was pretty tough. 
When you are a farmer your stock is everything. You live amongst them, 
you take pride in how they’re looking, it’s your income as well. So that was 
pretty tough. You had to send them somewhere. Or you had to sell them. 
But then you have no income. It was a big setback, and we did lose quite a 
bit of money. It cost us a lot (K34/1). 
Women farmers were, on the whole, more willing to have candid discussions about the 
challenging wellbeing and mental health dimensions of all events. Some women farmers 
mentioned that their husbands were often unwilling to admit to the severity during the event, 
but were more willing to accept it after it had subsided. KI34/1 said “He just couldn’t focus his 
thoughts and didn’t know what to do. And he’d admit that now, but at the time he was wanting 
to be busy doing things.”  
 
Some farmers took preparedness actions which lessened the amount of uncertainty and 
financial damage, leading to better outcomes in all capital dimensions: social, human and 
economic and natural. These actions involved maintaining a buffer capacity for feed, structured 
decision making and flexible approaches to maintaining farm systems during dry periods. 
However, while these preparation actions helped mitigate the severity of the impact, it did not 
reduce the impact to negligible levels. The three quotes below serve as examples of how 
farmers prepared for the droughts.  
I’m quite a structured person, I put a lot of structure around decision 
making, and so in the drought we’d have a weekly drought meeting, righto 
what decisions have we got to make this week? Do we need to buy more 
feed or sell stock, what’ve we got to think about next week if things haven’t 
changed. That really helped us. My partnership with my father who had 
experienced this before [helped a lot as well] (K4/1). 
It’s up to us to future proof ourselves. And we do to a degree. On farms, we 
try and be 2 or 3 years ahead on feed. So if we have a drought we can get 
through it (K3/1) 
Our whole farming system is built around being flexible, and dealing with 
dry periods. Because we’ve had them throughout history in North 
Canterbury, but they still can be difficult. Dealing with a dry period is no 
problem as long as it sits within what your system can handle. Any system 
has its limits, but the stronger it is, the more it can handle. The drought we 
had a couple of years ago, it was definitely outside of that (K1/1). 
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These preparedness actions demonstrate the effectiveness of social and human capital in the 
drought context. Those who prepared for drought cited two motivations; either they had 
previously experienced drought, or they had a close connection with someone who had. 
Knowledge and understanding of how to deal with drought are human capital dimensions 
which are in turn sometimes influenced by bridging or linking social capital. In the first quote 
above, K1/1 described how his relationship with his father had helped him learn that he needed 
to prepare for droughts, and how to prepare for them. This is an example of bonding/bridging 
social capital. Additionally, during the response, Winton Dalley (K2/231p) established linking 
social capital to transfer knowledge and skills about how to deal with drought to farmers who 
didn’t have access to bonding/bridging social capital. This is discussed in more detail in section 
4.1.3. 
 
The effectiveness of drought preparation was evident, and many farmers were focused on how 
to deal with droughts in the future. K4/1 compared the drought in North Canterbury (which 
lasted 3 years) to ones in Australia (lasting up to 7 years), saying that the strategies employed 
in Australia were worth considering in Hurunui given that the long term outlook was for longer 
and more severe future droughts due to climate change. “Australia can have really long 
droughts, but some of them put bailage [feed] in the ground 23 years ago, dig it in and covered 
it over, and then recently some had just opened it up 23 years later, that’s really, really good” 
(K4/1). A high-level respondent, K12/32, made the same point; “We say drought is a big risk 
up in NC, but if you talk to an Australian farmer in NSW, they have droughts that last 7 years. 
But they still have functional farms. A lot of it is perception.” The general message from both 
groups was that farmers in the Hurunui, and New Zealand in general, will need to be prepared 
for more droughts in the future. This drought had made the farmers interviewed place more 
focus on this, which can be related back to the principle of social resilience that resilience 
occurs in contexts of adversity.  
 
The word stress was frequently used by participants to describe the impacts of each adverse 
event. Hurunui Mayor Winton Dalley (K2/231P) discussed why he considered stress to be the 
top issue for people during and after a hazard event, and why it is important. 
If we want to talk about people, stress is probably the #1 issue. That’s 
divided up into lots of different parts. You have financial stress in your 
business, and in a farming sense you have stress with a natural hazard 
event like a drought and you have stress on animals. So we have a whole 
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raft of those stresses. But they all come back to one point, they come back 
to the farm or business owner. And by virtue of most businesses being 
family businesses in the district like this, they come back to the family as 
well. So then those stresses transmit and translates into all members of the 
family and inevitably that can cause some…. interpersonal stresses, and 
then that translates into child behaviour, and then into the school, where 
you get issues. So these things cascade. 
The workload goes up [at the medical centre], because it translates into 
physical issues, and even as far as mental health. So there’s a new level of 
stress on that provider. And of course, they’re a member of the community 
as well. So they’re under stress themselves, and many of those actually 
come off a farm, like the nurses and staff. So it ends up in our communities, 
nobody’s excluded from some levels of stress. And the effect of any event. 
So we went through that with the drought for a good three years, and when 
the drought was at its apex, the earthquake struck. At the peak of the 
drought, we got hit with another whole layer of stress and issues. 
You have these multiple kinds of strands, and nobodies immune, but some 
individuals actually have a heavier load, are affected more for a whole 
range of reasons, and a lot of it [depends on] where you are at the time. 
Everybody starts in a different place, there’s no one place that people start, 
and so where they start, and when an event arrives, will impact on how 
they respond, how they can respond, and how they come out of it. 
Adverse events cause disruptions to business as usual, and these situations then require farmers 
to work in different ways and make difficult decisions in times of uncertainty. That disruption 
then generates stress which manifests itself in different ways amongst different people. Absent 
of any immediate threat to life or livelihood, stress, in its many manifestations, is the primary 
concern when considering social resilience to natural hazards. The impact of stress can be 
conceptualised as human capital, impacting physical and mental health, and will be discussed 
in further detail in section 4.1.6.  
 
The impact of the drought can be summarised in three main themes: (i) it had major financial 
implications for farm businesses (ii) there was a lot of uncertainty about how long it would 
last, and (iii) these two interrelating impacts combined to create significant amounts of stress. 
One woman farmer (K6/1) linked these problems together while describing the impact of the 
drought. She started by reflecting on how the uncertainty impacted their decision making. 
So, the drought was… people never realised how bad things were going to 
be until it happened. Our first year of drought, I think people coped ok with 
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it, and I think banks were prepared to support people. So for us, we made 
the decision to graze all our stock off farm. And that’s a lot of coin to do 
that. In hindsight, we probably should have destocked. We actually had to 
do that the following year, because we had gobbled up all our reserves in 
that first year of drought. The next year, we destocked, and we have still 
not yet regained the stock numbers. And that really eats into your profit. 
We got rid of 40% of our capital stock, so we’re slowly building back up. 
And we’re still not back to pre-drought numbers. It’s really demoralising 
getting rid of stock, because you’ve had this breeding program for the last 
25 years, and you’ve got to sell them. It’s awful selling capital stock 
(K6/1). 
The uncertainty surrounding the decision making clearly led to financial stress. She then 
discussed how this led to significant mental and well-being impacts on her family and farm 
workers. 
It’s really interesting, I spend a bit of time in the city, but it even took me a 
bit of time to realise that I really needed to be at home more, for the staff, 
for my husband. You think it’s just going to rain tomorrow, but shivers… I 
need to actually be at home, I need to just… be taking care of my people. 
Rather than… you know, I do a lot of community work and so… and I 
realised that I needed to look after my own, rather than other people. So I 
was dealing it with it on a day to day basis, and it even took me a while to 
work out (K6/1). 
And finally she connected her own situation as part of a widespread problem throughout the 
district.  
I helped out a bit with the Rural Support Team, door knocking, and the 
mental health issue was the biggest issue for particularly our farmers who 
didn’t have kids, people that couldn’t go off farm to watch sport, or go and 
do things with their kids. So it was the people/farmers that it was only them 
on the farm, they were the biggest ones. There was nothing to take them off 
farm, and it wasn’t until 1-2 years into the drought, that we actually 
realised that there was this growing mental health issue. That was when 
Rural Support really kicked in. And once they did, they’ve done a fabulous 
job. I couldn’t speak more highly of Rural Support Trust.(K6/1). 
The financial impacts in this section can be described as an impact on physical capital, and the 
drought impacts on the land as an impact on natural capital. These more tangible impacts of 
drought are widely studied, while this thesis focuses on the social and human capital impacts. 
This includes how these physical and natural capital impacts have translated into social and 
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human capital impacts. The next section will describe the institutional response to the drought, 
and how it affected the local community.  
4.1.2 – Response  
The primary government mechanism for responding to adverse events in rural areas comes 
through the Ministry for Primary Industries’ (MPI) Primary Sector Recovery Policy (PSRP) 
(PSRP 2016). The PSRP is a framework designed to “(i) protect the Government from making 
decisions that are precedent-setting and have greater fiscal risk; (ii) help to constrain 
Government spending by setting guidelines for on-farm recovery assistance; (iii) provide 
stakeholders with confidence in managing their own risks and certainty that their risk 
management investments will not be undermined by ad hoc Government decisions; and (iv) 
ensure the Government acts fairly to citizens in need.” (PSRP 2016). In general, the framework 
is governed by principles which set guidelines and expectations as to how the government will 
respond during adverse events. Relevant principles in the context of this research include a 
stipulation that the Crown is not the insurer of first or last resort, and that the primary 
responsibility for risk management lies with those whom might be impacted. The Crown will 
meet basic welfare needs during events if necessary, and assistance is based on restoring 
community capacity for self-help (PSRP 2016). The policy has a strong focus on an equitable 
and fair response for all involved, and it forms the governing foundation for subsequent 
sections of this chapter that focus on response issues.  
 
Drought, in general, was described by government level participants as one of the more 
challenging types of disruptive event to respond to. The primary problem is that it’s not raining, 
and the lack of rain is not predictable. Some farmers and mid-level actors did not see this as a 
problem that the government could or should attempt solve. “So the drought affected us hugely 
on the land, but to me, I don’t see that as a government problem. Shit happens. In all honesty, 
it’s our problem” (K3/1). A regional level representative echoed that assessment. “What’s the 
government going to do? I mean, it stops raining. And it stops raining. You don’t know when 
it’s going to start raining again. But what actually can the government do?” (K22/2P). 
However, this doesn’t mean that the government does not play a role during droughts. 
 
The NZ government plays an important role in supporting farmers and farming communities 
both during and after drought events. During the Hurunui drought, local and regional 
government shared important information about preparedness and mitigation through 
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community networks. MPI provided factsheets on what to do, how to get help, and coordinated 
with stakeholder organisations and industry bodies in order to disseminate the information 
(MPI 2020A/B) (RST 2020). They also provided funding for local organisations to help  
support their community welfare efforts. K47/32P described the response from an MPI 
perspective: “We held farmer field days, helped fund community events like the ‘drought 
shout’. There was also lots of things like there was a women’s’ day in the Hurunui, money to 
rural women to run whatever they required” (K47/32P). These response activities provide an 
example of how intangible social and human capital factors were acknowledged and accounted 
for during the drought response.  
4.1.3 – Rural Support Trusts 
There were two primary institutional responses aligned with the PSRP that emerged during the 
drought. The regional response led by the Rural Support Trust (RST), and the Drought 
Committee which was established during the event in order to coordinate the response between 
stakeholder organisations (including Federated Farmers, Beef and Lamb, DairyNZ and the 
RST). The RSTs are organisations, made up of volunteers who are often retired farmers, that 
operate independently and there are 14 chapters nationwide. While some funding comes from 
local donations, they are primarily funded by the government to provide support where needed, 
especially in times of crisis. While additional support is provided after adverse events, the 
government funds RSTs to maintain response capability “When it comes to the RSTs, we 
actually fund them to maintain a certain level of capacity…help them build and maintain 
capability and capacity to deal with these things [adverse events]” (K25/23P). 
 
Conversations with representatives from MPI, the North Canterbury RST and other private 
organisations revealed differences in structure and purpose between the RST chapters. 
Accordingly, the discussion surrounding the RST in this section specifically refers to the North 
Canterbury Chapter, and national perspectives of RST effectiveness in other regions was not 
considered. In the North Canterbury RST, retired farmers are recruited to volunteer their time 
to support farmers (the people rather than the businesses) following adverse events. 
Respondents made it clear that the RST is about supporting people. Their website (Rural 
Support 2020b) describes their purpose:  
On any normal day, we know that living and working rurally can be a 
challenge. Sometimes things can get a bit too much. If this might be you 
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right now, or you are concerned for a family member or friend, call (XXX) 
for a free, confidential chat. RSTs cover all aspects of rural agribusiness; 
dry stock, dairy, cropping, horticulture, forestry, poultry, and rural 
contracting. We support all rural people - owners, managers, staff, and 
contractors. 
Using the framework provided by the PSRP MPI classified the drought as a medium scale 
event which triggered NZ$400,000 in funding support for the local RST to use for response 
activities. Respondents representing MPI described this process clearly and the quote below is 
representative of multiple respondents. 
We have the primary sector recovery policy, which is how central 
government assistance is triggered. MPI is the steward of it, we are the 
implementer, but we work with Inland Revenue and the Ministry for Social 
Development (K25/23P). 
The way in which the RSTs operate was well known locally. Winton Dalley (K2/231P) 
described the purpose of the RSTs, emphasising their role in supporting people above all else. 
Overall, he was positive and satisfied with how the drought response was conducted, in notable 
contrast to his views following the earthquake.  
The Rural Support Trusts are there to look after people, not the business, 
not animals, they are there to look after people. The funding stream from 
the government has been about supporting people. So if a business goes 
under because of a natural event, or any event, then that’s the way life is. 
But you don’t let it destroy the people. The Rural Support Trust is there to 
be the net to catch people. And it could be to help them manage an exit 
from the business, there has been one or two of those over time. It could be 
just short term support for them in terms of food and whatever, it could be 
support with health, or mental health. Any of that stuff, to do with people 
and family. That’s the government funding, and I don’t have a lot of 
problems with that. The provision of it has been more than adequate for 
our events, for that role (K2/231P). 
One representative from the North Canterbury RST was interviewed (K23/132), and he 
described the nature and ethos of their work. “Our philosophy in the trust is that we have an 
0800 number, and if someone calls that, we have someone there in person within an hour.” 
During the drought the RST conducted approximately 1100 farm visits. Local knowledge was 
critical to understanding the social vulnerability context; “No one ever talks about it directly, 
we don’t say we’re worried you’re going to top yourself, but in other ways we made sure that 
we kept in touch with those people” (K23/132). The work was demanding, but ultimately 
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described as having  significant value to farmers and the community. “Most of the week I’d be 
spending 2 hours a night on the phone, just connecting with farmers that I knew were 
vulnerable and struggling. And you know, someone has to do it. A lot of farmers, that’s the 
only social contact they have. They’re quite isolated” (K23/132). Many research participants 
at all levels either interacted with or worked with RSTs during the drought, and all were 
positive about the impact, importance and effectiveness of their work.  
 
While this research focusses on the North Canterbury chapter of the RST, many respondents 
at higher levels made general comments about RSTs as being one of the most effective tools 
the government has for response. K16/321P noted: 
The RST is a marvellous thing for government. Because if there’s one thing 
that ministers hate, it’s surprises, or things they can’t respond to, and 
being able to say that they can get RST to do something about this is a 
great position for the minister to be in. It allows him to be seen to be 
actually doing something, and taking responsibility. But he’s not actually 
doing a bloody thing. It’s all happening out there. The other component 
about that from the government point of view, is that it’s a very cheap and 
cost effective means of calming the community in a disaster situation. It’s a 
very cheap way for the government to cover their butt. And make no 
mistake, policy staff are aware of that, as are ministers (K16/321P). 
The RST representative interviewed was more blunt: 
The work that the RSTs do for MPI and the like is done for a pittance. If 
they paid what it actually cost, it would be far, far more [expensive]. It’s a 
very good deal (K23/132). 
The RSTs may be a ‘good deal’ for the government, but they are an even better deal for farmers. 
There was unanimous support for RSTs from farmer participants, and many spoke very 
positively about their experience of being supported by the RST. For example: 
One of the most important things, when people are under stress, is to… 
they’ve got to feel that they’re not alone. And you have [name removed] 
with the Rural Support Trust. Now, it’s not whether you can do much, it’s 
showing that there is support there. People get stressed, and then it all 
starts to spiral downhill, but just someone coming along and saying ‘you’re 
not alone in this’ can make a huge difference. For people. So the Rural 
Support Trust did that (FG/12). 
They’re lovely people, very thoughtful, and by doing what they do… having 
someone just turn up and have a yarn to you… it’s worth gold. It really is.  
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I mean, everyone deals with problems differently. You know, some people 
get quite vocal and others just stop. They need the tools to be able to find 
those people. The average person, they’ll get out, go out and talk to their 
friends, you know, compare notes, but you gotta find those that withdraw. 
They are the ones that need support. And they did. Because they had the 
tools to do it. And to me, that was probably the best thing that happened 
out of the bloody drought really. But you gotta have the right drive to do 
that, and that’s critically important (K3/1). 
Just being able to have a conversation with them, the rural support trust, 
for a start I suppose. Having them come and meet us. I’ve found them good. 
Lot of good people in there. Personally, I couldn’t say enough about them 
really. They’ve been really good. There’s only so much you can do, but I 
really do believe that they’ve probably saved a few lives along the way, 
through suicide prevention (K8/1). 
One participant (K16/321P) who had worked in the sector for over 40 years discussed an 
example that revealed the impact that the North Canterbury RST had on the drought. He did 
this by contrasting the drought response from the RST with another similar event years ago 
when the RST did not exist.  
There was another example, Waimate had a severe drought for three years, 
exactly the same as the one in the Hurunui, it was a full three years of 
disaster. Now, the outcome from that was disastrous, there was a collapse 
in families, a lot of people went broke. A heap of psych and related medical 
problems. All told, financially it was a disaster for the district. These things 
didn’t happen up here in a virtually similar drought situation, and I’m 
convinced that the difference is, I was involved in both, in the south 
Canterbury one, which occurred in the 80s, the people were just left alone. 
No one did anything. Up here, there was a huge number of events put in 
place which brought people together every week. No one was ever left 
alone. They might not have been given much, but they were never left 
alone. And if they weren’t talking to someone, then someone went and 
talked to them. And I’m convinced that that is the difference. 
There were just so many events set up and that was what the RST [and 
Drought Committee which is discussed next] did. They have people all over 
the district, and they know what’s going on with everyone. Most of these 
people are women, and they’ll catch up at the shop, or whatever, and if 
they don’t see each other, they’ll ring and find out. But these people are 
really good at being able to identify that there is a need to do this or that. 
Might only be a BBQ or a social get together of some sort, and the funds 
that come to us at the RST (some from gov, but a hell of a lot from the 
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general public), poured into these things. And they could happen without 
restraint. We were not short of farmers (K16/32P). 
There are two key points to emphasise in these quotes. Firstly, the aid the RST provided was 
not financial or tangible. It was emotional support. This is not quantifiable, and so the value 
cannot be adequately described objectively, only qualitatively. Second, while the events hosted 
by RSTs are mentioned, these weren’t officially planned by external agencies. Local 
knowledge drove when, where and how these events occurred. As will be discussed later 
(section 4.4.1) in context of other event responses, often this was done on a high trust model 
during the drought, which gave the community a sense of their own ability to manage using 
internal resources rather than seeking external support, which generated significant positive 
outcomes. 
 
The nature of RSTs support of farmers demonstrates how social and human capital are 
intertwined. The RSTs, made up of volunteers who are often retired farmers, have considerable 
knowledge and skills (human capital), which they leverage to generate bridging and linking 
social capital into the Hurunui community. Both of these factors have played a significant role 
in the positive outcomes described in this section. The praise for the work the RSTs did during 
the drought was present across all groups, public and private sector. The funding the 
government provided to RSTs to support the drought response was the most effective of all 
central government response actions discussed in this research.  
4.1.4 – Drought Committee 
The second response tool deployed by the government was the Drought Committee. This was 
set up by the Hurunui District Council and was driven by the Mayor, Winton Dalley (K2/321P). 
His motivations were to provide support for people “I was probably in that fairly secure space, 
and had weathered all these storms over the last 70 years, and was in a position to kind of be 
there as a bit of a support for those who were in those different spaces.” His goals during the 
response were to enable others to make good decisions and help them learn from the past 
experience of more seasoned farmers.  
[We didn’t want to] breastfeed people, but to support them. And to 
encourage them to make the decisions, encourage them to find the 
solutions, and just to be there to give a bit of wisdom, and learnings from 
the past, and hope that they will then become more resilient because 
they’ve weathered this particular storm, and then come out of the other end 
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stronger. Because that’s what you want, you want everyone to come out 
stronger, not weaker (K2/231P). 
Winton was not the only one to recognise the need for a coordinated rural voice.  
During the drought, MPI was starting to recognise the need for a 
coordinated rural voice. That the info that was coming in was coming from 
all sorts of different places, and they didn’t know how they should be 
responding to that. They were saying that we needed something more 
coordinated (K7/1). 
The Drought Committee met weekly or fortnightly to discuss emerging problems being faced 
by farmers and work towards finding solutions. The formation of the committee was seen as a 
positive. From one farmer’s (K8/1) perspective, “the drought committee was probably the best 
response, because we had everyone in there. Fed farmers, B+L, Dairy NZ, MPI etc.” The RSTs 
also played a significant role in the Drought Committee, providing support where need was 
identified and coordinating with all the other stakeholders. The local and ad hoc manner in 
which this occurred made it difficult to delineate between the role of the Drought Committee, 
and how that differed from the RSTs role. In general, the role the Drought Committee played 
was to develop needs assessments, and then work strategically to meet that need. This ranged 
from advice on steps to take to mitigate drought impacts such as when to destock, to 
coordinating with the RSTs in order to ensure that those in difficult situations received mental 
health support. Or organising local events in places that were hard hit in order to keep up 
morale. Information was disseminated during events such as field days, or meetings of local 
community groups. Like the RST response, the drought committee also demonstrates the 
intertwined nature of social and human capital. The establishment of connections between all 
relevant stakeholder groups allowed for the coordinated deployment of their knowledge and 
skills, which played an important role in the drought response. 
 
Establishing the Drought Committee’s role during the drought response is important, because 
the Drought Committee went on to play a significant role during the earthquake response, 
transforming into what is now called the Rural Advisory Group. This thread will be picked up 
for further discussion in section 4.2.6. 
4.1.5 – Compounding hazard events 
It is important to note the compounding and cascading nature of the adverse events experienced 
by the Hurunui community. While this chapter presents each hazard as separate event, in 
 95 
reality, research participants frequently contextualised the impact of one event by describing 
how it had flowed on from a previous event. It was common for the impacts related to the 
drought and the earthquake to be conflated, since most participants had been affected by both 
events which overlapped during the apex of the drought.  
 
A key informant from MPI (K47/32P) discussed compounding and cascading hazards in 
context of the Drought Committee. “…so that was the drought...and then we had the 
earthquake on the 14th of November. And we were kind of getting out of the earthquake, when 
M. Bovis happened in July 2017. So it was just one disaster after another.” Farmers also 
discussed how the hazards compounded and cascaded. 
I think the drought sort of just gnawed away at you. Incremental, little by 
little it just got worse and worse and worse to the point where we were 
thinking ‘why have we paid all this money for grazing, we should have 
possibly sold them at the time and just had a year off’. Whereas the 
earthquake was just huge, it was monumental, it was massive, and it was 
instant. And then we were flown into a different world, we were in a 
completely different mindset, frame. So we didn’t have any preparation, it 
was just… that’s it. Whereas with the drought, you could see it coming, you 
were slightly mitigating against it if you could, and making decisions little 
by little. But they did compound. I think for my husband especially. He was 
quite ground down by the drought. And then the earthquake on top of that 
really floored him (K34/1). 
Many farmers considered this to simply be a fact of life in New Zealand.  
New Zealand is positioned on two tectonic plates just above the roaring 
40s. We get everything. So the last 10 years, we had three major 
earthquakes, plus we had floods in 2009, and we had the windstorms in 
2011/2012 when all the big irrigators fell over (K7/1). 
Even through the challenges faced by farmers, some were still able to describe positive 
outcomes of their experiences, particularly in terms of the social connectedness and community 
spirit:  
Like I said, this area is still financially coping with the drought, then we 
had the good old earthquake. And there’s nothing like a big disaster to 
really bring people together. So there are some positive outcomes of all 
this, it did grow our sense of community. And it also made us realise that 
our community is a good community, and that we needed to celebrate that 
more. Going forward. And that we have people with good skills (K6/1). 
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Winton Dalley (K2/231P) also emphasised the compounding nature of the hazard events for 
the Hurunui, noting the extra stress it caused: 
So we went through that with the drought for a good three years, and when 
the drought was at its apex, the earthquake struck. At the peak of the 
drought, we got hit with another whole layer of stress and issues. Not the 
entire district, but a significant part of it. And probably at least 50% of the 
farming community had at least some level of effect of the earthquake on 
top of the drought stress (K2/231P). 
4.1.6 – Stress and Social Resilience 
The major impact of the compounding and cascading nature of the hazard events from a social 
resilience perspective was the cumulative stress experienced by those affected. 
Psychologically, stress can impact rational thinking and decision-making, which is especially 
important in a disaster context. As discussed in section 2.2.1 Shields et al. (2016, p.1) note: 
“Core executive functions such as working memory, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility are 
integral to daily life. A growing body of research has suggested that acute stress may impair 
core executive functions.” Kahneman’s (2012) System 1 (fast, automatic, frequent, emotional, 
stereotypic, unconscious) and System 2 (slow, effortful, infrequent, logical, calculating, 
conscious) model helps illustrate the impacts of stress. During highly stressful periods such as 
adverse events, humans default to using System 1 thinking (Kahneman 2012). For long term 
events such as the impact of drought, or recovery from earthquake, logical and conscious 
System 2 thinking is much more valuable. Stress can be described as an impact on human 
capital because it affects physical and mental health. Winton Dalley (K2/231P) talked about 
this when discussing the impact of stress.  
I’ve experienced a lot in my life time and the first thing that stops working 
when your under stress is the thing you need most to make hard decisions 
[the ability to think]. Critical. So what we did, was during our field days 
was to assist people to make those hard decisions, and that was by giving 
them, not telling them, but giving them some good advice, and options. 
That kinda took away the burden of making that decision, because someone 
else was actually helping them make the decision. So that was critical, and 
in terms of mental health, and suicide, and those kinds of things, I’m pretty 
certain that might have avoided some of that, because they were assisted to 
make decisions (K2/231P). 
This assisted decision making was also applied to those who were in repeated contact with 
farmers.  
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We organised mental health 101, for rural professionals, so with bankers 
and accountants and stock agents and you name it, who are working with 
farmers every day, to understand, because they are the ones that see them 
every day, so they can see that, oh jeez, old Fred down the road, he’s not 
doing too well. But don’t know what to do about it. [So we give them 
options] (K2/231P). 
During interviews, farmers were asked whether the stress caused from the events, as well as 
the responses to events (as will be discussed in sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.2), impacted on their 
abilities to make good decisions. The evidence was overwhelming. The quotes below are 
representative of how stress impacted farmers’ abilities to make good decisions in times of 
crisis from their perspective.  
Yup, you definitely see it. Farmers are probably some of the worst at 
getting very focused on what they’re doing day to day, and not looking up, 
and looking out. And I definitely can get into that when we get busy or 
through the winter we’ve been a person down in terms of staff, and so it’s 
just more of the practical stuff onto my plate, so yeah, the old brain can 
only cope with so much. You just sort of shut off that sort of looking 
forward, more strategic thinking. So you just gotta deal with that for that 
period, and then get back into it (K1/1). 
All the time. You see people that haven’t been getting enough sleep, haven’t 
been taking a break, procrastinated on making a decision, and so the 
situation gets worse, and suddenly they’ve got skinny sheep. I do see this as 
a big issue (K8/1). 
When discussing the drought, the same farmer reflected on the significance of the decisions 
that had to be made while they were in that mental state: 
Droughts are difficult, because when you mix it all together, you’ve got a 
hell of a lot of decisions you have to make, you have to be real decisive, in 
that time, and you know in the back of your mind that every one of these 
decisions is a $20,000 decision. But you’ve got to do it (K8/1). 
The problem also emerged organically in multiple interviews. Regional and national level 
perspectives were valuable on this subject, as they were often in a position to see patterns of 
behaviour moreso than farmers. They also suggested some solutions, similar to Winton 
Dalley’s decision to organise the Drought Committee. Namely, providing decision making 
support to people under stress. 
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When people are too stressed, they just seem to switch off from all the 
information. Getting someone to work alongside or support them for 
bureaucratic processes would be very useful (K21/2P). 
I know that I’d find that I was talking to people, and they’re fine, they’re 
fine, they’re fine, and then the combined pressure for one reason or 
another…. Sometimes people are just like “shit, I can’t decide what to do 
today”. Yesterday I knew I could go and do this, and that and that, and I 
did it for 14 hours, and today I just don’t know what to do.” And then 
someone turning up and having a cup of tea [and a discussion]… “oh now 
I know what to do” (K17/321P). 
I’ve definitely noticed that. Especially in a response, that people are so 
busy thinking about getting through today, or the next hour, or whatever, to 
try and get them to make decisions about something… it’s just not the right 
time. They’re not in the right headspace for that. And sometimes just 
helping them get through… where are we going to put the stock today? 
What are we going to have for tea today? What am I going to do with my 
kids today? That kind of day to day thing, rather than worrying about 
running the business is just sort of… day by day [KI29/2P]. 
Stress is not new. One respondent described how it has been dealt with in the past amongst 
farming families.  
Well, this is why farmers are a husband and wife kind of thing… Often the 
wife, and I shouldn’t be stereotyping, but they often are the more strategic 
thinker, tactical and operational work, actually going out and doing on the 
farm management, the husband, the man… I’m digging a hole here, but it’s 
often the women who are sitting at home doing the accounts and having 
more time for reflection, can actually provide the longer term strategic 
view. I think there’s probably a bit of an opportunity to capture and 
support that capability there (K12/32). 
Addressing these issues are a cornerstone of resilience for Winton Dalley (K2/231P). 
I hate the word resilience, but it does say what it says. So I gotta use it. So 
yeah, that was kind of, if I had a vision, that was get them through the 
drought stuff, and then start building resilience for the next event, because 
what I can tell you, there is one coming. Dunno what it’s gonna be, or 
when it’s going to arrive, but there is one coming. So, um, during the 
drought, we didn’t know there was going to be an earthquake, and during 
the earthquake, we didn’t know there was going to be M. Bovis. And we 
don’t know what the next one is (K2/231P). 
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In summary, five key issues have emerged from the first part of this chapter: (i) the drought 
had a significant impact on farmers, both financially and mentally; (ii) the primary problem 
from a social and human capital perspective was stress; (iii) too much stress was observed to 
reduce farmers’ abilities to make good decisions under pressure; (iv) the primary response 
activities were viewed as highly successful by all involved because they worked to reduce that 
stress; and (v) a key factor in the response was the strong relationships that responders had with 
those impacted, and their knowledge of the local area and the context.  
 
Stress and its impact on decision-making is a common theme throughout the rest of this chapter. 
The effectiveness of the drought response in terms of providing social support directly to 
farmers sits in direct contrast to the poor opinion locals had of the subsequent responses to the 
earthquake and M. Bovis. Strong relationships (social capital) and the capacity of responders 
to engage effectively with local communities (human capital) have been key factors in the 
effectiveness of the drought response, demonstrating both resilience as a process and the 
importance of engagement, however the nature of the earthquake and M. Bovis disaster 
responses led to very different outcomes.  
4.2 – Earthquake 
At two minutes after midnight on the 14th of November 2016, a large magnitude (Mw 7.8) 
earthquake struck the region during the apex of the drought. The Hurunui-Kaikōura earthquake, 
as it became known, had its epicentre in the district and involved 21 faults rupturing over an 
area of 200km2 (Kaiser et al. 2017).  Large ground motions resulted in significant damage, with 
thousands of co-seismic landslides, resulting in the closure of much of the main arterial route 
- State Highway 1 – for over a year (Stevenson et al. 2017). Distributed infrastructure such as 
water and power were also disrupted, including a significant quantity of stored stock water. 
There were significant flow on effects for the entire economy, in particular tourism, primary 
sector productivity, and social and psychological wellbeing (Stevenson et al. 2017, Fountain et 
al. 2019, Cradock-Henry et al. 2019).  
 
Applying the same structure as part one, the impact of the earthquake, and the response to it 
are considered first. The interaction between the lead response agency for the earthquake – 
Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management – and the local community is then 
examined. The next section details the inability to integrate local knowledge into the 
institutional decision-making processes, which was a major problem with the response that 
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local participants identified. The role of the Drought Committee and its transformation into the 
Rural Advisory Group in order to integrate local knowledge into the decision-making structures 
is discussed next. Finally, the Uninsurable Infrastructure Relief Fund, and other policy 
responses, are discussed as another example of how failing to integrate local context into policy 
responses can lead to/result in negative outcomes. 
4.2.1 – Impact 
The impacts of the Hurunui-Kaikōura earthquake across the district were varied, with 
properties in the northern Hurunui receiving the most significant damage. The regional hub 
town of Cheviot, escaped major damage which was advantageous as it served as a staging post 
for locals allowing the primary response to be directed towards the most affected farmers. One 
local government representative (K9/21P), who was also a farmer, commented that “We were 
quite lucky here in Cheviot, it was the north part of the district that got the brunt of it, the 
actual town was alright.” Impacts on farms were varied, including direct physical damage, as 
well as impacts on mental well-being. As was observed during the drought, the most notable 
social impact was stress. 
The earthquake was very stressful, but it was short term. I mainly dealt 
with fences. But from a business perspective most people’s issues were that 
the roads and water were out. Fences were out for containing stock too. As 
a household, very tough for the young family. Even though we didn’t get a 
lot of damage here, children were scared and everyone was… a bit you 
know… concerned. Just put a lot of strain on a lot of families (K8/1). 
The physical damage ranged from minor to major across the district, for farmers this included 
damage to water systems, fences, farm tracks, culverts, bridges and other uninsurable 
infrastructure. 
And the earthquake was… we were not affected as much, just having our 
septic tank pumped out for the fourth time, you know (K5/1). 
The earthquake was just huge, it was monumental, it was massive, and it 
was instant. And then we were thrown into a different world, we were in a 
completely different mindset, frame. So we didn’t have any preparation, it 
was just… that’s it. We lost our house and our pool. No one died, but we 
lost the ease of our life. How things were (K34/1). 
Damage to houses, water systems (stock water, grey water and potable water) and 
infrastructure were all commonly reported (Hamling et al. 2017). Disruption to water supply 
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was a described as an important issue. Compounding this was the fact that all farmers were 
experiencing the apex of a severe drought. 
Water supply was a big one, in the badly affected areas. That’s a bit of a 
vulnerability for these local areas. There were water schemes up in the 
Waiau that took almost 3 weeks to get back going again. And going into 
summer, stock water was a real issue [given the drought]. Easy to get 
bottled water for people, but big numbers of stock… That’s incredibly hard 
on people. Mentally as well (K1/1). 
With regards to the earthquake, we are fortunate that we are on this side of 
the Waiau river. Farm wise, we had to replace half of our tank fittings, 
water tanks, and now we’re seeing the odd slip on tracks that are probably 
from it, after rain. But, financially… we were probably $50 of tank fittings 
and 2 hours of work. Might be about $1k in regards to on the farm stuff. 
Household wise, there’s three houses on the property, parents, our house 
and a cottage we rent out. There’s damage to all of those, which will need 
building work. Not just insurance claims. That’s going to be the big one, 
the disruption when we do all the building work, and have to move out of 
our house and stuff (K4/1). 
The event had a significant impact on farmer mental health, and that of the wider local 
community. After the earthquake struck a farmer’s wife (K34/1), who did not get involved in 
farming herself, observed “…my husband was running around in circles. He just couldn’t focus 
his thoughts, and didn’t know what to do.” Some of these impacts were long lasting. One 
woman farmer (K7/1) had been impacted by the 2011 Christchurch earthquakes, and discussed 
how this had brought it all back up for her. 
I had nightmares for a long time where I’d wake up trying to get out of our 
bedroom (points to it), trying to get out those doors. I notice even now I 
can’t…in fact I’ve been caught out twice this year going into Christchurch. 
One time I went and parked in a parking building because I had to go to 
something in the Environment Court, and I had to go to the parking 
building, and I just… had quite a wee panic attack getting out of there 
really fast. And the other day, I went to go into a meeting I was supposed to 
have, umm…it was up on the third floor on the old building, and I couldn’t 
do it. I just couldn’t stay in there. It was like… nope (K7/1). 
She also discussed the mental impact it had had on her children.  
I’ve noticed… well, for my kids, they’re 17 and 14, and they don’t want to 
be left here alone. They don’t like to be on their own. And I know that’s the 
same with children everywhere. Young people who you normally expect 
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would be dying for an opportunity to have the house to themselves, it’s like 
“where are you going, how long are you gonna be?” and it’s just that… 
not you know… the idea of being by themselves if another one hits (K7/1). 
The event caused some participants to reflect on their lives, and their connection to the land. 
Many farmer participants discussed their history on the land, what it meant to them, and linked 
that back to their drive to be more resilient. The quote below is one example, but many farmers 
offered similar thoughts. 
Well, you think about why you are here, why are we farming. What is it 
about this place that keeps us here and keeps us doing it. People said to us, 
you’ve lost your home and you want to build another house, are you 
building to sell, or building to stay? And that got us thinking. No, we were 
building to stay. We want to stay here, it’s a family farm, my husband’s 
father bought it, and he’s been here all his life. And we realised, no we do 
want to stay here, it’s a special place. Its where we’ve raised our kids. 
It’s… we want to make a go of it, and luckily, throughout the time, I could 
work, so while we were getting more into debt, we had to take out extra 
mortgages and things but we were able to keep up with school fees etc. 
There was enough coming through (K34/1). 
When discussing the impact of the earthquake, the context of the drought was often brought 
up. One farmer/local government representative (K9/21P) described the positives of having the 
earthquake in the middle of the drought. “If we’d had the earthquake, and the ground had been 
wet you’d have had a lot more damage. We didn’t get all the slumping and slipping as the 
ground wasn’t wet. We would have been working in porridge. You could get machinery in there 
easy, it wasn’t getting stuck.” A regional level respondent who worked for a government 
organisation involved in the response described the differences between the impacts of the 
earthquake, compared to the drought.  
The earthquake was a disruption, it was totally different to the drought. 
Most of the worst damage was actually insured, there was help rebuilding 
what wasn’t. The devastating impact you’d see pictured was what was on a 
few farms. Contrast that with the drought, which impacted everyone, every 
farm in the district in a very severe way. There’s very few farms that 
suffered similar economic damage, half a million dollars uninsured, to the 
drought (K22/2P). 
 
Like the impacts of the drought, the financial and physical infrastructure impacts in this section 
can be described as an impact on physical capital, and the earthquake’s impacts on the land as 
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an impact on natural capital. However, these impacts on natural and physical capital 
subsequently translated into impacts on social and human capital. The next section will 
describe the institutional response to the earthquake, and how it affected the local community. 
4.2.2 – Response  
The earthquake was varied in its impact on both people and the landscape across the district. 
The widespread damage required a coordinated response through multiple organisations 
(Trotter and Ivory 2018). The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (now 
National Emergency Management Agency) activated the National Crisis Management Centre 
to support the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) groups response to the 
earthquake. CDEM groups, in this case Canterbury CDEM, delivered the regional response, 
while supported at the national level by the National Crisis Management Centre. The local 
community response to the earthquake was widely praised, however, the regional and national 
level response was seen as frustrating and inexplicable because the lead response agency 
initially did not to engage with the local community on matters related to the response. This 
had significant negative impacts on stress levels in addition to the post-earthquake and drought 
stress, which provides an example of how a lack of adaptability (social and human capital) at 
an institutional level can affect farmer stress levels and mental well-being (human capital). 
There was no intent to increase stress, but it was the outcome of the way in which the response 
was enacted. This section covers the immediate local response, the role MPI and the RSTs 
played, and outlines a key issue in the funding provision for community connectors.  
 
The immediate response to the earthquake in Hurunui district was driven by local community 
leaders. One key respondent (K10/1) is the only local interviewed who was not a farmer or an 
organisational representative. His inclusion in the study was justified due to his name being 
widely mentioned by both farmers and local and regional representatives as a key contact. His 
role during the earthquake was to organise and drive the initial local response, then stepping 
into a coordination role when regional and national level organisations got involved. His 
perspective is a key lens for how the response played out. He described how he initially got 
involved. “The earthquake hit, I happened to have a whole lot of farmer’ contacts on my phone, 
and I just thought that I’d see how everyone is getting on, if anyone needs a hand. So I sent a 
group text out to a whole heap of farmers and started getting replies back. The next day…I just 
was checking to make sure everyone is ok and that we were getting the help that we needed in 
terms of civil defence” (KI10/1). The role he played was as a communicator and coordinator 
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between both locals and regional/national organisations once they arrived (bridging and linking 
social capital). These included CDEM, Red Cross, Salvation Army and other local community 
support agencies. The role was informal, with respondents describing him as someone who 
saw a job that needed to be done, and then got on with it. He described the part locals played 
in the initial response: 
Our role was to really find out who was in trouble, who needed help, and 
what that help was that they needed. Initially it was just that. Where people 
had no water, to get them water. If they needed food and supplies, the same 
thing. And then on the Wednesday we started talking about what was 
happening up north in Oaro,  between us and Kaikoura. And we found out 
that they weren’t being serviced by CDEM or us, so they were being left 
out. So we found out what they needed, water, matches, torches, just the 
basics and went took all of that up to them as well (K10/1). 
The coordinating role this respondent played through interacting with other organisations will 
be discussed later in section 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 in the context of the CDEM response and road 
closure. Other respondents described the local response from their perspective.  
So, I was helping organise our initial response. If anyone needed a digger, 
or something else, I’d be the one to make sure it got to where it needed to 
go. It was good having that local knowledge used like that. We had a bunch 
of damage to the water, and we got the locals on to that pretty quickly 
(K9/21P). 
Being with the local fire brigade with the earthquake what we did was look 
after family first, made sure they were all safe and sound, had generator, 
power etc, and then came straight in here, so, yeah, we sort of dealt with 
what we could, over probably a 48 hour period (K3/1). 
The Rural Support Trust also played an important role during the earthquake. 
So the Rural Support Trust were great during the earthquakes too, any 
issues that we identified as individuals, or came to us at the centre [were 
passed on]. The Rural Support Trust system worked really well. And again, 
it had some local people that knew people, and when I could say to 
someone at RST, this is the situation, they actually knew who the person 
was. It was local people dealing with local people (FG/12). 
The representative from the RST (K23/132) described the outpouring of support the 
organisation received from the community for their work. “After the earthquake we had over 
$100,000 given to us in donations to use to help farmers. We would have gotten another 
[number removed] from the government.”  He also described their purpose and role which was 
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very similar to during the drought. “We put on some quite big community functions, getting the 
community together, some cheer up stuff. And a lot of little BBQs up this road or that road. To 
me, that was really, really important in keeping the stress level down.” This is an example of 
how social capital was used by the institutional response (RST) in order to reduce stress levels, 
positively impacting human capital. The local response, and that of the RST were seen as 
positive, whereas the official response from CDEM was not. Winton Dalley (K2/231P) was 
particularly scathing of the regional and national response.  
[The earthquake response has] been a real mixed bag in my view. The 
intent from ministers is almost always flawless, and they’ve come and they 
visit, and they’ve seen, and they’ve understood. But then the official 
response from the departments and officials, is often like chalk and cheese. 
Between what the ministers saw, and literally agreed, and then what was 
delivered... That’s been my kind of, I wouldn’t call it a crusade, but it’s 
been my cause of anger and frustration. And a lot of argument in the last 
18 months (K2/231P). 
One government-funded initiative in response to the earthquake was the introduction of 
‘community connectors’. Their purpose “was to put people out into the community to identify, 
to literally get them out there talking to people, visiting people, to understand what their need 
was, and connect them with some services” (K2/231P). All participants spoken to cited this as 
an excellent initiative. The community connectors effectively supported people, and provided 
linking social capital by connecting famers to the services they needed. However, according to 
Winton Dalley, the Mayor, the funding was announced immediately after the earthquake, but 
never arrived. “So that should have happened within days of the earthquake, it happened 6 
months later. It happened, not with any government funding, it happened with us applying to 
Lotto for funding – $600,000. Six months later” (K2/231P). This is an example of an effective 
response initiative with no tangible outcomes not getting funded by a neoliberalised institution. 
 
The following sections detail four specific response actions;  the initial CDEM response 
(section 4.2.3), the management and control of the road closure (section 4.2.4), the lack of 
integration of local knowledge into decision-making processes (section 4.2.5), using the Rural 
Advisory Group to integrate local knowledge into decision-making structures (section 4.2.6) 
and the Uninsurable Infrastructure Relief Fund (section 4.2.7).  
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4.2.3 – CDEM response 
CDEM was the lead response agency for the earthquake, with a legislated role to coordinate 
the response in partnership with a range of other response agencies such as MPI.  
 
MPI was the only regional/national level organisation that was described in a positive light by 
locals during the earthquake response, with Dalley (K2/231P) saying that “MPI during that 
period had been fantastic.” A national level MPI representative discussed their role post-quake 
at a higher level.  
So MPI under the CDEM legislation, we lead drought and biosecurity, but 
we have a supporting role in everything else. The earthquake was 
something else, so supporting role. We come under the welfare section in 
CDEM, and so what we need to do is provide a rural perspective to CDEM 
for what they need. What happened in Kaikōura, was for the first 4 or 5 
days you could hardly talk to anyone. Some of our key stakeholders, formed 
team AG [Rural Advisory Group, discussed in section 4.2.6]. So, first few 
days we had team ag tried to set up a database of what all the needs were, 
who needs what when. Roads were shut, communication was down 
(K47/32P). 
However, MPI had significant issues fulfilling their role under CDEM legislation. One 
respondent (K29/2P) described this: 
Yep, we definitely had issues. Couldn’t get cows milked, couldn’t get stock 
water in, couldn’t get stock out. Biggest issue we had was the road cordon, 
we weren’t allowed in. It wasn’t safe to let the truck drivers in, and so our 
hands were tied. And we couldn’t get in because MCDEM had the road 
closed. We helicoptered people to try and get to the farms, to get them some 
water. But that took time. It could have been done better, but it was a safety 
thing at the time, who overrides what etc. We were ready to do stuff, but we 
couldn’t get in (K29/2P). 
The primary response came through Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management 
(CDEM) at the regional level.  
 
From the beginning, the CDEM response caused friction with the locals. In the Hurunui, the 
long-standing local CDEM representative had died six months previously and had not been 
replaced, meaning that there was no local with an official CDEM role to coordinate during the 
initial response. The informant who coordinated the informal initial response (K10/1) detailed 
his attempts to interact (establish linking social capital) with CDEM.  
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On Tuesday [day after the event] we said, what’s happening with CDEM, 
we don’t seem to have any CDEM or a sector post or anything here as a 
base. And so we just started asking around, and then we connected in with 
CDEM down in Amberley, just to find out what the go was. They weren’t 
going to set up a sector post here was the word that we got back, and so we 
had some negotiation with the headquarters down there, and it got to the 
point where a group of us were just gonna take over the service centre and 
set up our own sector post because we knew that people needed help. There 
were chimneys down, people without water, there was all sorts of stuff. So 
we told the CDEM headquarters that we were going into the service centre, 
which is the local council office, and we were going to set it up as a sector 
post without them. So they sent someone up, because they knew we were 
going to just go ahead and do it anyway. K10/1 
Initially the debate over how this response would be structured was quite tense. 
When CDEM sent up someone from Amberley to work with us on the 
Wednesday, there were some fairly terse negotiations because they had an 
idea of how they were going to do it their way, and we said that no, it’s not 
going to work like that. And so we had a pretty intense negotiation, and it 
was negotiation, the guy who came up would go back and talk to his 
CDEM headquarters and say what we were and weren’t happy with. The 
key thing was they were wanting to exercise a degree of control that was 
more run out of Amberley, whereas we wanted to exercise a degree of 
partnership. And that’s where we got to, which was quite a good space. 
K10/1 
While there was consistent mention of tension between CDEM and locals in the response, it is 
important to note that this was only during the initial phase of the response. As the response 
progressed, there were common and consistent examples where both sides communicated with 
each other, resolved differences and generated better outcomes by developing working 
relationships (bridging and linking social capital). This is represented in the quote above where 
K10/1 describes the tense negotiation period, followed by working out solutions to problems 
and coming to an understanding that worked for everyone. While relationships between CDEM 
and locals in the Hurunui eventually became less fraught as social capital was developed, the 
initial frustration directed towards CDEM was consistent across all interviews with those 
impacted at the local level. Winton Dalley (K2/231P) was especially vocal in his frustration - 
a key factor, he said, was that the last major earthquake in New Zealand occurred in 
Christchurch, an urban location, and so “their whole mentality and expertise was the last urban 
event.” 
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They had absolutely zero understanding of what we were doing. They had 
quite a bit of understanding about what was happening in Kaikōura 
village, because it was kind of an urban event, and pretty public, so a lot of 
effort and understanding went into that. But all the rural areas in this 
district, Marlborough, Kaikoura and ourselves, were kind of… CDEM 
didn’t really have a clue about us. We actually were fighting them because 
they were stopping us from doing stuff and creating access issues, 
including cordons, because they believed they knew what they were doing, 
but they didn’t know what the effect of their actions were having on the 
rural areas. So we had a lot of scraps (K2/231P). 
When the topic of CDEM was brought up in interviews with farmers, very little prompting was 
required for frustrations to be voiced. Some farmers were blunt and direct: “With the 
earthquake Civil Defence was absolutely bloody useless, tits on a bull, didn’t happen, just 
didn’t happen” (K3/1). Comments from other participants reinforced this sense of frustration.  
They’ve probably told you all about the disastrous Civil Defence, and I 
probably can’t elaborate other than there were a lot of tosspots who were 
bureaucrats who had no idea, they were big brother, they were heavy 
handed and they were so impractical and they were a joke. What they tried 
to do was just bizarre, they just… they didn’t deem fit to get alongside 
people (K6/1). 
One farmer participant (K6/1) ruminated that farmers were actually more tolerant of the event 
itself, compared to the frustration generated by the bureaucratic response. 
They [farmers] are much less tolerant of the bureaucracy that follows. And 
that’s just my observation. I think they are much less tolerant of… more 
impatient with the response and recovery, once the Civil Defence kicks in 
and the bureaucracy kicks in. That because they are used to getting out and 
doing things for themselves, and getting on with it, I mean, when you live 
out here, you have to fix your own stuff. They are used to getting on and 
fixing stuff, so they get really frustrated when you are told that you can’t, 
that you’ve got to wait, and do it like this (K6/1). 
While the initial reactions to talking about CDEM with farmers were often outpourings of 
frustration and anger, in many interviews farmers would then come back to the topic and 
moderate the extent of their criticism. Usually with the reflection that subsequent efforts to 
bridge the communication gap were effective and the more glaring issues were gradually 
resolved over time. All respondents were uniformly furious over how the initial response went, 
but over time as efforts were made to build social and human capital – networks, relationships, 
capacity and capability – the effectiveness of the response increased and participants became 
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more accepting of the role CDEM played. The key problem was that the way the response was 
enacted initially did not account for local knowledge (discussed more in section 4.2.5), but as 
this was integrated into the decision making process (section 4.2.6), the response became more 
effective. 
I mean, they definitely did stuff well. They did come and just got stuck into 
it. They didn’t hold back. They did do very well, no doubt about that. I 
can’t fault that. They just said, ok, we’ve got a problem, and got on with it 
(K3/1). 
What else is there to do with the earthquake? CDEM were useless. Actually 
they weren’t useless, no they weren’t useless, that’s wrong. I shouldn’t say 
that. Just… umm… they just didn’t understand rural communities. They 
just didn’t understand how we operate, what we are good at, we are good 
at networking, we know everyone, I don’t think they appreciated that 
(K6/1). 
One farmer participant (K7/1) reflected that there is a balance that needs to be struck between 
a bureaucratic response and an empathetic response that takes account of the local context. 
“And I think that if I had a criticism of the Kaikōura earthquake response, it would be the 
apparent lack of empathy and the total disregard for local knowledge which would have helped 
make things run more smoothly.” Farmers were, in general very accepting of the need for a 
high level response, it was just the way in which it was enacted without communication, 
coordination and integration of local knowledge which proved frustrating.  
That distant focus on ‘getting your job done’ type bureaucracy has its 
place. Because if you had recovery and response that was totally 
community-centric, I don’t know that it would be as good. Because 
sometimes you just have to make some hard calls, some hard decisions 
about where priority goes, and resourcing goes, so I think there is a place 
for it, but it’s how you get that mixture between being clinical in your 
decision making, but still being seen to show empathy. It’s that balance 
(K7/1). 
The inadequacies of the initial Civil Defence response were evident in interviews at the 
regional and national level as well. One respondent with extensive experience who worked for 
MPI at a regional level echoed the Mayor’s (K2/231P) explanation that the CDEM response 
echoed an approach that had proven successful in an urban response, but no adjustments had 
been made for the different rural context.  
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And we also had to work… through all the pain that we had with the 
CDEM response. The rural-urban split that was so obvious in that 
response. Rural is different to urban, they are used to their land moving up 
there, they are used to having to look after themselves. It’s a characteristic 
of rural. And that’s what urban people and CDEM didn’t understand. 
Farmers are used to getting knocked down and standing back up again. 
Through the drought, that region developed its capability to just keep 
going, so when the earthquake hit, they already knew who was able to 
stand up and keep moving (K25/23P). 
4.2.4 – Road Closure 
The local frustration towards CDEM was centred around the closure of SH1 to Kaikōura, and 
the inland road between Waiau and Kaikōura. Specifically, the decision to close the road 
approx. 20km before any major damage occurred. This meant that residents were unable to 
access their properties to retrieve supplies, address animal welfare needs or return home. The 
closure also occurred days after the event, as one farmer (K6/1) said “We’d been driving this 
road for 3 days, and then CDEM closed the road and said sorry you can’t drive on it. And we 
went that’s bloody ridiculous, we’ve been driving it for 3 days to go and help people.” The 
road between Waiau and Kaikōura was closed in a similar manner. “The inland road going 
through Waiau to Kaikōura, people were using what they could of it. Then someone, 3-5 days 
after the actual earthquake, someone turned up and decided that they were in charge of it, and 
that the H&S plan said it wasn’t allowed to be used, so they put a road block up then and 
there.” All farmer participants brought up the road closures when asked about the effectiveness 
of the earthquake response. K10/1, the informal community response coordinator, described 
his initial attempts to open a line of communication. “I got the number of the guy in charge of 
overseeing the road closure, and said ‘Can you please let us know when you are making 
decisions about road closures, and then we can let the community know.’ And that didn’t 
happen.”  
 
There were many examples where these restrictions caused significant amounts of tension. At 
the local level, one farmer (K1/1) described how a friend of his had gone to get some pipes to 
fix his damaged stock water tanks. When he tried to go home “they said ‘oh, you can’t go 
home,’ and he said ‘Well, I just live down there, I’ve gone to get some pipe, and been going up 
and down the road to get what I need for the last week, and now you’re telling me I can’t go 
home?’ ‘Yeah, nah, you can’t go home.’ So I mean… it’s not a good idea telling someone like 
that, that, because he ended up grabbing him by the throat and saying “Look mate, I’m going 
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home, and you are not going to stop me” (K1/1). Another example that a farmer (K7/1) 
described escalated to the point where she called the Minister for Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management and the Associate Minister for Health in order to resolve the situation.  
I’m not usually the ‘get on the phone and bleat to the Minister’ type of 
person when people are trying to do their job. But I did in one case, and it 
really got to me. There was a young lady up in inland Kaikōura road, and 
she was four months pregnant, and she started spotting, a little bit of a spot 
bleed after the earthquake, and so her midwife arranged for her to have an 
emergency scan at the Christchurch Women’s Hospital to make sure she 
wasn’t going to miscarry. When she went to go out, she was told at the 
cordon that she couldn’t go, and she was told that she had to make her 
scans around the cordon. Her mother-in-law rang me from the car 
absolutely distressed, asking can we do something? That was the one time I 
just rang the Associate Minister for Health and Nathan Guy [Minister for 
Civil Defence], and went, “For heaven’s sake!” (K7/1). 
Other examples were given including a pregnant mother who was trying to get home to her 
family. These issues were known and acknowledged by MPI at the regional and national levels. 
One regional level respondent from MPI (K29/2P) said “There were some pretty horrific 
examples, and maybe they weren’t handled… there were maybe half a dozen cases that could 
have been handled a lot better.” A national level respondent (K47/32P) commented on the 
efforts locals made to resolve the situation. “We all saw Winton trying to negotiate opening 
the roads, there was stock water that needed to go in. And the farmers had the army going 
through, but they couldn’t stop to drop anything else.” The last part of this quote refers to an 
exacerbating factor, which was the fact that army convoys had been organised to travel on the 
road through to Kaikōura, but there was no communication with the locals about this. Farmers 
found this a missed opportunity because “there wasn’t any thought that as they were coming 
through they could have been used to disperse things on route. And there was no local input 
into these decisions” (K20/2P). Attempts were made to get the convoy to stop and resupply 
farmers on the way, but as one farmer (K9/21P) said “Even when it was raised with CDEM, 
they didn’t wanna know about it.” Tensions were further exacerbated because when the convoy 
came back they had taken the time to organise people to go with the convoy and collect their 
campervans from Kaikōura and bring them back out “but there were transport trucks sitting 
there wanting to go, and there were contractors that wanted to get back, and they wouldn’t let 
them” (K9/21P). A local government official (K20/2P) described the situation succinctly. 
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And there were ridiculous things that happened, limited access, so the army 
was able to go through, but the workers who needed to get in to reconnect 
the power weren’t. But that was the confused messaging that was going 
around. We lost authority over the road. So that was taken care of 
elsewhere. There were a whole lot of issues (K20/2P). 
An eventual solution to the problem was put in place for locals who needed to get back home. 
Local volunteers were assigned to the checkpoint, allowing them to verify locals who were 
heading back to their farms. K10/1 described his satisfaction at being able to negotiate a 
solution. “So we said, how about we set up a roster, and we can have a local work with your 
road closure people and they can screen who goes through so that you know that it’s only local 
residents going through. That worked really well.” This is another example of the phenomena 
described earlier, where initial relationships were highly problematic, but as social capital was 
developed over time, solutions were found for pressing issues.  
 
Conversations with representatives from Civil Defence at the regional and national level on 
these issues were enlightening. Respondents in this section are not identified by code in order 
to ensure an additional layer of anonymity. One respondent described the circumstances in 
which Civil Defence was given control of the road. 
I’ll tell you what should have happened. This is what the National Plan 
says: NZTA should have taken management of that road. Government 
Agency, it was a nationally significant piece of road to keep up and 
running. Ideally NZTA would have picked up and managed the road, they 
said they wouldn’t, they actually declined to take up that road. Next couple 
of points, we requested Police and NZDF [NZ Defence Force] to provide 
the security or the management of that road. Both of those organisations 
declined to do that at a national level. Now, the National Plan particularly 
specifies that that’s Police’s role, to cordon roads. And what Police would 
normally do is say that they are understaffed and ask Defence to help. 
Anyway, they declined. So we were left in a situation where we felt 
someone had to manage that road, so we reluctantly took it on board, and 
our primary purpose for managing that road… there were two parts to it. 
One was to get it serviceable and fixed, and so NZTA were in charge of 
that. They had companies doing that fixing, and those companies all said 
that they would not work on that road if there was any traffic on it. They 
said it’s just too dangerous to be in that space with earthquake unstable 
rock slides and boulders, and also have to worry about cars going through. 
Another respondent clarified why restrictions on the road were in place.  
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Problem was, was that people were sneaking through, or saying that they 
just needed to go up to their house to check the stock water, and so they 
were being let through, and then the next minute these cars were in 
Kaikōura, or were actually just about to get run over by a bulldozer. And 
there were two really, really close near misses for killing people who had 
snuck through. Don’t underestimate how dangerous that road was. Nothing 
happened on it, the landslides onto the roads from a geotechnical point of 
view were all super dangerous. 
The issue of which agency should have led the road cordoning and management was repeated 
by other respondents.  
The National Plan does say the Police had to do the cordon, but we never 
seem to be able to actually make it happen. The National Police 
headquarters said no, we’re not going to do it. They shouldn’t… someone 
should have held them accountable for that. 
The road closure is one specific example of the frustrations between CDEM and locals during 
the response. During the earthquake response (and the M. Bovis response) there was a clear 
lack of integration (social capital) of local knowledge (human capital) into decision-making 
structures. The drought response stands in stark contrast, which received overwhelmingly 
positive feedback from respondents about the engaging, human-focused response at the local 
level where farmers views and experiences were acknowledged and respected. The next section 
will discuss the importance of local knowledge, and the role of the Rural Advisory Group, 
which evolved out of the Drought Committee.   
4.2.5 – Local Knowledge  
The importance of integrating local knowledge into decision making structures is a key theme 
that emerged at all local level interviews, and is present throughout this chapter. References to 
this were unprompted and present in every adverse event context, and throughout all three 
groups. Local knowledge is contextual information and can be described as human capital, 
which is integrated into decision-making structures using bridging or linking social capital. 
The way in which it was referred to in the drought was mainly positive, in that the two primary 
response mechanisms, the RST and the Drought Committee, were responsive to local 
knowledge, and familiar with the local context. In contrast, the problems with response to the 
earthquake, especially the role CDEM played, were widely attributed to a lack of taking local 
knowledge, or context, into account in decision making. “I think that’s the critical point that 
they’ve actually got to go to the locals…Nobody knows the area better than locals people do, 
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they know the infrastructure, they know who’s there, what’s available, they know for example, 
with the earthquake, we called on you know, excavators, dozers, diggers, helicopters because 
we know who’s here” (K3/1).  
 
Every farmer talked about the importance of local knowledge. Farmers who were badly 
impacted by the earthquake talked about this more emotively. “And I think that CDEM, the 
government has actually got to realise that the people on the ground are the ones with the 
knowledge. Yeah, they might have all this fandangle bloody policy shit and… but the people 
on the ground actually know” (K6/1). Whereas farmers who were indirectly impacted by the 
damage described it from a distance. 
It’s… you do see a lot of frustration about the way things are done, about 
how the Civil Defence reaction is more and more centralised. And less 
local. And so, the ability for things to happen quickly gets hugely 
compromised, the more you take it away from the local communities, you 
just lose the local knowledge and how to do things. To the point where 
they’re often saying to local people you don’t do anything, you shouldn’t be 
doing anything (K1/1). 
The informal response coordinator who spent time communicating with CDEM representatives 
was still visibly frustrated about this.  
I was involved with Civil Defence here right from day one, on the front line, 
but they were trying to make decisions without local input, and they had no 
idea… we would explain things to them – no you can’t close this road 
because this this this and this. Farmers were ringing up saying they had to 
get stock out. It was that lack of understanding from the local perspective 
something that needs to be put into the system with adverse events is much 
better understanding, of getting that local knowledge, perspective and 
understanding (K10/1). 
These messages were reflected by Winton Dalley. 
I guess the thing I keep coming back to, and we have it in the Civil Defence 
organisation, we have it in, generally, in government departments, is a lack 
of knowledge of local. And local need. There’s a perception of what it 
should be, when you’re sitting somewhere like that, and your entire 
business career is sitting in an office in Wellington, or wherever, but it’s a 
huge reality gap here, between there and a rural area (K2/231P). 
This narrative was not limited to the local respondents. Interviews with regional and national 
level respondents revealed both awareness of the issue, and acknowledgement that it could 
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have been handled much better. A national level respondent who lived in Christchurch, worked 
in private industry and had a long history in the sector said “The rapidity with which people 
dug in and took hard positions was breath-taking, and that was a major failing. It wasn’t about 
trying to help people understand their perspective, it was more like “this is how it is, we’re in 
charge”, you just stay over there. That was a major failing (K29/32). He went on to add that 
by failing to account for the local context, “You anger the local community and you slow down 
your ability to move quickly in terms of a positive response.” These sentiments were shared 
amongst others in the private sector. One representative from an NGO who worked in 
community recovery after the earthquake was asked what she thought worked particularly well 
in the response. She described the collaboration between her organisation and the local council 
in overcoming the central government’s response which was trying to remove local input from 
the recovery.  
What worked really well was the collaboration. Like what we did with the 
NGOs. I also thought that council played a fantastic role in bringing 
everyone together, which was another rub. Because central government 
was saying that local government doesn’t have a place in earthquake 
recovery. And they were like… Yes we do. We know our local community.’ 
This is what I mean in terms of mindset, they come with a particular 
mindset ‘we do things this way, we don’t do them that way’. And not seeing 
that this area is different. Different players in a different context (K33/2). 
In the public sector these issues were also well acknowledged. A national level respondent 
from MPI said “Critical to good outcomes, is making sure that the people on the ground or 
who interact with farmers have a good understanding of how farming works.” All public sector 
respondents who were involved in the response shared similar sentiments. When one MPI 
respondent was asked how they could do better in future events, they responded: 
So in the community sense we try and find out how we can assist better, 
because we have all these different programmes and schemes and 
whatever, and we go out there, but we don’t actually ask what they need. 
So that’s where we’re turning that around with M. Bovis this time, because 
we’ve been through this with the earthquake recovery, is actually go out to 
some farmers, providers, and the people that are working, and saying, well, 
how we can do this better? How can we learn from what we’ve done in the 
earthquake recovery stuff, and get them involved at the beginning, rather 
than just going out there and saying this is it. You know. Because 
unfortunately that’s the way the government rolls, is usually this is what 
we’re doing. We just go out… we don’t actually do it the other way around. 
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And a lot of the time that’s just the way that government’s set up, 
government departments. 
While there have been acknowledged problems with the earthquake response, there is 
significant effort underway to improve in the future. Just as K10/1 found solutions by persisting 
in attempts to engage with CDEM during the road closure, he also described how things 
eventually changed during the general response. Eventually a system was put in place that 
when decisions were being made about the Hurunui district, a representative from CDEM 
would travel and discuss the plans with the locals which allowed them to participate in the 
decision making process “And so that got embedded down pretty quickly. Once it was set in 
place, it actually worked really well” (K10/1). 
 
A national level respondent who had worked on projects with strong local engagement in 
Canterbury discussed research that had been done in order to understand local preferences of 
who made decisions about their area. “We got the message from one end of the district to the 
other, that people wanted to make decisions about their resources in their area, and negotiate 
with someone that they knew, or somebody else in their area” (K16/321P). If decisions were 
made by people who had no stake in the matter, or who were elected by a different set of 
people, there was no trust as to whose benefit the decision would be made for. In reference to 
the response to the earthquake, he said that “To handle these kinds of things adequately 
requires the direct involvement of people who are a part of that community” (K16/321P).  
 
4.2.6 – Rural Advisory Group 
The Drought Committee evolved into the Rural Advisory Group (RAG) during the earthquake 
response. A Drought Committee meeting had been scheduled for two days after the earthquake, 
and Winton Dalley (K2/231P) proposed transforming the meeting into an emergency 
earthquake response meeting. He received agreement from all relevant stakeholders. The 
Minister for Civil Defence joined the call, and a daily call was held for the next 10 days. The 
development of the RAG throughout the earthquake response stemmed from a lack of local 
trust and support of the CDEM response.  
So the upshot was, that we effectively ran a parallel process and said 
literally, stuff you Civil Defence. There’s a lot of stuff that’s happened that 
the Civil Defence organisation doesn’t know happened, or how it happened 
because the rural sector looked after itself (K2/231P). 
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This provided an immediate antidote to the frustrations with CDEM, because it enabled 
Hurunui voices to be heard in the decision making processes. “So the gap was the rural voice 
into CDEM, and that’s been rectified with the rural advisory groups” (K47/32P). However, it 
was not a perfect solution. One problem was that the group initially had no authority with Civil 
Defence. Even though the Minister was on the call, Canterbury CDEM held all of the decision 
making authority over the response, such that “none of those rural agriculture organisations 
or even our own Council had any influence over Civil Defence Canterbury group. Or at the 
NZ/Wellington level” (K2/231P).  Ultimately, what was required was a “connection into Civil 
Defence, who have all the powers under the law, because the Civil Defence Act is seriously, 
absolutely draconian. It has power” (K2/231P). This formal role was not established early on 
in the response, though its importance came to be recognised later.  
Canterbury CDEM recognised that they needed knowledge and information 
and advice when adverse events strike in rural areas, what you need in 
terms of response. And they need to get it from one authoritative source 
that they feel is sensible and reliable. And the same thing from us as a rural 
sector. There has to be a way that it can get up from us to them in a 
coordinated way (K7/1). 
This need for a coordinated rural voice has been recognised and acted upon by multiple 
agencies since the initial earthquake response. Significant work has been done with the Rural 
Advisory Group to give them a formal seat at the decision making table. 
We now have a voice in what’s called the care group, the CEO group, all 
the councils’ CEOs of Canterbury, are the Management Group, and all the 
Mayors are the Governance Group. So, into the Care Group, which is 
where the donkeys work is done, we now have a representative of the RAG, 
we have a representative in that group, and then I represent that group in 
the Governance Group. It’s about getting recognised and respected. 
Because we were giving advice into the group, all these organisations 
were, but it was just totally ignored. So in the next event, we made it clear 
that that’s not tolerable. The RAG will be respected (K2/231P). 
The success of the RAG, like the Drought Committee, was put down to the way it was 
structured and most importantly relationships. “Probably more important than the structure 
here, was the relationships. They had been really cemented over the last three years, and we 
network. So we just flipped from drought into earthquake mode” (K7/1). There were many 
lessons learned during the drought, some of which became relevant to the earthquake context 
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while others were not. However, the RAG was not considered by some to have been as 
successful as the Drought Committee.  
There were a few things that didn’t work well though. So the RST hit the 
road immediately, but never actually kept any records of who they’d 
visited. For the drought it didn’t matter so much as it was long and 
insidious, but for the EQ when you were trying to find out if everyone was 
alright, you really needed a bit of organisation around who you’ve been to 
see etc. So we still learnt a lot going along (K7/1). 
There were also tensions between the different organisations. “In general, everyone wanted to 
be highly visible rather than doing the heavy lifting” (K7/1). These views were shared at the 
regional level as well. 
I mean, I got my views around team Ag [the RAG]. I really like the notion, 
but my feedback around it in terms of the Kaikōura response was that it 
was a nice sticker, but if you peeled it back, it really lacked substance. 
There was huge tension between Federated Farmers, Beef and Lamb, the 
different parties involved about who was in charge. A lot of that comes 
back to personalities and individuals. (K30/32). 
As a direct consequence of the experience in Hurunui, the RAG model is being developed so 
it can be implemented in other rural communities across NZ. This is important because what 
“you have to do is have all the relationships before the event. So that’s why RAG also helps. 
They know who the controllers are before the event. They also understand what the common 
language is. Learn the CDEM jargon.” (K47/32P). Participants showed optimism about the 
potential success of the programme, though as they also noted, it’s effectiveness will only truly 
be known when it is tested. 
 
Integration (linking social capital) of local knowledge (human capital) into decision-making 
structures was clearly a key issue during the earthquake response. While there was significant 
friction early on, continued attempts to engage were eventually successful, which led to better 
outcomes for those involved. However, by the time this happened, damage had been done, and 
trust (social capital) was lost. When recalling the event, the first thing that comes to farmers 
mind is not how the problems were eventually sorted, but the frustration and anger that they 
experienced attempting to come to some sort of understanding with those in charge. A more 
receptive attitude from CDEM from the start would have been helpful, though as demonstrated, 
they were dealing with their own problems related to who was responsible for what part of the 
response. 
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4.2.7 – The Uninsurable Infrastructure Relief Fund 
The Uninsurable Infrastructure Relief Fund (UIRF) was a policy response to the earthquake 
that emerged approximately two weeks after the event and was designed to offer farmers 
support in repairing extensive damage to uninsurable infrastructure such as sheds, fences, 
tracks and water supplies. Farm assets like these are essential, but are currently uninsurable. 
The UIRF was a grants scheme worth approx. $4-5 million to fund asset repairs and drive 
economic recovery. MPI administered the scheme under the same principles as the Primary 
Sector Recovery Policy (PSRP), for which the first guiding principle is that that the “Crown is 
not the insurer of first or last resort.”  
 
One of the challenges presented by the UIRF for farmers was that there were “criteria attached 
that made it very difficult, if not impossible, to actually apply” (K2/231P). Approximately $14 
million worth of applications were received, but they were only able to distribute approx. 
$2.5million worth of funds initially. Winton Dalley was on the committee that oversaw the 
distribution of the funds, and said that as soon as he saw the application form/process for 
applying he knew it wasn’t going to work. However, discussing the issue with officials got no 
results. “The criteria didn’t fit, it wasn’t that the demand wasn’t there, and the need wasn’t 
there to get this infrastructure up and running, it was just that the criteria were set without any 
reference to local people and the need.” The criteria also required detailed descriptions of the 
damaged infrastructure, including current valuations and assessment of repair costs. Accessing 
the necessary supporting documents was difficult for multiple reasons. For example, some 
applicants could not enter their damaged houses, the paperwork was extensive and many were 
in a state of significant stress following the drought, and earthquake. The general opinion was 
that “they made it so that no one fitted the criteria” (K9/21P).  
And it was almost like it was that actually no we don’t want to pay you any 
money so we’ll make it hard so you’ll go away. And for impacted people 
who were full of cortisol and were really seriously well-beingly unwell, not 
sick or anything, but it was impossible. Pages and pages and pages, it was 
really stupid. 
The respondent went on to describe the social impact this had.  
That was an impediment in the social recovery area which sloshed over 
into my area, because then our people had to go and help others and it 
really increased the unwellness of the overall community. What people 
didn’t appreciate right from the beginning, is the impact on the disruption 
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of the social fabric of our place. Just little things that could have made 
things much much easier. 
The post drought context in which this occurred presented the community with another major 
disruption at a time of significant stress for the district. For some, the support offered by 
government that had been designed to alleviate their stress, had the unintended consequence of 
adding an additional stress burden. The time cost required to access the fund, through gathering 
evidence and complex criteria, disincentivised participation. Applying for the fund was so 
difficult that some farmers decided not to apply. Post event pamphlets contained quotes from 
the mayor of affected districts reaching out to farmers encouraging them to take advantage of 
these schemes. One female farmer respondent (K34/1), who developed a joint application on 
behalf of several farms, had previous experience of writing similar applications and was not 
personally challenged by the process. However, when asked her opinion about the capability 
and capacity of other farmers to write the application she said: 
I know that my husband wouldn’t have found it easy at all, he would 
probably have missed out on it because he would have thought ‘oh this is 
too hard’, especially coping with everything else. And my husband sister, 
and her husband who are farming in [name removed] had their son do all 
the paperwork as well. I don’t think they could have done it all either. 
You’ve got to find someone with the skills and the knowledge, and the time. 
Because it just takes time, and you have to set it aside (K34/1). 
Reflecting on her experience, she went on to add: 
If it hadn’t been for me writing the letter about the water scheme, and 
driving that, those other farmers may not have got it. Farming people don’t 
always have great… they maybe write a letter once a year you know what I 
mean. It’s not a skill they use often. They can often sit on the phone and 
talk things through… but writing not so much (K34/1). 
Regional and national level respondents had strong views about the scheme, particularly in 
relation to the issue of trust. “It was designed to be really difficult, because of a lack of trust 
and people who are ripping the system off. We had only 10-12 who actually met the criteria 
because they were so tight, and were really difficult to calculate. Required judgement more 
than anything else. It’s an example of policy that’s really tight, because of a lack of trust” 
(KI6/321P). The concern was that some farmers would abuse a more lenient system for their 
own gain “because believe it or not, some people try to rort the system” (K47/32P). This was 
done out of a sense of responsibility for the use of taxpayer money and exposed a significant 
trade-off that had to be negotiated. MPI had to find a balance between ensuring that the 
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distribution of taxpayer funds was fair, while not making the application process too onerous. 
One respondent from MPI commented on this. 
I can see two sides to this, because one, we’ve got some people with big 
claims, we had to ensure that we were giving out taxpayers’ money for the 
right reasons, and to the right people. And we did have instances where 
people were not quite honest with what they were doing. They saw it as an 
opportunity. It is really hard to try and work out what the best way of doing 
things… After that I think we learnt thresholds. Up to a certain amount, we 
didn’t need quite as much evidence. But anything over $100,000, well we 
did need quite a lot of evidence. And if you are writing out a cheque for 
$100,000-$150,000, you did need quite a bit of evidence. 
In addition, there was political pressure being applied, such that “..there’s quite a tension that 
plays out with ministers who want to be seen to do something, and to move quickly. And it was 
a big event with big problems, and they needed help. It was something that probably sounded 
great, but then just never worked out how it was expected to.” Another concern was that this 
was explicitly for uninsurable infrastructure, but many types of infrastructure that were being 
claimed for were actually insurable. But they hadn’t been insured. This refers back to the first 
guiding principle of the PSRP – that that the “Crown is not the insurer of first or last resort” 
(2016, p.2). A national level MPI respondent said that:  
You go back to the incentives on this one, it’s interesting, most things are 
insurable. Farmers have chosen to carry their own insurance, how much 
should the State be involved in restoring infrastructure, when maybe it 
shouldn’t have been there in the first place, or it should have been insured. 
And then a lot of farmers look at that and say “well if you are going to pay 
me for replacing my culverts, then why should I bother to get insurance?” 
And so we start having conversations thinking that while we think we are 
helping the community, what we might be doing is propping up bad 
farming practices. 
Multiple respondents brought this up. One related the issue back to droughts. 
[During the drought] the people who were smart and sold their stock and 
brought in feed don’t get anything, because they’ve planned and done their 
feed budget [people who dealt planned and dealt with the drought get no 
financial aid]. All the people who didn’t do that, or kept their stock too 
long, didn’t stock up and have any reserves or resilience say “I need some 
feed”. So when you start saying that the government will help you get some 
feed, your neighbour who was a smarter farmer won’t get anything, but 
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you will [the key issue here is that you want to incentivise good farm 
planning, and bailing out bad practices sets the wrong incentives]. 
Some of the teething issues that emerged with the UIRF were probably a consequence of it 
never having been used before. When reflecting upon their experiences, respondents suggested 
there was a need for greater participation from end-users and integration of local knowledge; 
“The lesson in there is that you need to co-design.” (K25/23P). The fund as a policy 
mechanism was rapidly developed in a time of need, and it was previously untested. While 
questions about who was eligible, what was fair, and what incentives were being set were all 
considered, there was no consultation with local stakeholders.  
 
Attempts to improve the scheme were made over the following two years because the initial 
application process failed to distribute the money. Changes to application criteria over this 
period resulted in the fund being fully spent. The challenges of completing the necessary 
documentation was eventually alleviated by MPI providing a consultant to assist farmers. They 
“…went around and ran workshops, did a really good job, got everyone sorted out with the 
money they were entitled to. He ran them through the form, explained how to fill it out” 
(K22/2P). However, due to trust being lost early on during the initial implementation, there 
was a real struggle to get farmer buy in to the scheme after the improvements happened. 
We’ve tried really hard to promote it. We set different examples, case 
studies, we’ve been to workshops for different things and said this is 
available, we’ve put them in schools, school notices, I tried to think of 
every avenue to promote it. On social media, people giving help 
counselling, grief, illness, but… you can only lead a horse to water. I don’t 
think there would be anyone out there who wouldn’t know about it. 
A key lesson here is that strong engagement early in the process of policy development is 
important if the policy tool is to be successful in achieving its aim. This was just one example 
of this type of policy response, other examples suggest this was a systemic issue. When 
discussing the UIRF two other schemes were also cited by local, regional and national level 
representatives as suffering from similar problems, including the Staff Wage Top up Scheme, 
and the Temporary Housing Scheme. These schemes are not discussed in depth, as they did 
not directly impact farmers, however they are included as regional and national level 
representatives discussed them on a comparative basis with the UIRF.  
I had a similar experience with MBIE [Ministry for Business, Innovation 
and Employment] for temporary housing…when I [brought it up] I was 
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told by a senior Wellington official that there is no demand for temporary 
housing. I questioned the ministers on a conference call [asking] why or 
how he knew there was no demand and he said, because nobody has 
applied to Wellington for temporary housing. So these people out here, 
heads down, ass up, stressed, living in tents at that stage, and in caravans, 
in sheds, literally, and in old cottages. In all manner of accommodation, 
and with farms destroyed, were trying to run their business, and they were 
supposed to know to contact someone in Wellington, to register, to tell 
them that they needed some accommodation… (KI2/231P). 
The Staff Wage Top-up Subsidy was designed to support businesses, such as cafés, while there 
was no traffic access to the town. However, the application criteria made it “really hard to 
apply for. Really, really difficult. And then the second top up that you could get was nigh 
impossible, and most businesses at that point were almost bankrupt, like seriously 
overwhelmed, so they just went “nah, can’t do it”. So no, far too hard.” 
 
Both farmers and local stakeholders largely viewed the policies and responses to the earthquake 
has deficient, because they overlooked existing social capital networks and local knowledge 
due to a lack of recognition of social and human capital related phenomena at the institutional 
level (connections and adaptive management), which subsequently impacted social and human 
capital at the local level (connections, adaptive capacity and stress).  
4.3 – Mycoplasma Bovis 
The third case example of an adverse event is Mycoplasma Bovis (M. Bovis), a bacterial disease 
affecting cattle that was first identified in New Zealand on 21 July 2017. As the world’s largest 
exporter of dairy products, the M. Bovis incursion into New Zealand represented a significant 
economic risk, particularly if left unchecked (Ministry for Primary Industries 2019). Because 
M. Bovis was a novel risk – there were no previous cases in NZ – it became a complex event 
involving significant uncertainty around testing and potential spread patterns (Ministry for 
Primary Industries 2019b). MPI led the response, having a lead role for biosecurity-related 
events in the Primary Sector Recovery Policy (2016). Soon after its detection, the Government 
announced a decision to attempt to eradicate the disease, rather than controlling its spread. 
Eradication required widespread culling of infected cattle, and 150,000 cows are expected to 
be culled across the country by the end of the response programme. In many cases, all stock 
from infected farms in regions across the country were compulsorily acquired and destroyed 
(Ministry for Primary Industries 2019c).  
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There are two types of legal notices that were used to control the disease, Restricted Place 
Notices, and Notices of Direction (NoD). All farms that were either infected, or suspected of 
being infected were placed under a restricted place notice. This: 
1. “Prohibits all unauthorised movements of farm stock and other risk goods onto and off 
the property. This minimises the chance of the disease spreading from the property. 
2. Any movement of cattle requires a permit from MPI. 
3. Transport vehicles must follow a cleaning and disinfection process when they leave a 
restricted place. 
4. Staff from AsureQuality (MPI's managing partner for biosecurity) are ensuring that 
cleaning, disinfecting, and permit requirements are met”(MPI 2020G). 
A Notice of Direction is used when an authorised person believes stock or good movements 
could spread M. Bovis. 
• “The NoD aims to prevent further spread and doesn't restrict movement of stock or 
goods onto the farm. 
• Cattle can only move off the farm with a permit. 
• Other steps may be required (cleaning and disinfecting of vehicles)” (MPI 2020G). 
At the time of writing, M. Bovis has been detected on 262 total properties across New Zealand, 
with all but 10 being cleared by the 21th of April 2021 (Figure 4.1). Forty-five  properties are 
currently under Notices of Direction, and 136 are under active surveillance. Figure 4.2 shows 
a map of these farm locations, and Figure 4.1 is a detailed factsheet that the government 
regularly updates (MPI 2021X).  
 
A key part of the response was widespread and thorough testing. M. Bovis is difficult to test 
for, and a particular challenge with the infection is that cattle with M. Bovis are often 
asymptomatic. Accordingly, testing occurs multiple times and across large numbers of animals. 
All farms connected in some way with an infected farm (such as through cattle trading or 
bordering an infected farm) are also tested. Any farm that tests positive has all cattle culled, 
after which the farm is cleaned and disinfected at MPI’s expense, and the farm must then be 
kept free of any cattle for 60 days (MPI 2020I). Verifiable loss from the M. Bovis response also 
entails financial compensation (MPI 2020H).  
 
All farmers interviewed were affected by the drought. Most were affected by the earthquake. 
Few were directly impacted by M. Bovis, however the indirect consequences on the wider 
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community were significant. Interview results revealed that the response to the M. Bovis crisis 
generated similar issues to the earthquake response, with linking social capital not being 
established early on. This resulted in local knowledge not being incorporated into decision-
making structures, which negatively affected adaptability at the central government and local 
level, generating stress for farmers which negatively affected their social resilience.  
 
The scope of the research originally excluded M. Bovis because it was a biological rather than 
natural hazard. However, given the nature of early conversations with research participants, it 
became clear that the impacts and consequences of M. Bovis needed to be considered within a 
cascading sequence of disruptive events that had tested the resilience of farmers in the Hurunui 
over a number of years.  
 
Much of the discussion that follows involves a small number of individuals, and in the interests 
of maintaining the anonymity and privacy of farmers and government respondents, quotes will 
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Fig 4.1 – Latest M. Bovis update (MPI 2020X)  
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Figure 4.2 – Map of active infected farms (under restricted place notices), and farms under 
notices of direction (MPI 2020X). 
4.3.1 – Impact 
As with the two previous major disruptive events to occur in the Hurunui since 2014, the most 
notable consequence of M. Bovis was the stress it caused for farmers and the local community. 
During the drought, stress was caused by the uncertainty about when it was going to rain. A 
positive, supportive and highly effective local response contributed to alleviating farmer stress. 
During the earthquake, stress was caused by the event itself, as well as the response. This was 
eventually mitigated through the establishment of linking social capital between the lead 
response agency and the local community, allowing for adaptable responses at both scales. In 
contrast, the spread of M. Bovis was not visible to the local community, however the MPI 
response required invasive and distressing interventions. Multiple participants at all levels 
emphasised that for farmers, the negative impacts of M. Bovis did not come from the disease, 
but rather from the MPI response to the event. This section describes the impact of the response 
on farmers, and the next section describes the response from the perspective of those who 
enacted it. 
 
For farms infected with M. Bovis, the primary impact was the risk of having your cattle culled. 
Farmers talked about being more afraid of MPI than M. Bovis. “And now… you get a lot of 
farmers saying that they are more scared of MPI, than the disease. MPI’s created more fear 
than the disease itself.” During the drought, farmers described the distress of selling capital 
stock which had been bred on the farm for generations. For M. Bovis, it was the risk of having 
them slaughtered with no alternative. This was exacerbated by the lack of understanding of 
how to test for the disease, how it spread, and the high false positives rate during testing. “There 
is also a lot of uncertainty in the testing, which mean it had to be redone repeatedly, can have 
false positives. There’s no easy way to say that you have it or not.” Not only were farmers 
required to cull their prized animals, they couldn’t be sure they needed to lose them.  
 
Multiple public and private regional and national level respondents directly attributed MPI’s 
initial approach to responding to M. Bovis as a key factor in multiple farmer suicides. A Rural 
Support Trust representative stated that “…when it comes to M. Bovis, we’ve had two suicides 
that I know about just around here. And the reason for that is there has been no 
acknowledgement of the emotional impact that someone coming on your farm and saying we’re 
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going to kill all your cows and you can’t do anything about it has. I mean, that is huge” 
(K23/132). 
 
One farmer described his experience as the worst of all adverse events. “So the drought [and 
earthquake] were major, but they’re nothing compared to what we’ve been through in the last 
couple of months with M. Bovis.” The frustrations were with the way in which MPI interacted 
with farmers. One tool used by MPI to control the spread was to put restricted place notices on 
farms with suspected or confirmed M. Bovis. This limited what farmers could do with their 
stock. “Being in the clutches of MPI… the restricted place notices meant that you just can’t do 
anything without a permit. We couldn’t shear sheep without a permit, shearers weren’t allowed 
on the farm without a permit. We couldn’t move sheep to slaughter without a permit.” Poor 
and difficult communication with MPI was cited as a key aggravating factor.  
Well, communication is really important. Transparency. One problem is 
that MPI doesn’t show farmers test results. They only say whether they are 
clear or infected. But you can’t show them actual test results. When they 
are gnarling people based on these things, and are then holding that 
information back, you don’t have that transparency around… you are 
talking about people’s livelihoods here, and people’s wellbeing. And 
they’re holding all that information back, it’s quite major really. 
In addition, farmers described errors that were made by MPI. As discussed in section 4.3.2, 
MPI confirms that mistakes were made. A farmer respondent described an MPI decision to cull 
cattle on his farm. In his view the only reason the cull did not proceed was due to a casual 
conversation he’d had with his bank manager. “When we dug around in it, [we realised] that 
the heifers that infected his property arrived on the 17th of October, our bulls were bought on 
the 11th of October, so there was no crossover. MPI did a complete stuff up.” By their 
estimation, this saved the government from paying millions of dollars in compensation. The 
farmers who were directly impacted all cited their case managers at MPI as being instrumental 
to their eventual good outcomes. Case managers served as a connector between farmers and 
MPI, and were in position to see the outcomes that the response had on those impacted. As one 
farmer noted “I reckon we’re really lucky we had a case manager that’s not really that happy 
with how MPI is operating and put a lot of effort to really get all the information on the case 
to put it together.” At the regional and national level, there were many stories where these good 
outcomes did not exist. A core issue farmers identified, was that the efforts of case managers 
who identified problems with MPI’s response and advocated on farmers behalf was resulting 
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in them being seemingly targeted by MPI and removed from their positions. This resulted in a 
negative perception of MPI.  
We had a really great case manager, and he was removed from our case 
and basically put on leave because he was advocating too loudly for us. 
And he had to really go through backchannels and really try, because there 
was no clear mechanism to allow him to say that what this particular 
farmer is going through is really unfair. Or wrong. It was actually wrong. 
And he didn’t have a way to do that, so he was just labelled a 
troublemaker. It’s not just the farmers who are at the end, it’s all the 
middle people who are operating in these large systems that don’t have 
clear pathways to aggregate that information and use it. 
Effective communications between farmers and MPI were lacking, which resulted in farmers 
describing feelings of powerlessness. One respondent only achieved a good outcome by writing 
up their story and reaching out to the Prime Minister for help. This was not seen as a scalable 
solution for other farmers. “So you felt incredibly powerless, and there was also a lack of 
clarity around who to feed this stuff back to.” Many farmers spent considerable time and effort 
to help with the eradication programme, however many reported feeling as though they were 
being treated poorly. Farmers felt there was never any admission of wrong doing from MPI. 
“I’ve actually been quite surprised that MPI haven’t come and said sorry we’ve put you 
through this. It’s a mistake on our part. But there’s nothing like that at all.” Some farmers 
were forced to take legal action in order to have to restricted place notices lifted. They had been 
told they would be lifted, “but it only happened today, after a push from our lawyers.”  
We argued, in our writeup, that we think we saved the NZ government at 
least [millions of dollars] by proving that they didn’t have to slaughter 153 
really expensive pregnant dairy heifers that were valued at around $XX 
million, they were just going to slaughter all of them to be safe. And we 
went through this incredibly arduous process to prove that their process 
had been flawed in the way that they tracked M. Bovis to these cattle, and 
that they were never exposed in the chain of movement. And we didn’t get a 
thank you, we ended up spending a huge amount of time and money of our 
own, to save the government money, and to save the life of these cows, 
which is what we were really doing it for. That was just a really stark 
example of what it feels like to operate in a system that sees you, vs doesn’t 
see you. Or give you channels to actually report back. Because as the 
person on the ground, you have a tonne more information than anyone who 
is working in an air-conditioned office in Wellington. 
 131 
As with the earthquake, the lack of local knowledge integration into the decision making 
process, coupled with the distance of the decision makers from those affected, was cited as a 
significant barrier to good outcomes. It was very difficult for farmers to find the necessary 
support and advocacy. “Over time we ended up trying to engage with people who we would 
hope would advocate for us. Like Beef and Lamb, Dairy NZ, Federated Farmers, but you really 
had to work to get them to understand what we were going through on the ground.”  
 
The M. Bovis response led to many farmers feeling distressed. During the interviews, farmers 
were asked how the response had impacted their ability to think strategically, as discussed in 
section 4.1.6. One farmer who had effectively mitigated the impacts of the drought by making 
good strategic decisions compared the experience to M. Bovis.  
The M. Bovis thing was completely different, because we had no decision-
making power. Thursday, I had the cull notice lifted, and Friday I was 
thinking creatively. I went from being constrained, to looking at 
opportunity. Right, we need to start looking at cattle policy etc. I went from 
being under the cloud of it, to being able to look for opportunities within a 
day, I found it quite surprising really. 
The MPI response was described as reducing the level of trust farmers had in MPI.  
And I guess that… so the trust thing, it probably comes down to… if I… if 
MPI got in contact with me tomorrow about anything, I’d would say no, I 
need to do my background and talk to legal advice and see where I stand 
with whatever it is. It removes all naivety, can’t act on good faith. Before 
M. Bovis I was probably a lot more naïve, trusting. I did things by the book, 
that’s the kind of person that I am. But it hasn’t mattered. 
Those indirectly impacted by M. Bovis described how it changed the way they operated, there 
had to be more trust between trading parties. For example, in the past farmers exchanged stock 
without thought for the consequence, after the M. Bovis outbreak they were cautious to avoid 
bringing M. Bovis onto their farm. Farmers were aware of stories of the more extreme situations 
some farmers were getting into. “I think there are some people that are really really angry. 
And umm, disappointed with MPI, and disappointed with their neighbours” (KI7/1). The 
comment about neighbours referred to a privacy issue, where MPI initially refused to disclose 
which farms were infected to neighbouring ones citing privacy concerns. This caused an 
intense debate in the farming community and all farmers spoke about this with outrage. To 
them it was common sense, if a neighbouring farm was infected, stock had to be kept away 
from the fences. While this privacy policy had recently been changed at the time the interviews 
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were being conducted (mid 2018), it was commonly mentioned as stoking distrust and division 
within the community.  
 
Respondents at the regional and national level, both public and private sector, often commented 
on the general impacts M. Bovis was having in communities. “With M. Bovis, you have 
neighbours not talking to each other after getting infected. More isolation, no one goes to the 
local church... It’s increased the lack of connection with your local community” (K16/321P). 
Social networks and a strong sense of community are key factors in building rural social 
resilience, and these outcomes can be described as a negative impact on social and human 
capital. Farmers frequently mentioned the negative impacts of the MPI response on social 
cohesion within the community.  
4.3.2 – Response 
The M. Bovis response was led by MPI, which has a legislated lead agency role for biosecurity-
related events in the Primary Sector Recovery Policy (2016). Conversations with government 
representatives were candid – they described how they were aware of the issues described by 
farmers (lack of understanding of how the response impacted them, as well as poor two-way 
communication) and working on them as best they could. Respondents described MPI as being 
unprepared for this event for two reasons. Firstly, there was a lack of capacity at MPI to deal 
with this type of outbreak. “M Bovis is so big…we’ve actually had to build additional capacity 
through [it].” The lack of existing capacity had a significant negative impact on the 
organisations ability to respond to the outbreak, especially with the welfare response. The 
number of people working directly on the M. Bovis response had grown to over 350 when 
interviews were conducted in mid 2018, with one respondent noting that it is now bigger than 
the Ministry for the Environment. Secondly, M. Bovis was also different to any other 
biosecurity outbreak that MPI had dealt with in the past. “It’s not particularly well understood 
because every other country has it and manages it…It actually took a reasonable amount of 
time to completely land the risk profile of M. Bovis, the human risk as well as the transmission 
risks associated with it.” This uncertainty made management complex, and the primary impact 
this had was on farmers. “What we probably didn’t understand was the impact of the testing 
requirements, and the uncertainty. And the loss of control…it [all] goes on for months and 
months.” Given the potential national risk of M. Bovis spreading out of control, MPI took a 
risk averse approach to the response. A respondent from MPI described the dilemma they faced 
in the eradication programme.  
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And so on farms where there’s a very low amount detected, we don’t want 
to leave any possible reservoir for the disease to come back, and we have 
reasonable enough evidence to say that you’ve been in contact with it, and 
the only treatment is to kill the animals. And so you can imagine the 
debates and discussions that the response has had to have over animals 
with farmers saying, “prove to me that M. Bovis is important, prove to me 
that I have it.” It would be great if we could easily diagnose the disease, 
but we can’t, and so the uncertainty plays out right through the response. 
A direct impact of this was seen in the previous section, where farmers described how they had 
to go to significant lengths to prove how their cattle had not been exposed. And despite all the 
evidence presented, the way in which MPI interacted with farmers was heavy handed without 
acknowledgement of their views. MPI’s initial focus during the response was disease control, 
and the approach had wide ranging negative impacts on farmers who had, or were suspected 
of having, M. Bovis on their farms. A respondent described how the initial response only 
focused on controlling the outbreak, with little attention paid to the welfare outcomes for 
farmers. 
We started our response with a core focus around disease management. We 
put controls on because we didn’t want to spread the disease. We had to 
deal with all the uncertainties, and I wish we had an easy way to diagnose, 
but we didn’t. We had to test, and we had to test again, and sometimes had 
to test yet again. And in some cases, you’re saying they’ve been exposed to 
three risk events in the period of concern, they’ve had animals that have 
come directly off an infected farm, within the risk period. Why aren’t we 
finding M. Bovis. And so there are some farmers who have been through 
the ringer in terms of tests on that. 
All MPI informants described the biosecurity and welfare aspects of the response as 
enormously complex and challenging. The biosecurity response did not initially “have a strong 
welfare function, which is currently what we are retrofitting into M. Bovis.” There was 
widespread agreement amongst all those interviewed that the way in which the human 
dimension had been dealt with was poorly handled, however“…the reality of it [is that we 
were] learning by doing.” The response was unique for MPI, and new response protocols and 
approaches had to be developed over short timeframes. 
When you have a flood, it’s a whole valley that’s affected. And there’s 
camaraderie there. You’re all there, and just part of it. In terms of 
responses you can have a BBQ. But with M. Bovis, it’s different. It’s two 
farms in Gisborne, another three over there. People potted all over the 
country. You can’t get people together, they’re all going through it 
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individually. So it’s more like 200-300 micro responses, rather than just 
one response to a flood or drought. 
Several government respondents described the challenge of how to support farmers through 
the process. The uncertainty around testing made the privacy aspects challenging, MPI telling 
farmers that they might have M. Bovis had huge impacts on them, but not telling them had 
potential consequences for everyone around them. Test result uncertainty made clear 
instructions to farmers almost impossible. One informant who was a disease specialist 
seconded onto the welfare team began the interview by asking for help with how to quantify 
the different welfare impacts of different options for disease control.  
 
There were multiple frustrations that MPI had to deal with. Not all farmers were cooperative. 
Often they didn’t understand the nature of the disease, and would refuse to comply with any 
instructions unless they were legally compelled. Communicating the uncertainty and 
complexity presented by M. Bovis was challenging for MPI, and often farmers found it difficult 
to understand. Farmers just saw MPI recommending that their stock needed to be killed. One 
specific frustration was compliance with the National Animal Identification and Tracking 
system. This was a system devised to track all livestock across the country in case of a 
biosecurity incursion. Compliance with the protocol was low, which severely hampered the 
effectiveness of the response, though participants acknowledged that the eradication 
programme would not have been feasible without it. Respondents involved in the response 
described how their experience had caused much reflection on their role, and how it could be 
done better.  
And this is the stuff I’m talking about that we need to learn and understand 
and bring back into this policy [adverse events policy]. And bring it back 
into how we approach this stuff as an organisation. You’ve got to think 
about… is there some structural component to this in the organisation? Is 
there some stuff around who we recruit? How we train them? If someone’s 
job is to identify sick animals and deal with that, is it actually realistic to 
ask them to be also able to look after the people? Probably not. But we 
didn’t recognise that. 
As with the earthquake response, the deficiencies of the M. Bovis response were understood at 
the regional and national level and were in the process of being addressed during interviews. 
All participants described how more effective local engagement was key to better outcomes 
for both disease control as well as farmer wellbeing. “[We need to] go out to farmers, 
providers, and the people that are working, and say, well, how we can do this better? How can 
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we learn from what we’ve done. We need to get them involved at the beginning, rather than 
just going out there and saying this is it.” A common reflection was that farmers wanted to be 
a participant in the process, rather than an object. “A real shift in thinking for me, was going 
from having the farmer at the centre of our thoughts, to actually having the farmer be a 
participant in all of this. We still have work to get to that point, though.” This transition from 
a disease-focus to a people-focus was a consistent refrain across all public sector respondents. 
But we have learnt over this time, to go away from just worrying about to 
disease, to actively asking how do we support people through this. And 
that’s been a meaningful proactive step. We could have been doing that 
earlier, but most of the people involved in the response at the start were 
technical experts, and they often felt quite powerless a lot of the time. 
Because they couldn’t provide the easy answer. But how do you build that 
in a way that keeps the farmer empowered to make their decisions, and 
able to make their contribution to stuff? 
One of the key challenges for MPI in the response was the dual roles that they played; extension 
and enforcement. Extension, in an agricultural context, refers to engaging and working with 
farmers to “support sustainable land use decisions and improve economic, environmental and 
well-being outcomes for farmers and their communities” (MPI 2020F), whereas enforcement 
is ensuring they follow rules and regulations around health and safety, water quality, nutrient 
run off etc. The nature of the MPI response required a strong emphasis on enforcement, 
however, effective engagement with farmers and integration of local knowledge into decision-
making processes has been identified as equally important. The delicate balance between 
MPI’s dual roles was not struck.  One MPI informant talked about this: “it’s really hard when 
you’re going to an M. Bovis farmer, that we’re there enforcing the law, and then to turn around 
and actually ask for their opinion on something.” Respondents outside MPI also considered 
this to be a significant issue. “So if we look at the Bovis situation, on the one hand they have 
to do enforcement, on the other hand they have the investigatory side of it, and my own view is 
that the inherent clash of cultures within that hasn’t been fully recognised” (K13/32). 
Respondents cited ongoing discussions within MPI about this challenge, but there was little 
optimism that solutions would be found.  
4.3.3 – Command and control style of leadership 
A significant high level criticism of the MPI response from the private sector concerned the 
rigid command and control (C&C) style of their response. Respondents observed that senior 
leadership at MPI had backgrounds in areas with hierarchical leadership, such as defence or 
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emergency management, and often lacked a relevant science qualification. “The CEO is a 
former major general. The head of the Bovis response team is a former police man. And the 
new CEO of MPI has come across from running Corrections. You have nobody there who’s in 
a position to influence the culture of the organisation, who actually has a science background” 
(K13/32). This resulted in a hierarchical organisational culture where “even your technical 
people feel obligated to stick to the company line. It’s a career ending move to get caught out 
not sticking to the company line” (K13/32). Respondents described senior leaders at MPI as 
being prescriptive and unwilling to compromise on key facts about M. Bovis, such as when it 
first entered the country, and respondents suggested that this allowed it to spread further 
initially. The uncertainty around the testing, especially false positives, was also not recognised 
initially. This was problematic for the response because “the trouble is, in science we are 
dealing with uncertainty, and with Bovis that’s particularly the case, as the testing procedures 
are so flawed, so we really don’t know what we’re dealing with” (K13/32). A national level 
respondent became a trusted contact for many farmers seeking help, and he described farmers 
who had stock culled unnecessarily. He described that emergent Bovis lessons learned from 
different contexts around NZ could not be effectively communicated to decision makers 
because the necessary communication channels did not exist (linking social capital). One 
farmer respondent explicitly linked the stress (human capital impact) caused by poor 
communication to adaptability, the impact it had on their ability to think strategically and make 
good decisions. The respondent also described what he saw as significant tensions between the 
command and control style of response and effective integration of local knowledge into 
decision-making structures.  
 
Respondents were eager to discuss the problems they had with strict C&C styles of leadership 
in adverse events. One respondent who had been in a significant leadership position during the 
Kaikōura earthquake noted that “research shows that in a complex emergency, a command 
and control response (i.e. hierarchical system) never meets the needs of the emergency.” A 
deficiency of the M. Bovis response was inadequate provision for local information to be fed 
back up the chain of command. In his view, “what is required is a mixture of command and 
control and a more network style of management, of having relationships with people, knowing 
who to bring into the circle, and creating the right sorts of groups or teams of people to meet 
the challenges that you have.” Another respondent who worked in a strategic planning position 
also cited the negatives of the top down approach and advocated for a similar network-based 
approach. 
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A disaster occurs locally, so you’ve got to get a really good understanding, 
from the beginning, as what actually are the effects at a local level of the 
disaster. And you do that by engaging with structures and processes that 
are already in play in the community. So who are the knowledgeable 
people in this community? Who are the leaders? You also have to be alive 
to the sense that in that phase, new leaders, new people will arrive. And 
some existing leaders won’t cope. And that’s messy, but it’s a process of 
discovery and engagement and listening as distinct to ‘the cavalry’s 
arrived and we got this’ intelligence from all these people over here, and 
now we’ve come to a decision and we’re now going to recover you 
(K24/2P). 
Respondents from MPI were less willing to discuss this. Brief comments were made about 
issues with the lack of adequate channels of communication up the chain. A national level MPI 
informant described the situation from her perspective. “The command and control structure 
basically meant that stuff had to come up to national all the time, because there wasn’t a 
declared decision. So we had to go up to the top for every decision. Five weeks later you got 
an answer, way later than you needed it.” Regional level respondents made similar comments 
from their perspective. 
Yes, in the past it has been very regimented and very dictatorial, which 
hasn’t helped the management type structure either, because you can feed 
your information back, but the decision makers at the top just tell you how 
it’s going to be. I’m hoping that might change a bit (K29/2P) 
MPI informants commented that issues of leadership during response activities were 
recognised as deficient and were being worked on. A private sector respondent who worked at 
the regional and national level commented that “It’s quite a cultural change in a big entity like 
that, and I believe that they are trying. We are working with them on a number of projects. We 
actively see that” (K30/32). Respondents from the former Ministry of Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management noted “It’s a big, big issue that we recognise, traditionally DRR 
personnel are fed by military and emergency management personnel, or they have been in the 
past. So the bulk of DRR people come from this very command and control driven 
environment.” A major shift in strategy is underway at the Ministry, alongside it’s restructure 
as the National Emergency Management Agency. Respondents talked about the new National 
Disaster Resilience Strategy, suggesting that “The empathy part of it is really being emphasised 
these days though. Like being able to stand up in front of a town hall full of angry residents is 
now seen as a key skill that they want to build.” Conversations with high level policymakers 
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revealed an agreement with this sentiment – the need to switch to a more people and network 
focussed approach. 
 
Overall, the C&C style of response to M. Bovis resulted a lack of adaptive capacity and 
management (social and human capital) at the institutional level, which then contributed to a 
failure to establish linking social capital between the lead response agency and those affected. 
This exacerbated the stress farmers were under, negative affecting their adaptability and social 
resilience.  
4.3.4 – Capacity and the Rural Policy Unit 
One of the most difficult aspects of M. Bovis for MPI was the lack of capacity they had to deal 
with the outbreak. Respondents talked about how difficult it was “just trying to get people on 
the ground to try to deal with this response…It was getting people up to skill quickly, getting 
them on the ground.” The size of the M. Bovis response grew significantly over time, with 
rapid up-scaling of human resources. Enormous logistical and operational challenges had to be 
met.  
We’ve had to have councils involved, animal welfare groups, lab testing, 
just the logistics of getting trucks to take stock in, getting them all sprayed 
down with disinfectant. The works, can they take how many thousand cows 
at once, prices went down, because of cows going in, so it affected the local 
market. Trying to get the stock companies involved. If they could contain 
them on their farm, but they had to prove they had systems in place to 
control it. 
Scaling the response quickly was difficult, and capacity issues became clear to local and 
regional level respondents.  
You had a large government department that didn’t really understand the 
sector that they were representing. So the people that were coming to talk 
to individuals, to get involved, didn’t understand farm systems. So they’re 
putting in place restrictions as required by the Biosecurity Act without 
understanding what the impact on the farms was going to be. Not just the 
farmer, their own wellbeing, but the strength of the business. To me that 
was a bit of an eye opener (K18/2). 
A narrative that emerged out of the discussion on capacity amongst both public and private 
sector respondents was that MAF (Ministry for Agriculture and Fisheries which was 
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subsequently restructured into MPI) used to have this capacity prior to the neoliberal 
restructuring of the 1980s.  
I joined MAF in 1974. In those days there were 10 divisions, 6,500 staff, 
scattered throughout the country, there were 350 farm advisors, 150 
horticulture advisors, direct contact with farmers. All the animal health 
and other people. We also had research stations up and down the country. 
So they were not too far away from a couple of thousand people out there 
doing a wide range of things, with diverse skills. Over time now, we’ve lost 
a lot of that (K45/3P). 
Most respondents that were involved in the agricultural sector in the 1980s mentioned the 
utility of the Rural Policy Unit that used to exist within MAF until it’s disestablishment. In 
adverse events, the role of the unit was to ascertain the situation and then report on it. The Rural 
Policy Unit had people at the local and regional level who developed and maintained strong 
relationships with farmers and local communities which were leveraged during adverse events. 
This information was then collated and reported into the regional level, who then funnelled the 
information up to national level decision-makers. “Back when I worked at MAF, we had a 
response program, so if there was a snowfall or those kind of events, we had a very, very tight 
process where you had to have a report on the district managers table within 6 hours of the 
event”. Even farmers knew about it and talked about how it used to generate good policy 
outcomes for them. “If you go back 15-20 years, they used to have government farm advisors, 
so they were useless for a lot of things, but when something happened, they actually understood 
farmers. Communicated with farmers. MAF employed them and they knew what was going on. 
And if they aren’t sitting around that executive table, there’s a real risk that they won’t be 
listened to.” Participants wistfully reminisced over times when people who understood farmers 
would have a voice in national level decision making, ensuring the local context was taken into 
account.  
We used to have a Rural Policy Unit in MAF…and I could remember 
clearly time and time again, with respect to domestic internal policy, our 
unit would be saying “well that’s very good, and something that we want to 
see achieved, but it won’t work, people won’t accept it.” And that business 
of saying things are not workable, because people don’t think that way or 
operate that way, happened often. The people making decisions in middle 
and senior management had a pure economics background. And very 
capable guys, but they had never worked in the real commercial world. And 
they were not well placed for making decisions that had social implications 
(K16/321P). 
 140 
The Rural Policy Unit was cited as having generated a lot of good policy during it’s time in 
operation, such as the Primary Sector Recovery Policy (2016) described in this chapter. 
I think some of the good tools in policy making stem back to the 90s, where 
rural areas were in recovery from the 80s. You had an active well lead, 
well informed social Rural Policy Unit in MAF, now MPI. And that 
organisation had regional people out and about who connected with people 
on the ground. So we had these regional people who were well linked into a 
central policy unit. And I think as a result of that we had some good policy 
decisions around rural activities. Rural policy making was well informed, 
had good farmer input, and actually had some social science research 
going on to inform it. I don’t get the impression that’s happening so much 
these days (K45/3P). 
Respondents from MPI talked about the transition away from providing extension services, 
and directly cited cost as a reason for the Rural Policy Unit’s disestablishment. When asked 
why it was stopped, one respondent said “Because it was time consuming, it was free, and we 
were taking the work away from rural consultants because we were a free service, and we 
didn’t have enough people to go around. Cost a lot to run.” The attribution of taking work 
away from rural consultants is a good example of what drove the decision to restructure at the 
time; financial considerations. This can be directly linked back to financialisation as a key 
motivation for neoliberal restructuring as described by Harvey (2005). Multiple participants 
described how during the disestablishment no attention was paid to forms of value other than 
financial, because “people often default to financial drivers” (K30/32). Several respondents 
discussed how the government decided that it no longer had a role in providing services “…and 
part of it’s the governments fault, they withdrew from everything” (K12/32). The subsequent 
loss of capability in the Ministry was seen as deeply concerning.  
Now, what worries me, is that 20-30 years ago, you had MAF people all 
over the place. And some of them were really respected. They knew the 
area, they knew the farmers and all that. Now, MPI has become almost 
irrelevant regionally. They no longer have those regional offices. There 
may be some individuals that will be respected, but MPI is almost 
irrelevant. So when they get a policy that appears to originate from 
Wellington, they’re [farmers] resistant. (K45/3P) 
One participant directly related the loss of capability to failings in the M. Bovis response.  
The effect was to strip out human capital, and the MAF policy restructuring 
landed on the solution of taking out a layer of team leaders and admin 
people. Those were technical team leaders that embodied a lot of the 
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cultural and institutional memory, both of the community and of the 
business as well. I was around through all of that. It was a stripping of 
capability at MAF and they had a substantially diminished capability and I 
attribute some of our biosecurity failings since then to that lack of 
capability. 
A participant that took part in the M. Bovis response at the national level discussed how these 
restructurings had impacted New Zealand’s capacity and capability in comparison with other 
countries.  
People need more time to properly consider things. As somebody who’s got 
a large amount of experience in another place, NZ does things on a relative 
shoestring. So NZ developed the National Animal Identification and 
Tracking system and there were 5 or so people who more or less did that. 
The equivalent administration in Britain would have at least 30-40 people 
working on that. And I’ve seen that all over the place, that NZ, for our size, 
we do things with far fewer resources and I think we deliver an awful lot 
with far fewer resources than many countries have. But I think that our 
shortage of resources and the fact that so few are trying to deal with so 
much doesn’t help this issue at all. 
The loss of the Rural Policy Unit was part of a wider pattern of restructuring that occurred after 
the economic crisis of the 1980s. In general, the M. Bovis response exemplifies the wider 
patterns demonstrated in earthquake response, where stress was exacerbated due to local 
knowledge not being incorporated into decision-making process. Similarly, once local 
knowledge was adequately taken into account, outcomes improved. However, the initial 
damage caused loss of trust which negatively impacted the perception of the response in 
general despite later improvements. The M. Bovis response specifically demonstrates how 
institutional arrangements can have dramatic impacts on institutional capacity to effectively 
respond to adverse events.  
4.4 – Overarching Themes and Neoliberal Influence 
The first three parts of this chapter have focused on each of the three adverse events, and how 
their specific impacts and responses affected the social resilience of the community. Part four 
discusses the overarching key themes that emerged across all responses, while specifically 
drawing attention to how neoliberal restructuring impacted these themes. The first two sections 
set the scene by discussing how neoliberal ideology has influenced institutional adaptability 
through; (i) The New Public Management; and (ii) The Churn. The last two sections discuss 
themes related to social capital at the institutional and local level; (iii) relationships and 
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coordination; and (iv) sense of community and trust. As has been noted previously, there are 
often crossover or flow on effects between social and human capital impacts. Specific focus is 
placed on the interlinkages between social and human capital, especially across local and 
central government scales.  
4.4.1 – The New Public Management  
The New Public Management entailed two key shifts (Hood and Scott 2000, Hood and Lodge 
2006, p.186-187); first the implementation of evidence based policy and the requirement for 
quantifiable indicators to measure the success of policies. Secondly, the implementation of 
managerialism which involved a shift from valuing technical expertise in central government 
agencies, to recruiting individuals who were effective and efficient ‘people managers’. The 
New Public Management posits that ‘people managers’ do not need technical expertise, just an 
ability to manage people and keep track of key performance indicators (Harvey 2005; 
Mazzucato 2021). 
 
The shift from technical expertise or subject matter experts in central government, to ‘people 
managers’ was a key theme that emerged during interviews, with participants at all levels 
commenting on the shift from their perspective. The participants who provided key information 
on this topic often had public and private sector experience at the regional and/or national level. 
They were also generally older and had experienced the neoliberal restructuring, and the 
changes that had caused over the last 30-40 years. One participant in such a situation described 
the problem: 
That change from technical people in senior positions to management roles 
is actually a very significant one. And you’ll pick that up, talking to the 
range of people that you are, including the farming community, you’ll pick 
up responses from them that MPI or government generally don’t know 
what’s needed. That they’re disorganised and there is a lot of 
dissatisfaction with the M. Bovis response well beyond what you’ve seen 
publicised. If you look at how that comes about, it goes back to the absence 
of people within government agencies who have got a technical 
understanding of rural industry, and who have an absence of experience of 
knowledge of how rural communities work. They haven’t lived in rural 
communities, and the difference is that prior to going back through the 
1980s-2000s, government agencies like MAF had a lot of people who were 
born in and had lived in rural communities, and they understood the 
interactions and how they operated. So not only the technical things, but 
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the sociological components. In particular, what people will respond to 
and what they won’t. What they will accept and what they won’t. There 
were a lot of people like that in MAF in those days, right to the top. And I 
believe that this has made a significant difference to the way that 
government policy and responses have been developed and delivered. And I 
think it’s a retrograde step actually. Seriously so. And it’s real simple to 
overcome that, which hasn’t been put in place at this stage. 
The disestablishment of the Rural Policy Unit (section 4.3.4) is a good example of the negative 
effects of the shift to prioritise people managers. In this context, the loss of human capital can 
be described as a loss of institutional knowledge, which impacted linking social capital between 
central government lead response agencies and affected communities during the earthquake 
and M. Bovis responses. One farmer participant who also played a role in local government 
made this connection. “Honestly, a lot of this goes back to Roger Douglas’ day, we lost a lot 
of knowledge back then, and we’re still losing now” (K9/21P). Roger Douglas was the initial 
architect of neoliberalisation in New Zealand, which is referred to as ‘Rogernomics’ (Kelsey 
1995). The outcomes of the shift to people managers from subject matter experts can be seen 
in the lack of recognition of the importance of local and contextual knowledge in central 
government that has been described throughout the chapter, especially in section 4.2.5.  
 
A regional level respondent that worked for MPI and had significant experience on farm noted 
the disconnect between them and central government policy-makers. “You’ve got to explain it, 
sometimes they’ll be trying to make decisions and you’ll just say “that’s not going to work”. 
But whether they listen to you is a different story. And you’ve got to try and...say ‘well actually, 
you haven’t thought about this, you haven’t done this, come out and we’ll show you’.”  
 
Another key informant at the regional level in MPI described how they were now organising 
training days for key stakeholders working at the national level, bringing them onto farms so 
they could better understand the local perspective.  
One of our teams is in charge of rural proofing policy, we work with 
agencies, our Minister has contacted all of his colleagues, we’ve written to 
the chief executives of other agencies, we are now designing training 
programs to get an induction for policy analysts. At the local level my team 
is setting up field trips for Wellington people to come and learn about 
farms and farmers. We get them on farm, and let them understand and talk 
through it all with the farmers. 
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A national level respondent from MPI described participating in a similar kind of training 
provided for the M. Bovis response. The training was seen as positive and effective, and the 
respondent described her appreciation of understanding the complexities. “So, we were having 
a training session with DairyNZ the other day, they were showing us how to calculate feed 
budgets and work out how much food an animal eats, which changes depending on the time of 
the year, or the part of the country you are in, or if the animal is pregnant. You are trying to 
take all these factors into account, and it doesn’t take very much for your business as usual to 
become very critical or difficult to manage.” She later described how this had impacted her 
understanding of the importance of local knowledge. “For me, a real eye opener has been 
understanding just how much livestock moves. Instead of a closed system where you might have 
300 cows on a farm all year round, you’ve got animals moving all the time, because at different 
items of the year, you have different pasture etc. They have to move. So the minute you stop 
movements, you are fundamentally changing their norm of business activity.“ 
 
A high-level respondent who had worked at the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry when 
the neoliberal restructuring occurred described how removing technical expertise from 
decision-making processes was actually the goal, rather than just a by-product of the new 
system.   
MAF had a new CEO and the new framework from him was that anyone 
could manage if they were a manager, and they didn’t need to have 
technical expertise to manage. Moreover, actively it would be better not to 
have technical expertise in a manager’s area, so he’d move people around. 
So he’d put a fisheries guy in charge of biosecurity, and an agriculture 
quality guy in charge of fisheries etc. 
He went on to reflect that there had been a backlash against technical expertise in central 
government due to people managers “getting sick of being told ‘no’”, when subject matter 
experts rejected their ideas or said that what they suggested wouldn’t work as anticipated.  
Overall, participants suggested that a balance between people managers and technical expertise 
in central government was the most desirable outcome, because people managers did bring 
benefits technical experts often lacked. Managing people was a critical skill, but so was having 
knowledge of the local context. A national level respondent said: 
Internationally, I think industries have moved back away from the idea that 
managers can manage anything, back to technical expertise. The danger of 
technical expertise is that we promote technicians who can’t manage. So 
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we need managers that have got technical expertise, who can then manage 
technicians in their teams. That’s the challenge. I think that technical 
expertise is really important in institutional memory. I had that when I was 
at MAF, I know what a farm budget looks like, how to manage feed etc. But 
also, I had a network of relationships. So that institutional memory is 
threefold. 
The shift from technical expertise or subject matter experts to ‘people managers’ is a product 
of neoliberalism (Hood and Scott 2000, Harvey 2005, Hood and Lodge 2006, p.186-187). 
Results show that managerialist policies have had clear negative impacts on adverse event 
responses in the Hurunui, by inhibiting the integration of local knowledge and key contextual 
factors into decision-making process. Neoliberal policies have also had an impact on the 
development of institutional knowledge, as described in the next section.  
4.4.2 – The Churn  
The introduction of The New Public Management also entailed policies that encouraged 
managers in key public service roles to regularly shift between different jobs in the public 
service in order to gain experience in a variety of roles. The phrase ‘jack of all trades, master 
of none’ was used by respondents to describe this phenomenon and was colloquially known as 
‘the churn’ amongst high level participants. When talking about the shift from technical 
expertise to managers, one respondent from MCDEM with significant experience in national 
responses described how high turnover was common amongst managers. “The other thing is 
the difference between policy people and subject matter experts. So policy people do move 
around an awful lot, and they are the absolute jack of all trades, but master of none. And they 
get to dominate a lot of what goes on in public service. You see it a lot, and they just bland it 
all up.” 
 
The loss of expert knowledge in government, and the shift towards ‘generalist’ managers with 
non-specific experience was most commonly observed within regional and national level roles. 
A central government respondent with a long history in disaster response at the highest levels 
described how they was deeply concerned about New Zealand’s inability to learn from past 
mistakes. The participants concern was that people who were in key positions gained a lot of 
important knowledge and experience, but then moved on to entirely unrelated roles, and the 
replacements ended up learning the same lessons by making the same mistakes. This statement 
is more concerning when it is contrasted with regional level respondents who talked about how 
important it was to make sure the learnings from the earthquake and M. Bovis responses were 
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integrated into future responses. A regional level participant said: “However, they have learnt, 
so if there ever was another crisis, I’m hoping that they’ve got all this [the learnings from the 
M. Bovis response] in place.” Somewhat ironically, this participant moved to an entirely 
unrelated role a short time after the interview. Regional level respondents often talked about 
‘learning by doing’.  
 
At the national level, one MPI respondent was very aware of her position and talked about this 
in context of the M. Bovis response.  
I can’t leave, because if I do, then all this knowledge we’ve learned is just 
gone. I need someone else to come in and be an advisor for a month before 
they take on the managers role so they aren’t landed with being a manager 
from the get go, but they actually understand and get out in the regions to 
see the nuts and bolts of what they are doing first. I think a real concern 
here, is that people say “oh, look, M Bovis, what a fantastic opportunity to 
have people get practical hands on experience, and then they rotate people 
through. The problem is, you lose the institutional knowledge. People come 
in, and they say “let’s do it this way”, and others say “we tried that but it 
didn’t work”. And it repeats. So there’s this kind of churn that’s created in 
there. From a welfare point of view, we actually have to capture our 
learnings, get our information out so it’s accessible for others to use. So 
there’s a lot of concern about that. My view is that there should be people 
that come work alongside, rather than replace. 
Concerns related to the churn were echoed at all levels, though the way it was described 
changed. At the regional level, a participant described how during the Christchurch earthquakes 
their organisation worked with the Ministry of Social Development to deliver aid to 
communities. Strong relationships were forged with high levels of trust. This entailed effective 
service delivery, with the relationship being described as “we know you, we trust you, here are 
some funds, get on the ground, and get busy” (KI33). Immediately prior to the Kaikōura 
earthquake, it was abruptly decided that the Ministry of Health was going to take over the role 
from the Ministry of Social Development, and became the key contact during the Kaikōura 
earthquake response. There were no existing relationships, and no handover. The respondent 
described the new relationship as one that had no trust, with restrictive criteria and conditions 
being attached to funding despite a long track record of delivering support services effectively 
and efficiently, with audits to prove it. The participant described their attempt to access funding 
to provide support services during the earthquake response: 
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One of things was that we didn’t have… there was a lack of 
communication. We were new partners to them, but we’ve been operating 
in the district for 30 years, we are a trusted face in the community, and we 
could mobilise people very quickly. But there were delays. There was 
something like a 2-3 months delay before resources got to us, before we 
could mobilise. So the sequence of events for us, Sunday night everyone 
had the earthquake. Monday morning I was straight down to Amberley to 
be a part of the “what are we gonna do” conversation. I said we can 
mobilise people quickly, we submitted a funding application by Thursday to 
the Ministry of Health, and then nothing happened for 2-3 months. 
The way that criteria and conditions for funding have been used in this context provides an 
example of the problem of measurement (section 2.3.2), which can be viewed as the outcome 
of the managerialist approaches emphasised by the New Public Management (section 2.4.4). 
Institutions use indicators and metrics to measure progress or track success, but key sources of 
value are intangible and difficult to quantify. Relying on objective measurement to determine 
funding resulted in negative outcomes in this context, because core sources of value, in this 
case existing trusted relationships and social connections, were not considered. The UIRF 
(section 4.2.7) provides another case example with the same outcome – intangible sources of 
value were not considered in policy design resulting in negative outcomes – in a different 
context. 
 
Farmers also described experiences related to the churn, but again using different language. 
The best example was a farmer discussing why engaging with national level response agencies 
was so difficult.  
The change in personnel had a bit to do with it. After the earthquake, the 
MPI recovery fund thing [was a good idea] but it was a procession of 
different people that you’d meet with, and then the minister changed, and 
things like that. So you can put a massive amount time into it, and thought 
they actually had a pretty good case or built some understanding, and then 
a different team of people turned up and what actually happened was 
completely different than what they’d spent 6 months talking about. And so 
that’s… You’ll get that across the whole of that area. K1/1 
Overall, these two sections provide compelling evidence that the neoliberal shift to 
managerialism in New Zealand’s public service has resulted in significant negative impacts on 
the capacity and capability of central government institutions to effectively coordinate 
responses to local adverse events. Both the New Public Management and the churn help 
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demonstrate why local engagement from central government response agencies, and some 
regional agencies, such as CDEM, fell short of expectations. The outcomes can be framed using 
social and human capital concepts, which play an interlinked role in describing how the 
outcomes occurred. The next section will detail overarching themes related to social capital.  
4.4.3 – Relationships and Coordination 
Relationships between the lead response agencies and the affected local community (linking 
social capital) were crucial, as the three adverse events discussed in this chapter have already 
demonstrated. Additionally, relationships between the lead response agency and supporting 
organisations (linking/bridging social capital) were an important part of the coordination 
required to effectively respond. During the drought, the RST, MPI, and all other relevant 
stakeholders – such as Beef and Lamb, DairyNZ and  Federated Farmers – had a strong 
relationships and were directly linked through the Drought Committee. This was cited as 
playing an important role in the effectiveness of the drought response and resulted in a positive 
public perception of the response. In contrast, during the earthquake the response was 
perceived to be disorganised and untrustworthy due to a lack of relationships and coordination 
between the lead response agency – CDEM – and various supporting agencies – such as local 
community welfare support agencies and NGOs. Many participants at all levels expressed 
significant concern about the lack of coordination and cooperation between the organisations 
responding to the earthquake.  
 
An MPI respondent described an example of this during the earthquake. “It was a big national 
emergency, we had the Ministry of Health and the local District Health Boards, and they knew 
nothing about the RSTs, about our relationship with them, and they knew very little about the 
impact of the drought in that region, and what they were doing about it” (K25/23P). Farmer 
participants described how initial local community social service organisations as well as the 
Red Cross and Salvation Army all arrived in the district and visited the same most visible 
houses. This was described as concentrating the initial response where it was not needed and 
frustrating residents with multiple visits, while neglecting to visit other affected areas where 
support was needed. At the higher levels, respondents described similar coordination issues, 
citing a lack of reporting and situational awareness, and the need for better central coordination 
between all agencies involved in the response.  
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For social services, it really would be great if they could talk to each other 
and coordinate. But they are just these little groups that have these niche 
specialties, and no resources to go beyond what they are funded to do 
K28/2. 
M. Bovis provided similar examples. The dictatorial command and control style of response 
disincentivised good relationships between MPI, case managers and farmers early on in the 
response, which led to negative outcomes. As discussed in section 4.3.1, farmer participants 
described their case managers as being in the compromised position of having to choose 
between a good relationship with MPI, or advocating for farmers. As section 4.3.3 outlined, 
this was in large part due to the strict hierarchical nature of the response, which did not allow 
for effective two-way communication between the lead response agencies and those affected. 
Across both the earthquake and M. Bovis a common refrain was that relationships had to be in 
place before the event occurred, and that trust was fundamentally important to this. “If you do 
not have pre event basis of trust with actual potential recovery agents, or agencies, for me with 
council, then it’s just damn difficult, if not impossible, to build that trust in the immediate 
aftermath.” (K24/2P). Strong relationships were seen as fundamental across the board. A high 
level informant at the national level said: 
I’d go so far as to say that the connections we have between people, the 
networks, are the most important thing. I used to say to staff, that a cabinet 
paper [used by senior Ministers of the NZ government for decision making 
and policy] never achieves anything. People would say that they’d written 
the cabinet paper, but that’s just a decision support mechanism for 
politicians. The most important part was the implementation, the 
communication. Community participation. The buy-in. All those elements 
that led to that plan being undertaken. It is no use at all, if it just sits in a 
cabinet paper. And many of them do (K45/3P). 
The importance of an pre-established relationship prior to adverse event onset has been a 
driving factor in the attempt to establish a Rural Advisory Group with a formal role within the 
CDEM structure in North Canterbury. Additionally, respondents described a plan to create a 
RAG for all regions in New Zealand, and to embed them within the formal CDEM structures. 
 
Overall, relationships and co-ordination can be conceptualised as linking and/or bridging social 
capital, which had flow on human capital impacts (stress for farmers). The next section covers 
sense of community and trust. 
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4.4.4 – Sense of Community and Trust 
Fundamental to strong relationships and effective coordination are sense of community and 
trust. Two questions that were asked at the end of every interview were “In the context of all 
that we have talked about here today, what does trust (question 1) /sense of community 
(question 2) mean to you?” In the review of social resilience literature, trust and sense of 
community were identified as two important intangible factors for social resilience (Kwok et 
al. 2016; Paton and McClure 2013, section 2.4.2, Table 2), and the decision to ask all 
respondents the same question was made prior to the first interview.  
 
Farmers spoke enthusiastically about the strong sense of community (bridging social capital) 
in their district, which was noted to have served them well when they were tested by the drought 
and earthquake. K1/1 described the nature of the identity within the community.  
Oh, [this area has] got a really strong community, it would be as good as 
any…It’s maintained its own identity quite strongly…And generally 
speaking, clubs and the like are everywhere, not enough hours in the day 
you know, it’s pretty strong in terms of sports clubs and different things 
going on. Farm discussion groups, different things like that. So… I think 
it’s got a good farming community, I guess. It’s a great place to live (K1/1). 
K3/1 described how the community came together after the earthquake. 
Oh, yeah, it absolutely does [sense of community] have a huge impact, this 
is a very small community. Very tight community. It kicked in with the 
earthquake, it’s a small town, and the supermarket was absolutely trashed, 
shit everywhere, half the shelves on the floor, and they just walk in through 
the whole shop, pick everything up, tidy everything. That sort of stuff. 
There’s no money involved, just the community. When the earthquake 
happened, a lot of neighbours automatically, once they’d secured their 
situation, then [went to check on] their neighbours, and their neighbour’s 
neighbours, if there’s any elderly people living close by, they will check 
them out. The rest home. A lot of people do that, and that’s a small 
community (K3/1). 
The way institutional responses interacted and communicated (linking social capital) with 
locals during the adverse events impacted on their sense of community (bridging social capital). 
The RST response during the drought, and the events they ran, drew upon and had positive 
impacts on the local sense of community. In contrast, the M. Bovis was unique, and the 
distributed nature of the event combined with the privacy issue described in section 4.3.2 – 
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where MPI refused to divulge who had M. Bovis – caused suspicion and distrust in the local 
community. Similar sentiments about the importance of the local sense of community were put 
forward at the regional level. K22/2P described how it was fundamentally important for 
regional agencies to be a part of the community in order to engage with them effectively during 
adverse event responses. 
I think it’s very, very important. The way that we work in with the rural 
community, they need to have confidence that the council is coming from 
the right place. It doesn’t matter if it’s the council, or another organisation. 
They need to have confidence in us. The only way they are going to have 
confidence, is if you effectively become part of that community. You go and 
see them, and talk to them, and explain stuff and you listen. It helps greatly 
when something happens like the earthquake, and there’s something you 
can help them with. There was loads we were able to do to help after the 
earthquake, and that actually really enhanced our connection to the 
community (K22/2P). 
A respondent from MPI (K25/23P) commented on how the CDEM response had 
underestimated the strength of the community in the Hurunui, what it could bring to the table 
during the response, and how important it was “to better capture that going forward”. The 
respondent also noted that the strength of the community depended on context (section 2.2.3).  
It’s fundamental. That’s the lesson that rural communities can actually 
bring to something like this. That’s something I talked about with one of the 
controllers actually, CDEM hadn’t realised the strength of community. 
When you listen to all the voices from the inland road, and that whole saga, 
those voices were shocked, “how could they just forget about us, ignore 
us?” whereas the official side of things… they just had no idea what was 
going on up there. But each community is different. So if you compare the 
north Canterbury sheep and beef farming community to the mid 
Canterbury corporate dairy community it is very different. And that is also 
playing out in response and recovery. That’s different to Southland, and 
that’s different to Northland (K25/23P). 
The understanding of the importance of the local sense of community was not as present at the 
national level. Government respondent comments were often abstract and more values driven 
than reflecting a personal understanding. A regional level respondent from MPI discussed this, 
especially in context of the M. Bovis response. 
I think in the regions we’ve got a really good sense of community, as in the 
team. The MPI team. Really good sense of community. I wouldn’t say that 
in Wellington. I would say sense of community, that we believe in where 
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we’re living, especially out in the country. You can develop that sense of 
community, and it’s also wider that your stakeholders. So it might not just 
be one industry, but I see all the stakeholders I’ve got as my community. I 
can ring them, or they can ring me and it’s a two-way conversation. And 
it’s that trust thing, like private conversation, off the record type thing. 
That’s definitely trust, but also sense of community in that it’s two-way. 
Give you a call and keep building that community rather than losing it. 
Which I think is what happened with M. Bovis, a lot of the communities 
have been destroyed. And it has flow on effects as farms get depopulated. 
The staff go, the schools go, that kind of stuff (K29/2P). 
The contextual nature of sense of community, and how it differs between regions or farm types, 
provides an important example of how difficult it can be to generalise resilience concepts using 
quantitative measures. However, all of these factors can be captured using social capital 
concepts and the LSF.  
 
Trust was also seen as an important factor in relationships. Every participant considered trust 
to be fundamentally important in any response. The responses to this question provided some 
fascinating insights into the nature of social capital, and it’s influence on relationships. One 
emergency manager involved at a high level described relationships as being fundamental in 
building trust. “We don’t actually talk about trust explicitly, we do relationship building, 
creating 2-way (or 3 or 4 or 5-way) conversations, but that then generates trust” (K27/23P). 
A common refrain amongst participants at all levels, was that trust means that if you say you 
are going to do something, then you follow through. One farmer described who he trusted: “I 
mean I’ve got high level of trust in the District Council, moderate level of trust in the Regional 
Council, and very little trust in something like MPI or what comes out of Wellington” (K1/1). 
 
Trust at the local level was strong. Farmers had strong trusted relationships with local 
government and organisations. At the regional level, trust was more contextual and depended 
on the organisation – both in terms of which organisations farmers trusted, but also which 
organisation was trusted during each disruptive event. For example, MPI was trusted during 
the drought and earthquake response, but not during the M. Bovis response. A key difference 
is that the drought and earthquake response had regional level MPI involvement which had 
strong pre-existing relationships with the local council and other regional support agencies, 
such as the RST. In contrast, the M. Bovis response was led at the national level and did not 
engage with these agencies as effectively. During the earthquake, the relationship between the 
local community and regional CDEM was poor, as local knowledge was not taken into account. 
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The RST, in contrast, were trusted because of existing relationships and they had a strong track 
record of respecting local knowledge.  
 
Interestingly, respondents from MPI described how they do not to publicly advertise their 
funding of RSTs, choosing to deliberately distance themselves so they are not seen to interfere 
with the positive relationship between RSTs and farmers. “They [RSTs] have earned their 
[farmers’] trust. And their independence is so important. That’s why we don’t fully fund them” 
(K25/23P).  
 
The answer to the question of trust from a respondent from Environment Canterbury, an 
organisation that is generally distrusted by farmers, shows how institutional distrust can impact 
relationships. 
I don’t like trust. It’s a loaded word. Trust implies betrayal. Which 
inevitably everyone does at some point or other. Yeah, no, I’m not 
interested in that word. Anytime anyone chucks that word at me, trust, how 
can we trust you, I am immediately on my guard, because someone who is 
making their approach to me contingent on trust is effectively looking for a 
failure. That’s how I see it. I don’t like the implication of the use of the 
word trust. It is not right. Because it means that if I make one mistake, then 
that person has a reason to not trust me after that. And the implications are 
that I’m not a trustworthy person, like what the hell does that mean? 
The respondent had inherited an institutional legacy of distrust, which impacted on their ability 
to engage effectively with farmers they did not know. Farmers in the district who had a 
relationship with the respondent implied that they trusted his judgement and suggested that he 
be interviewed about this topic because of his experience.  
  
Relationships between the local and national level were generally poor with low levels of trust. 
Winton Dalley (K2/231P) described how the presence and subsequent absence of a strong 
trusted relationship changed the outcomes after the drought and earthquake. During the 
drought, there was a strong relationship between the Mayor (K2/231P) and the Minister for 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management through the Drought Committee. Just before the 
earthquake, he described how the minister had given him a significant cheque with no strings 
attached because he knew that they were in trouble, and he trusted Dalley to spend it with the 
best interests of the district in mind. In contrast, the Uninsurable Infrastructure Relief Fund and 
other schemes after the earthquake were an example of low trust response due to the imposition 
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of criteria which was difficult to meet. This negatively affected relationships between locals 
and central government response agencies as well as generating additional stress (human 
capital) for farmers impacted by the earthquake.  
The Minister knew what we were doing as a Drought Committee and he 
knew that the issue had not gone away for this district so he handed me a 
cheque with absolutely no criteria attached, for me to allow the Drought 
Committee to continue doing the work that they had seen us do for three 
years. That’s trust. Right. And then, all the stuff at earthquake time, was 
smothered in criteria. So where was the trust? Where was the trust? You 
know. And yeah, this was the same ministry that trusted me with [number 
removed] but in the next event, because, probably different people 
involved. So, that’s an example of trust and distrust (K2/231P). 
During M. Bovis, MPI lost farmer trust because of the way the response was enacted. The initial 
focus on disease control, without accounting for the impact it had on farmers, caused the most 
serious breach of trust discussed in this research. Respondents on at the local and national level 
commented on this, with MPI candidly discussing the negative effect this had on their ability 
to engage with farmers on important matters.  
 
The lack of local knowledge integration was often cited as a severe impediment to trust and 
strong relationships between the local and national levels, and sometimes even between 
regional and national levels. There was agreement on this at the local and national level. One 
farmer talked about the importance of: 
Ensuring that they have people in organisations that have some influence 
that understand farming on the ground. So, talking about MPI, it’s pretty 
obvious by a lot of the calls they are making, the way they are treating 
people, that they just don’t understand it at all. What happens on a farm, 
on the ground, and if they’re gonna be dealing with farmers they have to be 
able to react to things like M. Bovis, they need to have some on the ground 
understanding. K4/1. 
A national level respondent who worked at the regional level echoed this sentiment: 
The government as it’s currently setup doesn’t really understand farmers. 
The old MPI did because of where the people came from .The old MPI 
would have employed agricultural economists, whereas the new MPI they 
are just economists. They don’t understand farming. That’s an issue there. 
K13/32 
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The importance of local knowledge and understanding of the local context was cited as an 
important aspect of trust across all events and groups. Strong existing relationships were seen 
as key for this. Where strong relationships and trust were present during adverse event 
responses, there were good outcomes. A lack of relationships and distrust were associated with 
negative outcomes. The overarching themes described in this section can be conceptualised as 
social and human capital, and the institutional responses can be described as having positive or 
negative impacts on social and human capital. 
4.5 – Chapter Summary  
The purpose of this chapter has been to present the results of this research. The first part 
detailed the impacts of the drought, and why the response was considered the most effective, 
despite the drought being considered the most challenging event to deal with by many farmers. 
The RST took the lead role in supporting farmers in the drought response, with the aid of the 
Drought Committee and utilised strong pre-existing relationships and trust with farmers to 
connect with and support them during the drought. Stress was identified as a key human capital 
impact for all adverse events.  
 
Part two described the earthquake impacts and response. Results showed that the local 
community had significant difficulty establishing linking social capital initially, resulting in 
local knowledge not being acknowledged or accounted for in structural decision-making 
processes. However, after extensive efforts by one participant (K10/1) linking social capital 
was established which subsequently generated positive outcomes for key problems such as the 
road closure. Local knowledge was identified as a key factor for lead response agencies to 
account for, which required the establishment of bridging and linking social capital. These 
lessons resulted in the Rural Advisory Group (formerly the Drought Committee) being given 
a formal place in the CDEM decision-making structure in order to ensure local knowledge was 
incorporated – which is now being implemented nationwide. The Uninsurable Infrastructure 
Relief Fund provided another example where local context wasn’t incorporated into policy 
design, and offered an example of indicators and metrics being used to ensure fair policy 
delivery, with negative outcomes, which is a feature of The New Public Management.  
 
Part three detailed the M. Bovis response and impacts. Results illustrated a lack of adaptive 
capacity at an institutional level, through the dictatorial command and control style of response, 
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resulted in an inability for farmers to establish linking social capital with the lead response 
agency resulting in negative human capital (stress, mental health) impacts for farmers. A key 
learning from this section was how neoliberal restructuring had resulted in the disestablishment 
of the Rural Policy Unit, an organisation that MPI had previously relied upon to provide linking 
social capital and institutional knowledge (human capital) during adverse event responses. The 
value the unit provided could not be described in financial or tangible terms, and was therefore 
disestablished resulting in negative outcomes in adverse event responses in rural areas.  
 
The final part covered key overarching themes related to social and human capital. The first 
two sections focused on human capital impacts, describing how the neoliberalisation of NZ 
institutions had influenced adverse event responses through The New Public Management and 
the churn, which had negatively impacted adaptive capacity, adaptive management and 
institutional knowledge. The last two sections described key themes related to social capital – 
relationships and coordination, and sense of community and trust. Overall, the results 
demonstrated that key factors in each adverse event, and the response to them, can be 
conceptualised as social capital (bonding, bridging and linking) and human capital (stress, 
mental health, knowledge, skills, adaptive capacity, adaptive management). This chapter also 
demonstrated that a key pattern in the responses to the three adverse events is that when social 
and human capital related phenomena were accounted for, good outcomes resulted, and when 
they were not, negative outcomes prevailed.  
 
The next chapter will incorporate the literature in order to discuss the results. 
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Chapter 5 – Discussion 
Resilience thinking is rapidly being institutionalised as the hegemonic approach to hazard 
management through the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. However, the 
transfer of the concept into the social domain and it’s operationalisation in policy and practice 
has resulted in theoretical and practical challenges. In Aotearoa New Zealand, hazards and their 
management are a part of everyday life and the government has a strong focus on building 
resilience. However, a gap exists in understanding how governmental and institutional 
responses to adverse events affect those impacted. Focusing on the Hurunui district in North 
Canterbury, the primary aim of this thesis was to investigate how the institutional responses to 
three major and distinct adverse events affected the local community’s social resilience using 
social and human capital concepts. The literature review critically described the theoretical 
foundations of the study, as well as the institutional context in which the adverse event 
responses were enacted. The results presented the empirical data collected across three groups 
of research participants – those who experienced the events and responses, those who 
responded, and those who organised the response. This chapter presents a detailed discussion 
of the implications of the results within the broader context of the literature review.  
 
The structure of this chapter is similar to that of the literature review, and consists of four parts. 
The first part presents a summary and synthesis of the results, broadly connecting the key 
themes that emerged in the results to the theoretical foundations outlined in the literature 
review. This forms the basis upon which the first two research questions can be addressed. The 
subsequent parts follow the same progression of points made in the literature review, beginning 
with the development of resilience thinking in ecology and then covering it’s transfer into the 
social domain. Parts two and three reveal the key challenges associated with operationalising 
SES resilience – nuance, norms and measurement, and provide the foundation for the 
incorporation of multi-capital frameworks. The final part introduces the Living Standards 
Framework as a mechanism to account for intangible factors of resilience which are not easily 
measurable, and examines it’s utility in addressing the key challenges for operationalising 
resilience. Adopting this structure and discussing the results in context of the literature review 
allows for the identification and demonstration of the strengths and weaknesses of each 
subsequent theoretical advance relative to the findings of this study. The three research 
questions guide the topics covered, and are directly addressed in the chapter conclusion. 
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4. What role did social resilience play in the community response to the three hazard 
events in the Hurunui? 
5. What were the institutional responses, and how did they affect the local community’s 
social resilience? 
6. What insights can social and human capital provide for understanding and 
operationalising social resilience in order to improve institutional responses to 
adverse events? 
5.1 – Summary and synthesis of the results 
Resilience, especially social resilience, played a crucial role in how the Hurunui community 
responded to the impacts of the three adverse events examined by this research. The distinct 
institutional responses to each adverse event also had significant impacts on the social 
resilience of those affected, both positive and negative. This section examines the results of 
this research and focuses on illustrating factors related to the first two research questions. 
Multi-capital concepts – social and human capital – are used to frame and describe different 
aspects of social resilience. While all capitals were observed to play an important role in each 
adverse event in the Hurunui, social and human capital were focused on because they provide 
the most effective means to describe key intangible factors. 
 
Social capital is sub-divided into three types – bonding, bridging and linking (Coleman 1988; 
Putnam 2000; Giorgas 2007; Figure 5.1). Bonding social capital refers to close ties or 
connections such as those between families or close friends. Bridging social capital is the 
connection individuals have with their wider community. And linking social capital is the 
connection between individuals or communities and those who are outside of the wider 
community which can enable access to a different set of resources. Linking social capital is 
becoming increasingly recognised as an important resource during adverse event responses 
(Aldrich and Meyer 2015), and social capital in general is also increasingly being used as a 
descriptive tool to capture intangible value in adverse event contexts (Aryal and Wilkinson 




Figure 5.1 – Different types of social capital drawn upon in the Hurunui during adverse event 
responses. Where events are identified in parentheses, these factors were specifically drawn 
on during one particular adverse event. 
Not all literature regards social capital as uniformly positive. Referred to as social capital’s 
‘dark side’, strong group ties, such as described in the bonding variety, can in some instances 
lead to negative outcomes for groups (Durlauf 1999). While this is not discussed in the results, 
because there wasn’t sufficient evidence, there were some hints of bonding social capital 
related problems that emerged during interviews. It is also important to note that the concept 
of social capital was used in an exploratory way to gain insight into social resilience following 
adverse events. While metrics for social capital have been proposed, the issues of attribution 
that plague resilience thinking are equally prevalent here, and so the aim is not to ‘measure’ 
social capital but to describe it (Harper 2002, Halpern 2005, Scrivens and Smith 2013, Field 
2016). 
 
Human capital is not theorised with the same depth and nuance as social capital. In the NZ 
context, the LSF describes human capital as: “the capabilities and capacities of people to 
engage in work, study, recreation, and social activities. Includes skills, knowledge, physical 
and mental health.” Human capital is drawn upon to integrate concepts related to adaptability 
– such as adaptive capacity and adaptive management – into the multi-capital framework, as 
well as physical and mental health related issues such as stress. Figure 5.2 shows how 
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adaptative management, adaptive capacity, and stress are linked and affect each other. Human 
capital as represented in Figure 5.2 can be used to describe both farmers and organisations, and 
thus are transferable between different scales.  
 
Figure 5.2 – Key factors related to human capital and the links between them, during the 
adverse event and responses in the Hurunui 
5.1.1 – Drought 
The initial impacts of the drought were primarily financial due to the lack of rain, which caused 
subsequent flow on social impacts that were exacerbated by considerable uncertainty as to how 
long the drought would last. The primary human impact of the drought was stress, which can 
be viewed as having a negative effect on human capital. As noted in the literature review, 
excessive stress can have a negative impact on individual’s capacity to make decisions, which 
can result in poor strategic farm planning, such as when to destock or feed management (section 
2.2.1). At the local level, farmer participants described a strong sense of community in the 
district, with mutual support and a sense of coming together to help each other. The Hurunui 
District Council responded to the drought through the formation of the Drought Committee, 
which brought key stakeholders together – such as local government, the RST, Federated 
Farmers, Beef and Lamb, DairyNZ –  in order to establish a co-ordinated response and provide 
logistical and decision-making support to affected farmers. This illustrates the establishment 
of bridging and linking social capital amongst key stakeholders which enabled adaptive 
management, generating adaptive capacity, in order to alleviate stress impacts on farmers in 
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response to the drought impacts. There was explicit local recognition of the problems that 
excessive stress caused, and decision making support was a key part of this local response.  
 
The central government response to the drought came through funding provided to the RST 
and local council in order to facilitate their support activities. Alongside the proactive 
establishment of bridging and linking social capital, the drought response respected, 
acknowledged and accounted for farmers and their local knowledge during the response 
process. Respondents from all groups cited the strength of the local community, the 
connections between those impacted and those responding, as well as the capacity that existed 
to respond, as key factors that helped generate positive outcomes. The drought response was 
considered the most successful response, despite it also being described as the most challenging 
adverse event of the three discussed.  
 
Figure 5.3 shows the connections and actors that played a key role in the drought and the 
subsequent response. The green arrows represent connections between different parties, and 
the emphasis of the arrow (size) represents the relative importance and usefulness of the 
connection during the drought response. There are three levels of arrow emphasis, low, medium 
and high. The emphasis on each arrow is qualitative, and based on participant descriptions of 
the connection. Interview data did not suggest that low emphasis connections needed to 
improve, rather, arrow emphasis illustrates which connections were most important during the 
drought. For example, the connection between the farmer and the RST is considered more 
important than the connection between the farmer and MPI. Bridging and linking social capital 
are not distinguished between in the figure because they are context dependant depending on 
respondents pre-existing relationships. For example, some farmer relationships with MPI could 




Figure 5.3 – Connections between different organisations during the drought response 
Overall, key learnings from the drought illustrate how an institutional response which accounts 
for bridging and linking social capital as well as adaptability was highly effective. The central 
government funding for the RST combined with the Drought Committee led by local 
government provided the best example of an effective response across the three adverse events 
presented in this research. However, it must also be acknowledged that those responding had 
strong pre-existing relationships amongst most key stakeholders which the literature (Thornley 
et al. 2014; Paton 2020) and results have noted as being a key factor in the effectiveness of 
adverse event responses (discussed more in section 5.1.3). Additionally, the RST has 
considerable historical experience with droughts, which can be described as institutional 
knowledge, the implications of which will be discussed in further detail in section 5.1.4. In 
contrast to the drought, the next two events – earthquake and M. Bovis – were novel, because 
few local residents had recent, direct experience from which to draw on during the responses, 
especially in the local context.  
5.1.2 - Earthquake 
The earthquake struck during the apex of the drought, and the associated impacts compounded 
the stress many participants were already experiencing. The earthquake impacts included 
damage to infrastructure such as houses, roads, water supplies and power. The damage to water 
supplies, especially stock water, was significant because of the drought conditions and led to 
animal welfare concerns. The response from the local community and local government in the 
early phase of the disaster were well regarded, with significant co-ordination and logistical 
efforts undertaken to ensure the safety of the community, and identify where welfare and 
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logistical support needed to be prioritised. These local responses made good use of existing 
bonding and bridging social capital and demonstrated adaptive capacity and management 
(human capital). In contrast, the official response from Canterbury Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management was viewed poorly by local respondents due to a lack of connection 
(linking social capital) between the community and Civil Defence Emergency Management 
response personnel.  
 
One respondent (K10/1) detailed extensive attempts to initiate two-way communication 
between the community leaders driving the local response, and Civil Defence. Eventually these 
efforts were successful. Once this connection was established (linking social capital), the 
integration of local knowledge into decision making structures enabled joint solutions to key 
problems, such as the road closure. However, many participants cited extensive concerns with 
the time it took for this to be put in place. The initial inability to get local knowledge integrated 
into decision-making structures had an additional negative impact on the stress levels of 
participants during the early phases of the earthquake response. Participants described how this 
exacerbated the considerable existing stress they were under due to the earthquake, which was 
already compounding upon the stress caused by the drought. 
 
The problems caused by the lack of connection between the lead response agency and local 
responders was recognised ex post by participants at all levels and all relevant organisations. 
An important outcome of the earthquake response was the initial informal integration of the 
Rural Advisory Group (formerly the Drought Committee) into the Canterbury Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management (CCDEM) decision-making structure. This was later formalised 
in order to ensure that there were formal channels for local knowledge to being accounted for 
in decision-making processes in future emergencies. The Uninsurable Infrastructure Relief 
Fund policy response was another important example of local knowledge initially not being 
sufficiently acknowledged during the earthquake (section 4.2.7), leading to unnecessary 
additional stress upon those impacted until changes were made.  
 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the connections between the different actors across the earthquake 
response. The green arrows denote connections, with the size of the arrows again denoting the 
importance/influence of those connections. The red lines denote the initial lack of connection, 
and the blue dotted line shows how the Hurunui Rural Advisory Group was formally integrated 
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Figure 5.4 – Connections between different organisations during the earthquake response 
Overall, the earthquake response emphasised the importance of connection and engagement 
between different scales (social capital), and the integration of local knowledge (human capital) 
into decision-making structures which enabled adaptive management (human capital), and 
ensured that the response did not inadvertently increase the stress of those impacted. Linking 
social capital, integration of local knowledge and adaptive management are all highlighted by 
the literature as important for social resilience and will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter (sections 5.2 and 5.3). 
5.1.3 – Mycoplasma Bovis 
The M. Bovis outbreak was first discovered in the district seven months after the earthquake. 
All farmers considered the risks of having M. Bovis on their property and took precautionary 
measures. The impact was especially acute for those who had to interact with MPI due to either 
having M. Bovis, or being suspected of having M. Bovis. Participants from all levels, including 
from within MPI, described the Ministry’s interactions with farmers as unacceptable. High 
level participants noted that the M. Bovis response was unlike the drought or earthquake 
because it was not localised. Districts throughout New Zealand had one or two properties which 
were infected due to the large number of stock movements between farms. Accordingly, the 
social resilience of local communities was not drawn upon in the same way, and the local 
responses were unlike those seen during the drought or earthquake. Participants described 
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farmers on infected properties as being ostracised within their communities, with distrust and 
suspicion commonplace within a usually strong community. A particular decision by MPI to 
protect the privacy of infected properties (section 4.3.2) further stoked this suspicion and 
distrust amongst communities, which also increased the stress levels of all involved.  
 
The response had significant negative impacts on the social resilience of farmers due to the 
primary focus on disease control combined with the top-down, ‘command and control’ style of 
leadership utilised by MPI during the response. Many participants cited being aware of multiple 
suicides that occurred in the area because of the intense pressure applied on farmers by MPI’s 
response to M. Bovis. Communication between MPI and farmers was described as 
unidirectional, from MPI to the farmer. One participant described extensive attempts to 
establish contact with MPI, the lead response agency, but unlike the attempts made by K10/1 
during the earthquake, had no success. The participant’s case was only heard after directly 
contacting the Prime Minister. The inability to establish linking social capital was particularly 
problematic due to significant uncertainties around the bacteria, such as testing, which would 
have benefited from an adaptive management approach that respected and incorporated local 
knowledge into decision-making processes (human capital). Respondents at all levels 
described the MPI approach as dictatorial, with no room for discussion. This directly inhibited 
any adaptive responses, such as those that occurred during the earthquake response when 
linking social capital was established between Civil Defence and local responders.  
 
The key problem here was, again, the lack of connection between the lead response agency and 
the community, including farmers and local support networks, which resulted in a lack of local 
knowledge being incorporated into the decision-making process. During interviews high-level 
participants described the lack of capacity and capability to deal with M. Bovis at the time. The 
M. Bovis outbreak was novel, and MPI had neither the experience nor the personnel to run an 
effective response that adequately accounted for farmer welfare across the many affected 
districts. Participants at all levels also discussed how a former organisation within MPI, the 
Rural Policy Unit, would have been tasked with gathering and feeding local knowledge into 
the decision-making processes, but had been disestablished years ago due to a lack of financial 
justification for the programme (discussed further in section 5.2.3). During M. Bovis, RSTs had 
initially been relied upon to provide this function, but the scale of the crisis overwhelmed them, 
resulting in significant tensions between MPI and the RSTs that threatened their ongoing 
relationship. Lessons were learned during the response, and participants from MPI revealed 
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that they are now very aware of the problems and were in the process of integrating local 
knowledge into the response. Questions still remain as to whether these learnings will become 
institutional knowledge, given the problems associated with the churn – described in the next 
section.  
 
Figure 5.5 outlines the connections between the different organisations involved in the M. 
Bovis response. The green arrows denote good connections, with size showing the most 
important relationships, whereas the red single directional arrows denote how the response 
involved only one way communication between MPI and farmers impacted. The red bi-
direction arrow between the farmer and the dead cow denotes the connection between them, 
but is red due to farmer’s extreme difficulty in influencing outcomes for their stock due to a 
lack of connection with MPI, even when there was strong evidence that they were not infected.  
 
 
Figure 5.5 - Connections between different organisations during the M. Bovis response 
Overall, the M. Bovis response reemphasises the importance of connection and engagement 
between those impacted and those responding as well as considering the stress the response 
imposes on the local community. More importantly, it also provides the strongest evidence for 
the importance of adaptability, capacity and capability (human capital) within responding 
institutions. This will be discussed in more detail in section 5.2.1. 
5.1.4 – The relationship between social and human capital 
The core themes that emerged in each response have been the importance of the connection 
between people (social capital), especially at different scales (linking social capital), as well as 
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the capacity of both individuals and organisations to respond (human capital). Social resilience 
has clearly played an important part in each response, and the institutional responses have had 
clear impacts on those affected – both positive and negative. When discussing the importance 
of connection, or social capital, the key words that participants used can be related back to the 
themes of relationships, co-ordination, sense of community, and trust (sections 4.4.3, 4.4.4). 
The previous three sections have demonstrated the importance of the linking social capital 
connections between different scales during the responses. It is also important to re-emphasise 
the strength of bonding and bridging social capital within the local community in the Hurunui. 
Most participants ascribed a large part of the success of the drought and earthquake responses 
to the support provided to each other within the community. The M. Bovis response offers a 
counterfactual where the strength of the local communities were not drawn upon due to the 
distributed nature of the event. Respondents who were directly impacted described the M. Bovis 
response as the most difficult to deal with overall, with social isolation from the local 
community being a significant factor.  
 
The literature describes the inextricable connections that exists between social and human 
capital (Pretty and Ward 2001; Walker et al. 2004; OECD 2010; Roberts and Lacey 2014; 
Sharma 2014), which were observed in this research. In the Hurunui, there were many 
examples of how connections (or lack thereof) between farmers and lead response agencies 
(linking social capital) generated positive or negative outcomes for farmers by either increasing 
or decreasing their stress levels (human capital). Results show that linking social capital often 
enabled adaptive management which had positive effects on adaptive capacity (human capital). 
The effectiveness of the drought response, which utilised linking social capital and institutional 
adaptability, reduced farmer stress which aided farmer decision-making capacity 
(adaptability). In contrast, the initial earthquake and M. Bovis response exacerbated stress, 
which can inhibit decision-making capacity (adaptability). Social capital and human capital 
impacts are clearly linked, and the relationship is circular (Figure 5.6) – an impact on one 
automatically affects the other. For example, a lack of capability and capacity at the 
institutional level during the M. Bovis response inhibited the establishment of linking social 
capital. In turn, this inhibited adaptive management and adaptive capacity at the local and 
institutional level, which increased farmer stress. Consequently, this damaged trust and the 
relationships between the lead response agency and the local community, making linking social 
capital harder to establish. The interplay between social and human capital is illustrated in 




Figure 5.6 – The feedback loop between social and human capital can be positive or negative 
5.1.5 – Neoliberal influences on adverse event outcomes 
Some government and private respondents were aware of how the negative feedback loop 
between reduced capability and capacity and decreased social connection and discussed its 
origins. The neoliberal ideology that has occupied a hegemonic position in NZ since the 1980s 
has reshaped the way our institutions can respond to adverse events through significant 
restructuring. Neoliberal styles of public management – including The New Public 
Management and the churn – have negatively impacted capability and capacity (human capital) 
as well as the connections between different scales (linking social capital). One example of this 
phenomenon is the disestablishment of the Rural Policy Unit (4.3.4), which reduced MPI’s 
capacity to incorporate local knowledge into high-level decisions. The value the Rural Policy 
Unit provided was to connect central government decision makers with local knowledge 
produced by farmers and other rural professionals. However, this knowledge was intangible 
and participants described how the Rural Policy Unit was disbanded because the value it 
provided was not understood at the central government level. The neoliberal restructuring 
context provides a strong basis for an argument that this was a part of what David Harvey 
(2005) called ‘creative destruction’, which involves the destruction of prior institutional 
arrangements and occurred through the financialisaton of the public sector.  
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Analysis of interview data revealed two primary mechanisms through which neoliberal 
ideology influenced adverse event responses and outcomes – The New Public Management 
(4.4.1) and ‘the churn’ (4.4.2). The New Public Management entailed two key shifts; first the 
implementation of evidence based policy and the requirement for quantifiable indicators to 
measure the success of policies. Secondly, managerialism – the shift from valuing technical 
expertise in central government agencies, to recruiting individuals who were effective and 
efficient ‘people managers’. This is consistent with the literature, which describes the New 
Public Management as a theory which posits that ‘people managers’ do not need technical 
expertise, just an ability to manage people and keep track of key performance indicators 
(Harvey 2005, Mazzucato 2021). However, as this research establishes, subject matter experts 
provided important context into high level decision-making structures creating beneficial 
outcomes during adverse event responses. The value of such skillsets in decision-making 
structures – diverse perspectives which enhance adaptability (human capital) and incorporation 
of local knowledge (social capital) – was inadequately understood, and key sources of value 
were disestablished due to a lack of recognition of their importance.  
 
Neoliberal restructuring also introduced a practice which has become colloquially known as 
‘the churn’ (Figure 5.7). In an effort to upskill public sector employees, public servants are 
regularly moved between ministries or agencies to enable them to gain experience in different 
contexts. The impacts of this were clear in the data, with local respondents frequently 
describing the challenge of maintaining relationships with government officials. Key contacts 
were often only in their roles for short timeframes before moving on,  which continually 
severed the relationships (linking social capital) that were developing. For example, it was 
particularly frustrating for farmers during the M. Bovis response to continually re-explain their 
complicated situations to new MPI case managers. In addition, respondents described how the 
churn inhibited the development of institutional knowledge. Lack of experience was observed 
through the failure of learning lessons from previous disasters, because key people with 
institutional knowledge of those events had moved on. Research participants who occupied 
these positions that experienced ‘the churn’ during both the earthquake and M. Bovis responses 
often described how they hadn’t initially understood what was required, but were learning on 
the job. Some participants also spoke of being unable to leave their job, as there was no one 
else who could pass on institutional knowledge to new staff. 
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Figure 5.7 – The churn 
Overall, the results of this research clearly demonstrated that key factors associated with social 
resilience were nuanced and intangible, and that social and human capital dimensions of 
resilience were inadequately considered within neoliberalised institutional decision-making 
structures. This section emphasised the relationship between social and human capital, and 
illustrated how neoliberal restructuring has had significant impacts on linking social capital 
and adaptability at the institutional level. In turn, this has had negative impacts at the local level 
during adverse event responses, generating stress, which inhibited adaptability and the 
establishment of linking social capital at the local level. Ultimately, this resulted in sub-optimal 
response outcomes for local communities, and additional stress on individuals affected during 
disasters. A clear understanding of this problem is necessary in order to discuss how the Living 
Standards Framework provides some important solutions (which will be discussed in detail in 
part 5.4).  
 
The next two sections further analyse these results through the lens of key SES resilience 
thinking concepts, discussing key examples in greater detail as they relate to the research 
questions. 
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5.2 – Early resilience insights from ecology  
Social-ecological systems resilience thinking formed the theoretical foundation of the research 
approach. Key insights that initially emerged in the field of ecology included the importance 
of transformation and adaptability – especially adaptive management and adaptive capacity 
(Gunderson and Holling 2002, Folke 2016). Additionally, two paradigm shifts – stable state 
framing and the shift to a qualitative focus for resilience analysis from quantitative approaches 
– provided important framings (Holling 1973). 
5.2.1 – Adaptability can be framed using social and human capital  
Early resilience research in ecology focused on the importance of adaptability (Walters 1986, 
Lee 1993), and subsequent work identified the important related concepts  of adaptive 
management, adaptive capacity, the adaptive cycle, transformation and panarchy (Gunderson 
and Holling 200,2; Walker et al. 2004; Folke 2006). These concepts are closely aligned with 
the factors that influence human capital, noted during the summary and synthesis of the results 
(5.1).  
 
The results of this research have demonstrated that adaptability – including adaptive 
management and adaptive capacity – has been an important factor in social resilience in the 
Hurunui throughout all three events described in the results. Farmers are inherently adaptable 
and are required to make strategic decisions based on a range of issues, including seasonal, 
climatic and animal welfare considerations. In the face of unpredictable adverse events, they 
adopted both adaptive management techniques as well as drew on their own individual adaptive 
capacities to respond effectively. Their local knowledge (human capital) and relationships 
(social capital) within the community enabled them to adaptively respond to the drought and 
earthquake by rapidly developing collaborative arrangements with key stakeholders. In doing 
so, they were able to effectively problem solve during the initial response, until more formal 
response structures were in place. 
 
The initial lack of adaptive management at an institutional level during the earthquake and M. 
Bovis responses precluded the establishment of linking social capital, which resulted in a lack 
of adaptive capacity at both the farmer and response level. Once linking social capital was 
established, adaptive management became possible by incorporating local knowledge into 
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decision-making structures which generated adaptive capacity to deal with key problems. 
Transformation, which is described as the capacity to change a system when the current one is 
not fit for purpose, is a key concept that describes this process. The initial approach to the M. 
Bovis response was described as a rigid command and control style focus on disease control. 
The catastrophic outcomes that resulted – including multiple farmer suicides – forced a 
transformation of how the response was managed, in order to place greater focus on the human 
impacts of disease control. In this sense, transformation and adaptability are linked, and both 
can be framed through social and human capital concepts in the analysis of the results. Section 
5.4.2 describes why framing adaptive responses more broadly as social and human capital is 
more effective for operationalisation. 
 
Results suggest that a causal mechanism for this inability to adequately consider social and 
human capital impacts in advance are related to neoliberalised management structures which 
focus on quantitative approaches designed for efficiency. The next section describes the 
importance of qualitative analysis. 
5.2.2 – The qualitative dimension is essential for resilience analysis 
On the first page of the paper that is considered the intellectual genesis of SES resilience 
thinking, Holling (1973, p.1) argued that: 
…if we are dealing with a system profoundly affected by changes external 
to it, and continually confronted by the unexpected, the constancy of its 
behaviour becomes less important than the persistence of the relationships. 
Attention shifts, therefore, to the qualitative and to questions of existence 
or not. [emphasis added] 
Clearly, the importance of the qualitative dimension was not maintained during the early 
adoption of resilience theory by policy and practice. However, recent literature does suggest a 
return towards placing emphasis on qualitative analysis (Vallance 2015, Kwok 2016, Kaika 
2017, Cradock-Henry et al. 2019). The results of this research demonstrate that incorporating 
qualitative knowledge into decision-making structures is fundamentally important when 
responding to adverse events. When considering social resilience in the Hurunui, a region that 
has been confronted by multiple unexpected adverse events over the last 10 years, qualitative 
approaches provided important knowledge alongside more traditional quantitative 
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methodologies. A key contribution and conclusion of this thesis has been to demonstrate that 
accounting for intangible sources of value in institutional decision-making processes is 
fundamental for good outcomes. The qualitative methodological approach revealed that there 
were intangible social and human capital drivers in every single response that were difficult to 
capture using existing quantitative methodologies. The results of this research show that when 
these factors were taken into account by the institutional responses to the three adverse events 
in the Hurunui, good outcomes resulted, and when they were not, negative outcomes prevailed.   
 
A key example that demonstrates the usefulness of qualitative analysis is the importance of 
connection and engagement (social capital) between the lead response agency and the local 
community for response outcomes. During the drought, the primary response support 
mechanism (the RST) relied heavily upon existing relationships and connections with farmers 
(section 4.1.3). The utilisation of these networks resulted in high trust interactions between the 
RST and local farmers, and respondents described the drought response as the most effective 
despite the event widely being considered to have the most significant negative impacts. The 
earthquake response at the regional and national level did not have access to strong pre-existing 
relationships or networks between CDEM and the local community, and this initially caused 
significant tension. However, as interview data revealed, one respondent (K10/1) undertook 
significant efforts to develop these relationships and integrate into existing networks in order 
to solve pressing issues that local community had identified (road closure, stock water, 
infrastructure repairs etc), which then led to good outcomes. During the M. Bovis response, 
MPI took a heavy-handed command and control (section 4.3.3) style of response to disease 
control in an attempt to gain control of the situation. This approach failed to recognise local 
farmer knowledge (which is now recognised as an essential part of an effective M. Bovis 
response) and the negative psychosocial outcomes that farmers experienced resulted from a 
lack of control over the situation, and an inability to influence or access decision-makers. High 
level respondents (4.3.2) described attempts to ascertain effective quantitative indicators to 
deal with the problem, all of which were unsuccessful. 
 
Focusing on qualitative analysis at the institutional level also reveals the importance of 
understanding the tension between efficiency and persistence (Table 2.1), and how this impacts 
social resilience and the effectiveness of adverse event responses. Neoliberal restructuring 
focused on financial efficiency, which limited the capability and capacity of the institutional 
responses to the earthquake and M. Bovis. The primary example is the disestablishment of 
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MPI’s Rural Policy Unit (4.3.4), and the impact that had on the M. Bovis response (which is 
discussed in detail in the next section). In pursuing financial efficiency, the neoliberal 
restructuring neglected maintaining or building capacity for long term persistence. This has 
implications for government driven responses. For lead response agencies, taking qualitative 
factors into account would mean considering social and human capital related phenomena 
during responses. For example, the earthquake response did not initially recognise the 
importance of establishing linking social capital with the Hurunui community. However, 
pressure from K10/1, alongside the adaptability of the lead response agency, resulted in the 
establishment of linking social capital, and the positive outcomes demonstrate the effectiveness 
of doing so. In contrast, the M. Bovis response did not demonstrate the same adaptability, which 
resulted in negative outcomes for a sustained period of time. The key message is that the 
institutional settings in general need to account for intangible sources of value in decision-
making structures, which includes building and maintaining adequate social and human capital 
stocks to enable effective and adaptable adverse event responses.  
 
The importance of qualitative analysis for understanding the resilience of systems characterised 
by uncertainty and unpredictability was clearly demonstrated throughout the results. Stiglitz 
(2018, p.13) captured the problem when he said: “What we measure affects what we do. If we 
measure the wrong thing, we will do the wrong thing. If we don’t measure something, it 
becomes neglected, as if the problem didn’t exist.” Insights from this section provide clear 
benefits for understanding key aspects of each research question, such as social resilience, the 
impact of institutional responses, and addressing the problem of measurement. However, a key 
problem for subsequent developments in the field of SES resilience was that qualitative 
dimensions remained largely absent from the discourse until as recently as the last decade 
(Cutter 2015, Ostadtaghizadeh et al. 2015). 
5.2.3 – Framing outcomes through multiple stable states to reveal key drivers 
The current conceptualisation of resilience originated in ecology as a response to the stable 
equilibrium framework, which posited that a natural equilibrium existed to which nature would 
naturally return following a disturbance or adverse event. The concept of resilience was 
introduced as a rejoinder to this dominant paradigm, with Holling (1973) arguing that rather 
than just a single stable state, there were instead multiple stable states with fundamentally 
different characteristics and thresholds between them (Holling 1973, p.2). Fundamentally, this 
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initial conceptualisation of resilience was about maintaining a preferred stable state without 
transitioning into an undesirable one due to external influence. While stable state framing first 
emerged from ecology, the distinction that certain states are more desirable than others, 
provides a useful heuristic for framing and analysing the results of this research.  
 
The utility of multiple stable states is exemplified by the neoliberal transition that led to the 
disestablishment of the Rural Policy Unit, and the consequences this decision is having on 
adverse event response for rural communities throughout NZ (section 4.3.4). During adverse 
events, the Rural Policy Unit’s role had been to leverage social and human capital through 
existing networks and capacities to rapidly ascertain the situation and then report back to 
central government from a local perspective. Employees of that organisation were operating 
within communities, and had developed strong relationships with farmers over many years. 
They were effective and trusted conduits for information to move from local communities to 
national level decision-makers. As the results have demonstrated, these types of linking social 
capital connections between local responders and lead response agencies are essential. 
However, the intangibility of this value clashed with the neoliberal ideological shifts (Harvey 
2005) which, in seeking financial efficiency, required all programmes to have a financial 
justification (section 2.4.5).  
 
Multiple respondents at different levels directly linked the disestablishment of the Rural Policy 
Unit as a driving factor in the lack of consideration given to local knowledge during the M. 
Bovis and earthquake response. Using the stable states conceptualisation, the time prior to the 
disestablishment of the Rural Policy Unit can be characterised as a stable state in which the 
organisation created value by inserting local knowledge into centralised decision making 
processes, with demonstrated benefits to social resilience. After the disestablishment, a new 
stable state emerged in which that value was no longer created. Multiple participants described 
how this resulted in central governments being unable to effectively engage with rural 
communities, and this thesis provides evidence of these outcomes during the earthquake and 
M. Bovis responses. 
 
A second example of how stable states can be used to reveal key drivers of resilience relates to 
what MPI participants called their ‘over reliance’ on the RSTs during the M. Bovis response 
(4.1.3). Respondents described how during the initial period when the focus had been on 
disease control, MPI had relied upon the RSTs to play a primary role in the human response. 
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However, little thought had been given to the scale of the response required, and RSTs in 
certain regions became overwhelmed. This led to a breakdown in the relationship between MPI 
and the RSTs in some districts, which threatened the working relationship between the two 
organisations. These frictions almost caused the stable state change to one where this effective 
support tool was no longer accessible by MPI, which would have had negative impacts on 
future adverse event responses. Both of these examples also serve as a reminder of the 
importance of incorporating intangible value into decision making processes.  
 
These two examples also exhibit the characteristics of hysteresis. Hysteresis refers to the fact 
that once a critical threshold has been passed and the stable state has changed, shifting the 
ecosystem back into the original stable state is more complex and resource intensive than 
simply maintaining it (Figure 2.1; Ludwig et al. 1998). During the research, the Minister for 
Agriculture spoke publicly about the potential to re-establish an organisation that played the 
same role as the Rural Policy Unit. During interviews, respondents at all levels (including 
farmers and MPI) were concerned that the strong relationships and capability that had made 
the Rural Policy Unit effective no longer existed. Respondents who discussed the breakdown 
in the relationship between MPI and certain RSTs also expressed relief that their differences 
had been resolved. It was their opinion that the loss of RSTs as a support mechanism would 
reduce social capital, and have a significant final cost compared to simply maintaining the 
current arrangements. A key conclusion for this research is that paying for the maintenance of 
desirable stable states is far more economically and socially efficient than risking the shift into 
an undesirable state and having to rebuild lost capability and capacity.  
 
While resilience thinking emphasises the importance of qualitative analysis, it also 
acknowledges the role quantitative analysis plays. Stable state framing has the potential to 
provide a model for how metrics might be formulated for the maintenance of desirable stable 
states. Certain desirable stable state characteristics, such as channels for local knowledge to 
flow up to central decision makers, could provide a means for policy makers to adapt traditional 
governance tools such as targets and indicators for resilience. Metrics, or proxies, for the 
analysis and maintenance of these stable state characteristics could be developed. This is 
consistent with Almedom’s (2012) observation that resilience should be measured as an 
outcome, monitored as a process and identified as an emergent property. This will be discussed 
in further detail in section 5.4.3. 
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Overall, SES resilience theory provides a number of useful insights and informative tools for 
resilience analysis that are directly related to the research questions. Social and human capital 
can be further theoretically explored through the concepts of adaptability and transformation. 
The two initial paradigm shifts discussed by Holling (1973) also provide useful insights for 
understanding the importance of qualitative analysis, which helps us understand and retain 
intangible value that is more costly to replace than maintain. These ecological insights, 
however, do not paint a comprehensive or holistic picture of all that is important in the results. 
The literature review discussed three key challenges with the initial ecological interpretations 
of resilience: firstly, it approached resilience from a system level without adequately theorising 
the local level. Secondly, it did not adequately account for the social dimension, and finally, it 
also did not provide sufficient means for the concepts to be effectively operationalised. The 
next part will discuss the social dimensions of resilience. 
5.3 – Incorporating social science insights into resilience thinking 
In the social sciences, resilience concepts relevant to this research started emerging in 
psychology from the 1980s onwards (Alexander 2013). This section highlights how the 
influence of concepts from psychology and disaster risk reduction add additional value to SES 
resilience thinking. Four key insights for addressing the research questions are covered in this 
part; (i) many of the early learnings from psychology and disaster risk reduction can be 
conceptualised within social capital, (ii) resilience is more usefully conceptualised as an 
outcome of a process, rather than as a characteristic of a system, (iii) insights from cognitive 
psychology illustrate the way stress impacts decision-making, and (iv) how cognitive biases 
and life experience can impact decision-making processes.  
5.3.1 – Connection as social capital  
In psychology, the concept of resilience was initially used to explore why some children had a 
greater ability to withstand and recover from adverse circumstances than others (Garmezy 
1973, Garmezy et al. 1984. Buikstra et al. 2010). This conceptualisation of resilience initially 
focused on the individual level as opposed to the system-level focus of Holling (1973) and 
resilience in ecology in general. Subsequent research in psychology and disaster risk reduction 
showed that this initial individualistic focus failed to capture all relevant insights and it became 
apparent that fundamental to an individual’s resilience was the community and societal 
dynamic (the system level) of which they were a part (Berkes and Ross 2012,). Just as the 
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ecological system level view of resilience emphasised the importance of individual and 
community, so did the individual level view from psychology emphasise the importance of the 
community and the wider system. Resilience insights from psychology now emphasise the 
importance of connection and engagement between different scales - individuals, families, 
communities, and institutions (Paton and Johnson 2001, Paton and McClure 2013). 
Participation within families and communities can be framed as bonding and bridging social 
capital, while engagement between individuals or communities and those responding can be 
described as linking social capital.  
 
The results of this research are entirely consistent with these learnings and the first part of this 
chapter (part 5.1) has extensively detailed the importance of both engagement within the 
community as the connections between the local community and lead response agencies. The 
importance of linking social capital between the lead response agency and the local community 
is demonstrated throughout the earthquake and M. Bovis response which began without these 
connections in place. The initial negative outcomes spurred adaptive processes which resulted 
in these connections being established, allowing for positive outcomes. The drought response 
provides an important counterfactual where these connections existed, which resulted in 
positive outcomes from the outset. Trust between interacting parties was widely considered to 
be a key factor in establishing connections between parties.  
 
It should also be noted that many of these factors were not inherently obvious. The research 
design specifically sought out and incorporated views from local, regional and national sources 
in order to triangulate key drivers for response outcomes. None of the three responses can be 
adequately understood or explained from one single point of view. Those at the coalface were 
in a position to observe the outcomes of decisions made at a higher level, but often did not 
understand the rationale behind the decisions. Those in central government were able to explain 
their intentions, and the factors that had been taken into consideration, but rarely understood 
the outcomes of their policies. 
5.3.2 – Resilience as a process 
A key distinction between early ecological and psychological conceptualisations of resilience 
is how the former considers resilience as a characteristic or property of a system, while the 
latter views it as the outcome of a process (Almedom 2012, Ungar 2018). A core concept in 
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social resilience that is now common across disciplines is that developing resilience is a process 
that involves continual development and adaptation in the face of adversity (Masten 2014, 
Ungar 2015a; 2015b; Martin et al. 2016; Ungar 2018). 
 
This was evident throughout the results. The effectiveness of the drought response was due in 
large part to the significant time and effort invested by the RST to develop and maintain their 
relationships. While the responses to the earthquake and M. Bovis had initial negative impacts, 
they developed new understandings and learnings in contexts of adversity which then allowed 
them to adapt to the context which resulted in resilience. The Rural Policy Unit was a process 
of continually maintained relationships and capacity which helped generate resilience 
outcomes through connection and adaptability until it’s disestablishment. As Ungar (2018) 
states, resilience as a process means that a “system is engaged in a continuous process of 
acquiring and sustaining the resources required to function well under stress.” The negative 
impacts of the initial responses to the earthquake and M. Bovis can be viewed as disrupting the 
processes which generate resilience by inhibiting connectivity and participation. However, 
once connections were established and different parties started engaging, the resilient processes 
generated better outcomes. The key distinction here, is that resilience is an outcome of this 
process, rather than a characteristic that has been conferred. This insight is useful when it comes 
to answering the third research question, which focuses on how to affect the processes which 
generate and maintain resilience. 
5.3.3 – Cognitive psychology explains biases in judgements and the impacts of stress  
The impacts neoliberal ideology has on decision-making processes can be further discussed by 
drawing on two insights from cognitive psychology. The first is further clarification on the role 
stress plays during adverse events. As discussed in the literature (section 2.2.1), acute stress 
can negatively impact people’s abilities to think rationally and make good decisions, which is 
especially important during adverse event responses (Shields 2016). Kahneman (2012) 
describes two systems of thinking which helps illustrate how stress impacts decision making 
abilities. System 1 is “fast, automatic, frequent, emotional, stereotypic, unconscious”, whereas 
system 2 is “slow, effortful, infrequent, logical, calculating, conscious”. During periods of 
acute stress, humans default to using system 1 thinking as part of the ‘fight or flight’ response 
(Kahneman 2012). Accordingly, managing stress levels for impacted communities through 
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effective responses to adverse events provides support during a time when making critical 
decisions is required. 
 
The results of this research extensively detail participants experiences of stress during each 
response. Most importantly, respondents described how central government response efforts 
during the earthquake and M. Bovis generated additional stress that exacerbated the negative 
impacts caused by the event itself. At the local and regional level, many participants also made 
the connection between excessive stress and poor decision making. The Mayor of the Hurunui 
cited using specific strategies to keep people thinking critically at local events during the 
drought, and farmers also described the strategies they used to manage their stress and 
recognise when they weren’t ‘thinking right’ (section 4.1.6).  
 
The second insight from cognitive psychology also comes from Kahneman (2012) in 
describing human biases and their effect on judgements. A general trait shared by all humans 
is a systemic bias that Kahneman calls ‘what you see is all there is’. When faced with a 
decision, the human mind generally only considers what it knows, and rarely considers what it 
does not know. This concept is akin to that of known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown 
unknowns which emerged in cognitive psychology (Luft and Inghan 1955) and was 
popularised by Donald Rumsfeld (2002). This insight is particularly useful as an explanation 
for describing why replacing subject matter experts with people managers in central 
government decision-making processes caused negative outcomes for adverse event responses.  
 
Subject matter experts have a much greater range of knowledge about their area of expertise 
that can be drawn upon instinctively when making decisions at higher levels. Replacing them 
with ‘people managers’ limits the factors considered to what they see in front of them, which 
is often purely quantitative. Ultimately, this comes back to neoliberal ideology, specifically 
managerialism which emerged from The New Public Management and proposed that people 
managers didn’t need technical expertise, just the ability to manage people. The key problem, 
through Kahneman’s lens, is that people managers who do not have a deep understanding of 
the topics they are managing and are only considering what they know when making decisions 
– which is often limited to quantitative analysis. The role for technical experts, or disestablished 
organisations such as the Rural Policy Unit (section 4.3.4), is to insert expert/local insight and 
knowledge into the decision-making processes which is often qualitative (experiential) in 
nature and supplemental to the quantitative analysis. The additional insights provided allow 
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people managers to expand what they ‘know’ and consider more contextual factors during the 
decision making process, which both the literature and results of this research suggest result in 
better outcomes for those impacted. It is important to reiterate that the argument made isn’t 
that subject matter experts need to replace people managers, rather that there must exist a 
diversity of views within the decision making process so that both qualitative and quantitative 
factors can be considered.  
 
The results of this research suggest that neoliberal ideology has had significant impacts on the 
hazard management processes which affect resilience after adverse events. Incorporating these 
insights from cognitive psychology helps mechanistically describes why The New Public 
Management and ‘the churn’ have had negative impacts, which provides a foundation upon 
which The Living Standards Framework can be proposed as a potential solution.  
5.4 – Analysing the potential of multi-capital frameworks 
This chapter began by summarising the synthesising the results of this research, it then 
incorporated resilience insights from the literature review, both of which combined have 
provided sufficient evidence to answer the first two research questions. However, throughout 
the chapter social and human capital concepts have been used to frame the discussion, which 
are used by the Living Standards Framework, in order to address the third research question 
which relates to operationalisation. The final part of this chapter examines the challenges for 
operationalising SES resilience, and discusses how incorporating multi-capital frameworks has 
the potential to offer a way forward. The first section summarises the key learnings from SES 
resilience, and analyses them in context of the three key challenges that SES resilience faces 
for operationalisation (part 2.3) – nuance, measurement, and norms. Part two reintroduces the 
Living Standards Framework (LSF) and examines it’s potential to address these challenges. 
Part three discusses how this impacts the problems of nuance and measurement. Part four 
examines how incorporating the LSF can improve how intangible phenomena are accounted 
for in resilience analysis which addresses the normative issues raised in the literature (Cote and 
Nightingale 2012; Brown 2014). Ultimately, this part provides the final insights required to 
address the third research question.  
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5.4.1 – Challenges still remain for operationalising SES resilience 
SES resilience insights are critical for answering the research questions, however, as the 
literature review raised, key challenges for SES resilience thinking remain (2.2.4). These 
challenges – nuance, measurement, and norms – are both theoretical and practical, and directly 
relate to the importance of qualitative analysis. The three challenges are also interlinked - the 
problem of nuance refers to how resilience concepts have propagated through to policy makers 
and practitioners through quantifiable indicators, leaving out the importance of qualitative 
analysis. This has resulted in the problem of measurement – key factors associated with social 
resilience are often intangible and not easily measured. This, in turn, leads to social theorists 
and researchers levelling valid criticisms at modern resilience conceptualisations, arguing that 
they fail to adequately deal with how normative concepts – such as power relations, structure, 
and agency – play a large part in shaping outcomes in adverse event responses. 
 
The key problem for SES resilience is that qualitative analysis is required to elucidate these 
factors, but the institutionalisation of SES resilience through the Sendai Framework has 
mandated a quantitative approach to operationalisation. A myriad of challenges with this 
approach have left policy makers and practitioners, including research participants, confused 
as to what SES resilience means, and how they are meant to implement it.  
 
These three challenges are all demonstrable through the results of this research. The problem 
of nuance was clear from the very beginning. All participants knew the word resilience, most 
said that they hated the word, and very few understood what it meant. Simplistic concepts such 
as bouncing back, or returning to normal were common, but accurate understandings were rare. 
This problem is troubling – how can you implement a concept no one understands? The 
problem of measurement is a key factor in this lack of understanding. Despite the emphasis 
Holling (1973) placed upon qualitative analysis, attempts at operationalisation have been 
quantitative – consisting of targets and indicators.  
 
Ultimately, this research argues that the way resilience concepts have being disseminated 
through institutions is fundamentally flawed, which is negatively impacting operationalisation. 
This was also clear in the results. A disease control expert at MPI who was responsible for the 
welfare response during M. Bovis began his interview by pleading for help in understanding 
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how he could quantitatively assess the welfare needs of farmers, and model the types of support 
that would be most effective. A qualitative approach had not even been considered.  
 
It should be noted that many participants who had experience with the earthquake or M. Bovis 
response were much more open to the importance of qualitative analysis, as they had come to 
understand the problems with the quantitative orientation. This can be related back to Ungar’s 
(2018) point that resilience occurs in contexts of adversity – that experiences of problems often 
demonstrate the need for better solutions. However these conclusions were only obvious to 
those directly involved, and there was often no access or ability to communicate the problems 
and required solutions upwards to those who had the authority to make decisions – and factors 
related to the churn exacerbated these issues. Ultimately, because of the way the public service 
is organised with The New Public Management, the structural problems caused by neoliberal 
ideology are invisible, except to those with direct experience. As discussed previously, factors 
such as the churn resulted in these lessons repeatedly being ‘learned’ and then ‘forgotten’ by 
institutions as public servants moved onto new unrelated roles. The normative problems which 
this thesis focuses on are mostly invisible to those who rely on measurement.  
 
In addition to these three challenges, a final insight that paves the way for the LSF comes from 
the view that SES resilience thinking is an analytical framework rather than an explanatory one 
– this means that it can be used as a tool to consider all relevant factors related to resilience, 
but it does not explicitly provide solutions to context-specific challenges (Alexander 2013). 
Essentially resilience thinking has been developed as a tool to understand problems, but it does 
not explicitly provide a path towards solving them. Parts 5.2 and 5.3 describe how concepts 
from both the ecological and social side of SES resilience provide key explanations for many 
factors discussed in the results, but they do not provide obvious solutions. Re-emphasising the 
importance of concepts most easily captured through qualitative analysis such as adaptability 
(human capital) and connection (social capital) does not provide a simple path forward for how 
these issues can be structurally addressed. What is required is an implementation framework 
to support resilience decision-making, such as the LSF. Recent rural resilience research 
emerging from New Zealand suggests that multi-capital frameworks are being adopted to frame 
resilience (Pomeroy 2016; Fielke et al. 2018; Payne et al. 2018; Pomeroy 2019; Payne et al. 
2021). 
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5.4.2 – Situating the Living Standards Framework 
The field of development studies categorises two types of development – immanent 
development and intentional development. Immanent development is described as emergent, 
unintentional, and ‘what people are doing anyway’. Intentional (or interventionist) 
development is a focused and deliberate process where governments and other organisations 
pursue and fund specific development outcomes (Morse and McNamara 2013). In the early 
1990s research in the field concluded that intentional development rarely achieved its 
objectives. The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) emerged in an attempt to better 
understand all relevant factors for human development. A key issue identified with previous 
attempts at intentional human development was that the approaches had failed to account for 
all factors that were important, many of which were contextual or intangible, which 
compromised outcomes for the projects. The development of the SLA focused on how to 
account for all that was important for those whom the projects were being developed. The SLA 
is a multi-capital framework, which integrated the concepts of financial, physical, natural, 
social, and human capital.  
 
As the literature review outlined (section 2.3.2), there are strong similarities between the SLA 
and SES resilience thinking, in that both focus on key factors for the long term persistence of 
developing communities, and both theoretical approaches have come to similar conclusions 
about what is important (Tanner 2015, Ostadtaghizadeh et al. 2015). The key difference 
between the two, is that the SLA focused on operationalisation, while SES resilience thinking 
focused on explanation. The multi-capital approach offers significant advantages for 
operationalisation which can be adopted by SES resilience thinking without any theoretical 
adjustments.  
 
In New Zealand, the past 40 years of neoliberal restructuring have caused significant problems 
with accounting for sources of value that aren’t easily measurable. Following the election of 
Jacinda Ardern in 2017, the Prime Minister openly called for the NZ Treasury to find ways to 
account for the social, human and environmental value that exist alongside economic value in 
policy analysis. Her second budget as Prime Minister became known as the ‘Well-being 
budget’ (Budget 2019), reflecting her government’s drive to incorporate human dimensions 
into the policy domain. The New Zealand government’s response for addressing these 
challenges is known as the Living Standards Framework (LSF), which is based upon multi-
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capital frameworks that originated with the SLA. Adapted for a developed context in NZ, the 
LSF places four capitals – social, human, physical/financial and natural capital at the centre, 
and emphasises their shared importance for consideration in decision-making structures. This 
approach to disaster resilience has subsequently been operationalised through the National 
Disaster Resilience Strategy (2019), which is the NZ government’s formal response to its 
obligations under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDRR 2015). 
 
This thesis argues that the value of the LSF, and multi-capital frameworks in general, is the  
attention they provide to all sources of value – both those that are quantifiable and those that 
are intangible – from the very beginning. The key mechanism of action that is affected here is 
related to Kahneman’s observation that human decision-making is systemically biased towards 
what is already known, while failing to adequately consider known and unknown unknowns. 
Policy decisions were limited by ‘what you see is all there is’, which was primarily quantitative 
data. By adding the LSF into consideration, attention is automatically paid to the all types of 
capital, including those more difficult to quantify such as social and human capital. It is 
important to note that simply making the factors ‘known’ does not automatically solve all 
challenges involved with operationalising resilience concepts. Additional steps will still need 
to be taken, such as the development and subsequent maintenance of adequate social and 
human capital stocks (such as by an agency such as the former Rural Policy Unit), which can 
then be drawn upon as a resource during policy development in order to better incorporate 
intangible factors into decision making processes. The LSF can play a role here, but further 
work is required.  
 
Figure 5.8 shows how the LSF can currently be incorporated into decision-making processes 
as an abstraction layer which guides attention to key sources of value. With the LSF, decision-
makers do not need to have a comprehensive understanding of resilience theory and it’s nuance, 
rather just an appreciation for the importance of social and human capital, and willingness to 
consider related intangible factors. This does not obviate the need for subject matter experts, 
rather it provides more effective ways for them to communicate their knowledge when it is not 
easily quantifiable.   
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Figure 5.8 – The LSF as an abstraction layer for policy development 
Another benefit of the LSF is that it is transferable across all contexts. No matter whether the 
next event is major earthquake, a volcanic eruption, or a drought, the factors that need to be 
considered during the response can be theorised within a social, human, physical or natural 
capital framing. Additionally, like SES resilience thinking, the LSF is a boundary object, such 
that interdisciplinary perspectives can be incorporated within the LSF to guide decision-
making. 
 
One of Harvey’s (2006) observations about neoliberalism can also be applied to the LSF. 
Harvey (2006, p.146) argued that in order for us to adopt any hegemonic mode of discourse, 
the fundamental concepts must become so deeply embedded that they are taken for granted and 
beyond question. 
A conceptual apparatus has to be constructed that appeals almost 
'naturally' to our intuitions and instincts, to our values and our desires, as 
well as to the possibilities that seem too inherent in the social world we 
inhabit. The founding figures of neoliberal thought took political ideals of 
individual liberty and freedom as sacrosanct, as 'the central values of 
civilization', and in so doing they chose wisely and well, for these are 
indeed compelling and great attractors as concepts. These values were 
threatened, they argued, not only by fascism, dictatorships and 
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communism, but by all forms of state intervention that substituted collective 
judgements for those of individuals set free to choose. 
If resilience thinking is to become a hegemonic approach to adverse event management, it must 
have similar simple pathways to implementation in policy and practice. However, resilience 
thinking is a complex conceptual apparatus, and it is not reasonable to expect laypeople to 
understand the intricacies. The argument here isn’t that resilience thinking must become 
hegemonic and unquestioned, but rather that the tools for operationalising this approach (the 
LSF) must be comprehendible by those who are to enact it. Deep theoretical discussions about 
adaptability, and the role that participation and engagement play in adverse event response 
effectiveness is appropriate at the higher levels of government and academia. However, for 
practitioners and policy makers the concepts must be simplified and generalised for effective 
operationalisation. The LSF, through social and human capital concepts, can help provide a 
simpler and more generalised pathway for implementation.  
 
The next two sections examine how incorporating the LSF addresses some of the current SES 
resilience challenges in terms of implementation. 
5.4.3 – Addressing the problem of nuance and measurement 
The rapid adoption of resilience in policy and practice has resulted in a less nuanced 
understanding, as simplified definitions have been rapidly distributed. Ultimately, utilising the 
LSF to frame these issues does not inherently solve the problem of nuance, but it does help 
address it by providing a framework which makes the qualitative factors as well as the inherent 
systemic complexity more visible. The LSF was created as a tool to guide public sector decision 
making by the NZ Treasury (2019) and, as demonstrated in this chapter, it has value when 
considering intangible phenomena related to SES resilience. By incorporating the LSF, disaster 
recovery becomes about more than just ‘bouncing back’ with commensurate targets and 
indicators; the qualitative factors associated with social and human capital are also accounted 
for. During the earthquake response, for example, eligibility criteria for the Uninsurable 
Infrastructure Relief Fund did not take into account the costs to human and social capital. 
However, applying the LSF automatically makes these intangible phenomena more visible on 
a systemic level, focusing attention on social and human capital and allowing for these factors 
to be better considered during the decision-making process. The intent here is not to make an 
ex post assessment of the correct decision, rather it is to emphasise the importance of 
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systematically taking all factors into account a priori when making these types of decisions. 
This approach enables positive accounting of intangible benefits that might otherwise not 
appear in reports based on quantitative analysis.  
 
The LSF also provides practical value for policy makers and practitioners. One participant who 
worked on these policy challenges in the private sector brought a copy of the LSF to an 
interview in order to use it to demonstrate what they saw as the key challenges in policy 
development. The respondent specifically referred to the value of social and human capital 
concepts, describing how they allowed the organisation to engage more effectively with 
government as they allowed for concepts which wouldn’t previously be recognised to enter the 
discussion. This suggests that the LSF might be a useful tool at all levels for response or policy 
consideration, not just at the institutional decision-making level.   
 
The problem of measurement remains challenging. Incorporating the LSF alongside resilience 
thinking does not offer any concrete ways to better objectively measure the intangible factors 
often associated with social resilience. This result is consistent with international research, 
which also highlights these challenges (Cutter 2008, Cutter 2012, Cutter 2016). It also reflects 
broader issues and appeals in social science literature for objectively measuring social capital 
(Harper 2002, Halpern 2005, Scrivens and Smith 2013, Field 2016). The problem here is 
context. Targets, indicators and legislative instruments are effective and appropriate 
mechanisms for dealing with data that is objectively quantifiable and transferable between 
different contexts, but key sources of value that need to be accounted for are not.  
 
Ultimately, the problem of measurement for the normative issues described in this research are 
unlikely to be solved through the use of current accountability mechanisms such as targets and 
indicators. While proxy indicators can be used in their place, they are often associated with 
perverse incentives and outcomes (Carpenter et al. 2001, Birkmann 2007, Dakos et al. 2015, 
Hallegatte & Engle 2019). Research participants familiar with the process of developing the 
LSF confided doubts as to whether it is possible to adequately measure cognitive resilience 
indicators. The problem cited was context, in that lessons learnt in one case are not necessarily 
transferable to another without a deeper qualitative understanding of why and how (Adler et 
al. 2017). The attempts to use quantitative analysis for operationalising resilience can be related 
back to Holling’s (1973, p.1) rejoinder to natural equilibrium theory, where he stated that it 
was “an analytic approach developed in one area because it was useful and then transferred to 
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another where it may not be.” However, the LSF does provide a potential solution to these 
challenges. While quantitative factors might not be transferable across contexts, the LSF can 
be. No matter what adverse event occurs, analysis of all possible responses can be 
conceptualised through the LSF as social, human, physical and natural capital concepts. 
Humans, in general, are more easily capable of understanding the value of social and human 
capital – ‘connection and capacity is good’ ‘lack of connection and capacity is bad’ – compared 
to the more complex theoretical analysis of adaptability and cross scale engagement.  
 
The inability to adequately measure key sources of value in our communities is problematic. 
Kaika’s (2017) reflection that we need to change what we do, as well as how we do it, draws 
attention to the need to find different ways to address this problem. While it may not be possible 
to adequately quantify subjective indicators, the LSF framework, combined with resilience 
thinking, provides new ways of thinking about these problems, and how to bring them into the 
policy domain. Focusing on process-based indicators as part of policy or project design and 
implementation might offer a more robust alternative for indicator development (Hallegatte & 
Engle 2019). Quantitative indicators for resilience, such as the importance of adaptability and 
connection, might be better addressed in the design phase of policy response, ensuring that 
adequate attention is paid to those matters at the beginning, rather than during the outcome 
evaluation stage (Cradock-Henry et al. 2017). As Almedom (2012) states, resilience should be 
measured as an outcome, monitored as a process and identified as an emergent property. Stable 
state framing can also help reveal vital characteristics that can be tracked as indicators. For 
example, a set of indicators could be developed in order to ensure that MPI and the RSTs 
maintain a good relationship, and provide a leading indicator for warning when the relationship 
needs additional maintenance. This way, a stable state which maintains this source of value can 
be quantitatively managed.  
 
In the case example of the demise of MPI’s Rural Policy Unit, if explicit focus was paid to 
social and human capital, and questions were asked as to the impacts on adaptability and 
connection, and these factors were taken into account, a different view might have been taken 
as to whether eliminating it completely was acceptable. This could have occurred at a high 
level and would not have required quantifiable indicators for outcomes, but acknowledgement 
of the importance of social and human capital visible within a systemic framework such as the 
LSF. This has the added advantage of proactively dealing with potential problems, rather than 
 190 
reactively. A qualitative view rich in context after the restructuring can only shine a light on 
what was lost, but cannot regain it.  
5.4.4 – Accounting for the normative dimensions of resilience 
A resilience perspective, informed by the LSF, also offers an opportunity to better understand 
the normative dimensions of resilience, including the theoretical challenges related to power 
and politics. The LSF aims to account for key resources that confer value to NZ but may not 
have previously been measured or are not suited to quantification (Frieling and Warren 2018). 
For example, how would one characterise the lack of trust caused by years of eroded specialist 
capability in MPI due to fiscal restructuring, which culminated in insufficient capacity for a 
social response during a biosecurity threat? The issue here was of quantification, or of only 
focusing on quantification. Incorporating the LSF and multiple types of capital stocks allows 
for normative factors such as the structural impacts of neoliberalisation to enter the analysis. 
Suddenly that which is not measured (or is not easily measurable) becomes visible on a 
systemic level within a public policy framework developed to identify these types of 
phenomena. This heuristic is not just about detailing or creating new understandings, rather it 
becomes about systematising them within a whole-of-government approach through a 
collective understanding of the problem. 
 
Using the LSF alongside resilience thinking as an analytical tool, the loss of the MPI’s Rural 
Policy Unit illustrates that inadequate attention was paid to normative factors such as linking 
social capital during the review of the programme. This then negatively impacted bonding, 
bridging and linking social capital and adaptability during the responses, which in turn 
indirectly influenced physical/economic and natural capital. Social and human capital concepts 
can incorporate a range of important factors such as resilience as a process, institutional trust 
and unequal power dynamics. Such factors fit comfortably within the LSF and can be analysed 
comparatively alongside the other capitals.  
 
From a local perspective, results illustrate how social and human capital are both positively 
and negatively impacted by institutional responses following adverse events. Strong 
relationships between the RSTs and local farmers delivered the most effective results of all. 
However, the case example also revealed potential thresholds, where overreliance on the RSTs 
might have resulted in the breakdown of relationships – i.e. bridging and linking social capital 
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– which then impacts all other capital stocks. This may result in a new stable state where an 
extremely effective support tool no longer exists. Following the earthquake in the Hurunui, 
officials required verifiable evidence of loss before compensation payments were made, in 
order to ensure equitable outcomes for those who had taken proactive risk management 
strategies. The negative impacts of these policies were unquantified and therefore invisible, but 
led to a perception that seeking compensation created more negative outcomes than positive 
ones. During the M. Bovis response, previously strong and trusted relationships were broken 
by the loss of MPI’s Rural Policy Unit, causing a significant breakdown in the trust developed 
between farmers and MPI over many years, which manifested in poor outcomes during the 
response. All of these examples involve normative factors and can be comfortably accounted 
for through the LSF using social and human capital concepts, which can then be explored in 
further detail through the incorporation of additional fields of research where appropriate.  
 
From a high-level perspective, prior to the economic crisis of the 1980s NZ could be described 
as having relatively high levels of social and human capital, but low levels of economic capital 
(Kelsey 1995). External shocks, including falling wool prices and the Yom Kippur oil price 
shock, combined with poor management (Templeton 1995), took NZ to a threshold where 
economic collapse was only barely averted. As one interviewee who had been involved in the 
restructuring stated: “we saved the patient [NZ], barely.” This crisis had a transformative 
impact on NZ’s fiscal management, with an overwhelming focus on fiscal prudence and 
evidence-based policy during the years that followed (Kelsey 1995). Utilising the LSF, this 
research provides strong evidence that subsequent restructuring placed an overwhelming 
emphasis on financial/physical capital at the expense of social and human capital. This was not 
an explicit and intentional focus, but the shift in arrangements demanded that policy be 
designed based on evidence. Economic factors were the simplest to measure, in contrast to the 
intangible aspects of social resilience encapsulated within social and human capital.  
 
Figure 5.9 is a conceptual representation approximating how the focus on capital stocks has 
evolved over the past 40 years, based on empirical evidence generated by this research. During 
the period prior to the 1980s economic reforms, a  lack of focus on financial capital can be 
observed, offset by greater emphasis on social and human capital. An economic crisis resulted 
in neoliberal reform, which led to the outsized focus on financial capital at the expense of social 
and human capital. Finally, a representation of an optimal distribution of capital stocks is 





Figure 5.9 – Distribution of capital stocks in New Zealand over time 
Finally, it is important to reiterate the interlinked nature of the three challenges for 
operationalising resilience – nuance, measurement and norms. Normative issues are primarily 
subjective and intangible, hence current legislative instruments such as targets and indicators 
do not account for them. Nuance in the definition of resilience was lost during the rapid 
transmission and uptake of resilience thinking into the policy domain, and these complexities 
associated with resilience thinking are not easily demonstrated due to a lack of clear objective 
evidence, or measurable phenomena. At the heart of both of these challenges, is the problem 
of measurement – the intangible aspects of resilience are invisible in an evidence-based 
decision-making framework. These problems are also circular. One problem influences and 
creates the other. Adopting the LSF alongside SES resilience thinking does not provide clear 
cut solutions to any of these challenges on an individual basis. It does, however, make that 
which is unseen, visible. And in doing so, it draws attention to each of these three challenges, 
illustrating the problems that they pose. The first step to solve a problem, is to understand it. 
SES resilience thinking, combined with the LSF, provide a clear definition of the problem. 
This can be used as a strong foundation upon which to build solutions.  
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5.5 – Chapter Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter has been to discuss the results of the research in context of the 
literature review in order to provide a strong foundation from which the research questions can 
be addressed. The first part described the results in context of the literature review, drawing 
heavily upon social and human capital to address the first two research questions. Key 
conclusions are that social resilience played a significant positive role during the drought and 
earthquake response, whereas the geographically isolated nature of the M. Bovis response 
provided a counterfactual where the absence of social resilience demonstrated how important 
it was during the drought and earthquake. Strong evidence is also presented to demonstrate that 
the way in which the government and other institutions responded to these events had a 
significant impact on the social resilience of the local community. During the drought and M. 
Bovis, there were significant issues with establishing connections (linking social capital) 
between the lead response agency and affected participants, which was exacerbated by a lack 
of adaptability (adaptive capacity and management) to deal with emergent problems. The 
drought response, which drew upon existing strong connections and capacity, provides an 
important counterfactual for a response where these factors are accounted for in advance. The 
improvements cited in the earthquake response after establishing linking social capital further 
demonstrate the point.  
 
Parts 5.2 and 5.3 delved into the theoretical insights provided by the ecological and social 
dimensions of SES resilience. The key conclusion is that while SES resilience provides 
valuable insights for understanding the first two research questions, such as the importance of 
qualitative analysis, it does not offer a path towards operationalising these concepts. This is in 
large part due to the institutionalisation of the concept through the Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction which primarily relies upon quantitative mechanisms, targets and 
indicators, for implementation. In order to make this problem systemically visible and provide 
an alternate means for operationalisation, this thesis then incorporated the Living Standards 
Framework – a multi-capital framework – as a tool to be used for drawing attention to often 
overlooked sources of value during adverse event responses.   
 
The next chapter will summarise the key learnings of this thesis, directly address the research 
questions, discuss key limitations and areas for further research and examine the implications 




Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate how the institutional responses to three 
distinct adverse events affected the Hurunui community’s social resilience, and to ascertain 
how insights from this research might help operationalise resilience concepts. The first two 
research questions focused on understanding the impacts of the adverse events, as well as how 
they affected the Hurunui community. The third research question provided a foundation upon 
which operationalisation might be examined.  
1. What role did social resilience play in the community response to the three hazard 
events in the Hurunui? 
2. What were the institutional responses, and how did they affect the local 
community’s social resilience? 
3. What insights can social and human capital provide for understanding and 
operationalising social resilience in order to improve institutional responses to 
adverse events? 
The first research question drew attention to the concept of social resilience which was used to 
understand how the adverse events impacted the Hurunui community. The second research 
question focused on how the institutional responses to the adverse events affected the social 
resilience of affected farmers in the Hurunui. This drew attention to the institutional processes 
which guide how governments and private organisations respond to adverse events and design 
policy to support responses. The third research question incorporated social and human capital 
concepts alongside the Living Standards Framework in order to describe and account for 
intangible sources of value that are important for resilience analysis.  
 
The conclusion to this thesis has four parts. The key findings and discussion of the study are 
first summarised, describing the results alongside theoretical concepts introduced in the 
literature. The research questions are then directly addressed and key contributions to theory 
are identified. Next, the implications of this research for policy and practice, as well as the 
limitations of the study and areas for further research, are discussed. The final section examines 
how resilience thinking offers useful ways to conceptualise institutional change. 
6.1 – Summary and synthesis of the thesis findings 
The results of this study presented strong empirical evidence that key sources of intangible 
value – adaptability and linking social capital – were not initially considered in the structural 
decision-making processes used by central government institutions in their response to the 
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earthquake and M. Bovis. The earthquake and M. Bovis responses demonstrated how a lack of 
adaptive capacity in the lead response agencies, combined with an inadequate focus on 
establishing connections with those impacted, led to negative outcomes for affected farmers. 
The drought response provided a counterfactual, showing an example of an institutional 
response which incorporated intangible sources of value from the very beginning. This can 
partly be attributed to the actions of a different, more local institution, which hadn’t faced the 
same ideological pressures as the agencies that oversaw the other two crises. The North 
Canterbury Rural Support Trust – a local organisation dedicated to supporting farmers – had 
significant experience supporting farmers through past droughts (human capital) as well as 
strong social connections (social capital) with the farmers affected. The RSTs deep connection 
with place and established and trusted relationships with farmers had existed for a number of 
years before the drought. 
 
These relationships and capacity were explicitly utilised from the beginning of the response 
which led to farmers describing it as the most effective response to the most challenging 
adverse event they had coped with over the past decade. Conversely, intangible social and 
human capital-related phenomena were not adequately considered by central government 
institutions and response agencies during the earthquake and M. Bovis responses, which this 
research argues were key drivers in the negative outcomes that eventuated. A key conclusion 
for this thesis is that not all sources of capital (value) are measurable, which is problematic 
when institutional policy design, such as adverse event responses, requires quantifiable 
indicators to ‘measure success’.  
 
Additionally, the literature review established that human beings have a cognitive bias which 
makes them unlikely to consider what they don’t know when making decisions (Kahneman 
2012). Stiglitz (2018, p.13) outlines why this is problematic: 
“What we measure affects what we do. If we measure the wrong thing, we 
will do the wrong thing. If we don’t measure something, it becomes 
neglected, as if the problem didn’t exist.” 
The results of this research demonstrated that an inability to account for factors related to 
intangible capitals caused compounding stress for farmers, who were already under significant 
pressure due to the impact of the adverse events. Shields et al. (2016) suggest that excessive or 
chronic stress can reduce decision-making capacity, which can be described as adaptive 
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capacity, negative affecting social resilience – the ability to absorb a disturbance and adapt to 
retain essentially the same function (Folke 2016).  
 
The potential for the Living Standards Framework to be used as a mechanism through which 
these problems can be better understood and addressed was then critically analysed. This thesis 
argues that the Living Standards Framework, and multi-capital frameworks in general, serve 
two primary purposes. Firstly, they are a tool which can be used to conceptualise all factors 
related to resilience, which means that decision makers can use multi-capital frameworks to 
account for and understand the intangible characteristics of social resilience that are not 
adequately quantifiable, namely dimensions of social and human capital. These intangible 
factors can then be situated within a framework which includes more quantifiable factors, most 
often dimensions of economic and physical capital. Secondly, the framework makes these 
factors explicitly visible – social and human capital are placed alongside physical and natural 
capital which suggests equal importance. This can help ensure that policy makers and 
practitioners place adequate emphasis on these factors, which can help systemically addresses 
the cognitive bias illustrated by Kahneman (2012) – that humans often fail to consider what 
they know they don’t know when making decisions. 
 
6.1.1 – Influences from the literature 
Social-ecological systems resilience thinking formed the theoretical foundation of this 
research, illustrating key factors related to social resilience. Significant contributions came 
from two strands of research – ecology and psychology (Berkes and Ross 2012). From the 
initial ecological conceptualisation of resilience, key learnings highlighted the importance of 
adaptability (Walker et al. 2004; Folke 2006), drawing attention to the importance of 
maintaining the capacity to be able to adapt to changing conditions during adverse events at 
multiple scales (Gunderson and Holling 2002). Concepts relating to adaptability – adaptive 
management, adaptive capacity and transformation – provided a theoretical explanation for the 
lack of institutional capacity to adapt and effectively manage the initial earthquake and M. 
Bovis responses, which led to negative outcomes. Critically for this research, initial resilience 
insights also drew attention to the importance of moving beyond quantification for resilience 
analysis and incorporating qualitative insights as well.  
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In the social sciences, resilience research draws attention to the importance of social 
connection, such as participation within communities and engagement between different scales 
(Paton and McClure 2013). In disaster resilience research, this includes trust and the local 
‘sense of community’, as well as relationships between the local community and the lead 
response agencies during adverse events (Aldrich 2015; Kwok et al. 2016). Social connections, 
referred to as an important aspect of social capital, were critical during the adverse event 
responses, and helped enable adaptive capacity and adaptive management. A conclusion of this 
thesis, supported by the literature (Pretty and Ward 2001; Walker et al. 2004; OECD 2010), is 
that social and human capital are related, have a symbiotic relationship and are mutually 
reinforcing. Insights from cognitive psychology showed how cognitive bias could impact 
decision-making structures at the institutional level (Kahneman 2012), and this research 
highlighted that biases caused negative impacts on farmer decision making at the local level 
due to increased stress levels from both the crisis and subsequent response activities. Finally, 
a key insight from the social sciences was the shift from viewing resilience as a characteristic 
of an individual or a system to an outcome of a process (Ungar 2018). This drew attention to 
the institutional structures, which are processes, that govern adverse event responses, and the 
ideology which drives them – neoliberalism.   
 
The institutionalisation of resilience concepts through the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (UNISDRR 2015) using quantitative measures, such as targets and indicators, has 
encountered significant challenges for operationalisation. As this research has demonstrated, 
when response agencies acknowledged and connected with existing community networks and 
incorporated local knowledge, such as during the drought response, good outcomes resulted. 
When these intangible social and human capital factors were not accounted for, such as during 
the earthquake and M. Bovis responses, the effectiveness of the response was reduced, and the 
community suffered negative consequences.  
 
6.1.2 – Institutional challenges 
Neoliberal ideology has reshaped how people within institutions design policy in New Zealand 
and around the world (Larner 1997; Harvey 2005; Mazzucato 2018; Mazzucato 2021). This 
research presented two key processes – The New Public Management and ‘the churn’ – as 
having significant impacts on adverse event responses, how related policy is designed, and how 
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the personnel who implement adverse event responses and design the policy are managed 
(Larner 2000; Harvey 2005; Mazzucato 2021). The regular rotation (or churn) of public sector 
employees between different ministries and agencies enables them to gain experience and 
opportunities for upskilling (section 4.4.4). However, as participants at all levels described, 
this inhibits the development of deep institutional knowledge and memory resulting in the same 
mistakes being repeated over time. It also continually severs the social connections (linking 
social capital) which are developed between central government institutions and stakeholders 
(section 5.1.4).  
 
The New Public Management refers to a set of institutional practices which entailed two key 
shifts; first the implementation of evidence based policy and the requirement for quantifiable 
indicators to measure the success of policies (Harvey 2005; Mazzucato 2021). Secondly, the 
shift from valuing technical expertise and subject matter experts in central government 
agencies, to recruiting individuals who were effective and efficient ‘people managers’ (section 
4.4.3). Following the neoliberal shift, institutions began using quantifiable indicators as a way 
to ‘measure’ progress and deliver on policy objectives. However, as this research established, 
not all sources of value are quantifiable, and humans generally fail to consider what they do 
not know when making decisions. Additionally, neoliberal ideology has incentivised a public 
service workforce that focuses on the ability to manage people through key performance 
indicators without technical expertise. All of these factors have resulted in important sources 
of intangible value being excluded from decision-making structures which has led to some of 
the poor outcomes described in this study (section 5.1.4). 
 
Overall, results suggest that neoliberal practices have reduced the capacity and capability of 
central government institutions to effectively respond to adverse events. During the adverse 
events this was made clear by the lack recognition of the importance of adaptability and the 
connection between the local community and lead response agency during the earthquake and 
M. Bovis. A key factor in this shift occurred through the neoliberal process of financialisation 
that the restructuring that entailed. An organisation developed by the former Ministry of 
Agriculture, called the Rural Policy Unit, whose purpose was to connect local communities to 
central government decision-makers, was disestablished (section 4.3.4). Information provided 
by interviewees combined with literature on neoliberalism provide the basis for a strong 
argument that the only value considered during the restructuring was that which was 
measurable, financial capital. However, the value the Rural Policy Unit in building connections 
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(social capital) and enabling adaptability was intangible and not recognised (section 5.1.4). The 
drought response through the RST, which recognised the importance of social connections and 
adaptability, provides a counterfactual. The RST are regional institutions which maintain 
independence from central government and accordingly have not faced similar neoliberal 
restructuring pressures, suggesting that neoliberal influence is a negative factor in how 
institutions respond to adverse events.  
 
The impact of the disestablishment of the Rural Policy Unit can also be related back to the 
concept of hysteresis (Scheffer et al. 2001) which states that once a certain type of capacity is 
lost, regaining it costs much more than maintaining it. Maintaining organisations that produce 
intangible value is far more economically and socially efficient than disestablishing the 
organisations without recognition of what was lost and then having to rebuild capacity. MPI’s 
over reliance on the RSTs to handle farmer welfare issues during the M. Bovis response (section 
4.3.4), which resulted in significant tensions in the relationship between the two organisations, 
provides another example of the importance of maintaining the relationships (social capital) 
between organisations responding to adverse events.  
 
Ultimately, this thesis has demonstrated that accounting for intangible sources of value in 
structural decision-making processes during adverse event responses is important. Results 
showed that social and human capital can be used to describe and account for a range of 
intangible phenomena which have provided demonstrable value in both their presence and 
absence in the three distinct adverse event responses in the Hurunui. The conclusions of this 
research, specifically the value provided by The Living Standards Framework, are intended to 
be generalisable and transferable between different contexts.  
 
Figure 6.1 synthesises the core arguments that have been built throughout this thesis. Social 
resilience is a process that is affected by institutional arrangements. Institutions have been 
influenced and shaped by neoliberal ideology over several decades through the introduction of 
the New Public Management which emphasised evidence-based policy reliant upon 
quantifiable measures of success, implemented by people managers. Additionally, the churn 
inhibited the development of linking social capital, institutional knowledge and memory. These 
institutional arrangements have resulted in adverse event responses failing to recognise and 
account for intangible sources of value, leading to negative outcomes for farmers and the 
Hurunui community during the earthquake and M. Bovis responses. The success of the drought 
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response, which accounted for these factors, provides the counterfactual. The key conclusion 
is that institutional decision-making structures in New Zealand need to better account for 
intangible sources of value in order to generate better adverse event outcomes. Multi-capital 
frameworks – such as The Living Standards Framework – provide a useful framing mechanism 




Figure 6.1 – Social resilience: the impact of institutional arrangements  
All of these factors combined provide the foundations necessary to address the research 
questions. 
6.2 – Addressing the research questions 
1. What role did social resilience play in the community response to the three hazard 
events in the Hurunui? 
 
Social resilience played a crucial role in the community response to the drought and 
earthquake. Local respondents described how the community came together and helped each 
other following each event (Figure 5.1). Participants at all levels described the trust and ‘sense 
of community’ within the Hurunui community, and demonstrated adaptability and strong social 
connections (bonding and bridging social capital) which are key factors for social resilience.  
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The M. Bovis response provided the counterfactual. The lead response agency, the Ministry for 
Primary Industries (MPI), described M. Bovis as a novel event with distributed impacts across 
the nation. Unlike the localised nature of the drought and earthquake, there were a limited 
numbers of infected farms in each region across the country, which precluded a co-ordinated 
local response. Local participants described how during the outbreak the community became 
suspicious of one another, which was exacerbated by MPI attempting to protect the privacy of 
farmers with infected properties. During the M. Bovis response, the community did not rally, 
unlike during the drought and earthquake. Most farmers described the drought as the most 
difficult adverse event to deal with, except the few participants who were directly affected by 
M. Bovis. The catastrophic outcomes – multiple respondents at all levels (including from MPI) 
anecdotally described multiple farmer suicides as a consequence of the M. Bovis response – 
demonstrate the importance of local community cohesion and trust as critical factors during 
adverse events, alongside the importance of an effective adaptable institutional response that 
engages with the local community.  
 
2. What were the institutional responses, and how did they affect the local community’s 
social resilience? 
 
The lead response agency for the earthquake was Canterbury Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management, with policy support provided from central government in Wellington. This 
response was negatively received by local participants, though once initial problems with 
communication and coordination were addressed, the response improved over time. During the 
earthquake response local participants described significant difficulty in establishing a 
connection (linking social capital) with the lead response agency (figure 5.2). This led to a 
number of problems in the affected area which increased stress levels among farmers who were 
unable to liaise with the lead response agency in order to address important issues that were 
obvious at the local level, but invisible at the institutional level. Additionally, policy responses 
designed by central government in Wellington also failed to recognise contextual factors and 
incorporate local knowledge which resulted in programmes such as the Uninsurable 
Infrastructure Relief Fund being initially undersubscribed, further exacerbating farmer stress 
until changes were made.  
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The Ministry for Primary Industries was the lead response agency for the M. Bovis outbreak, 
and initially used a ‘command and control’ style of response which resulted in catastrophic 
outcomes for affected farmers. The approach to the response was described by respondents at 
all levels, including MPI in retrospect, as dictatorial with unidirectional communication from 
MPI to farmers. The novel nature of the disease combined with significant uncertainties around 
testing and infection patterns led to emergent information becoming clear at the local level, 
which was then unable to be transmitted to those with decision making authority. The inability 
for farmers and other respondent private sector organisations to communicate these factors to 
MPI inhibited farmer’s adaptive capacity as well as the ability for MPI to adaptively manage 
the outbreak. Respondents at all levels described how farmers were more afraid of MPI 
thinking they had M. Bovis, than actually having M. Bovis. The key problem for farmers was 
the way in which the institutional response to the event had been enacted. 
 
The drought response provided a counterfactual. Institutionally, the North Canterbury chapter 
of the Rural Support Trust was the lead response agency for the drought – with funding 
provided by central government to support their response activities. Despite most farmers 
describing the drought as the most difficult adverse event for themselves and their farming 
practices, they also described the drought response as the most effective. There were clear 
differences between how the RST engaged with the local community in contrast with the 
earthquake and M. Bovis responses – farmers and their local knowledge were respected and 
acknowledged during the response process. This involved strong connections between the RST 
and those affected as well as a focus on adaptive capacity through decision-making support for 
farmers and other organisations that supported the response. The intangible factors related to 
social and human capital were proactively accounted for during the drought response, which 
this research argues helped drive the positive outcomes that resulted. 
 
Paton (2020) states that prior experience of hazard events is an important determinant of 
improved preparedness for future events. The North Canterbury RST had experience with 
droughts, the capacity to respond effectively to them, and had strong existing connections into 
the affected community. The lead response agencies for the earthquake and M. Bovis had no 
experience of previous hazard events in the region, and did not have strong connections with 
the community. Local participants described significant difficulty establishing linking social 
capital with the lead response agencies during both the earthquake and M. Bovis, with repeated 
attempts made. While the difficulty of establishing relationships during adverse event 
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responses must be acknowledged, the successful establishment of linking social capital during 
the earthquake response and the subsequent positive outcomes, in contrast to the M. Bovis 
response, suggests that responding agencies should be more aware of, and take advantage of, 
attempts by local communities to establish connections.  
 
Addressing the final research question will illustrate how neoliberal restructuring reduced 
public sector capability to establish these connections, disestablishing organisations which 
provided this capacity to central government, and how the Living Standards Framework can 
be used as a tool to help address these challenges. 
 
3. What insights can social and human capital provide for understanding and 
operationalising social resilience in order to improve institutional responses to 
adverse events? 
 
A key challenge for the theoretical foundations that underpin this thesis – social-ecological 
systems resilience thinking – is operationalisation. Modern public bureaucracies use 
quantifiable indicators as a mechanism to design policy and measure progress towards 
objectives. Attempts to use quantitative techniques to implement resilience thinking have 
largely been unsuccessful. Holling (1973), Vallance (2015), Kwok et al. (2016), Kaika (2017) 
and  Cradock-Henry et al. (2019) have all described the need to place the emphasis back on 
qualitative approaches, and multi-capital frameworks have been identified as an operational 
approach that is largely consistent with resilience thinking (Tanner et al. 2015; 
Ostadtaghizadeh et al. 2015). The Living Standards Framework – a multi-capital framework – 
is a tool used by the New Zealand government to model all sources of value, tangible and 
intangible, through the concept of multiple capital stocks. Social and human capital concepts 
are drawn upon to describe intangible value as well as to simplify and generalise complex 
resilience theories into concepts which are more easily transferable between research, policy 
makers and practitioners. 
 
A key conclusion of this research is that neoliberal restructuring has reduced public sector 
capacity and capability which has resulted in an inability to account for intangible sources of 
value in structural decision-making processes during adverse event responses. The purpose of 
the Living Standards Framework, specifically the associated concepts of social and human 
capital, is to capture these intangible sources of value and make them visible or ‘known’ to 
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policy makers. As noted earlier, a cognitive bias means that humans have trouble accounting 
for what they know they do not know when making decisions (Kahneman 2012). The Living 
Standards Framework can help address the key challenges for operationalising resilience - 
nuance, measurement and norms – by making the problems ‘known’ within decision-making 
structures. Additionally, incorporating intangible sources of value into decision-making 
processes proactively addresses the excessive stress generated by response activities which 
don’t adequately account for social and human capital related phenomena. 
 
A final counterfactual drawing on the drought response demonstrates that institutions which 
account for intangible factors captured by social and human capital generate better outcomes. 
The Rural Support Trust, which led the drought response, provides an example of an institution 
which has not been directly affected by neoliberal restructuring. Respondents from both MPI 
as well as the RST described how the government had maintained the operational independence 
of the RSTs in order to ensure that distrust for the government didn’t transfer into distrust for 
the RST. Accordingly, the RST as an institution has not faced the same neoliberal restructuring 
pressures as central government institutions, meaning that policy approaches related to 
managerialism and the churn have not affected RST operations. Additionally, the RST is 
staffed by retired farmers who are knowledgeable about the local context and understand the 
importance of adaptability and of having strong relationships with farmers in the regions they 
operate in. The North Canterbury RST staff maintained strong local connections to place, 
where often RST members had been farmers themselves, and there was a continuity of support, 
which allowed strong relationships with farmers to develop over time. This institutional 
knowledge and memory played a significant role in the drought response, which the lead 
response agencies in the earthquake and M. Bovis did not have. The organisation responsible 
for providing these services to central government, the Rural Policy Unit, had been 
disestablished during the neoliberal restructuring due to a lack of quantifiable evidence about 
the value it provided.  
6.2.1 – Contributions to theory  
Social resilience is now conceptualised as the outcome of a process (Ungar 2018). This thesis 
argues that the processes which generated and maintained social resilience in the Hurunui 
during the adverse events and the responses to them were affected by institutional 
arrangements. Institutional arrangements govern systematised responses to adverse events 
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through central government agencies and private sector organisations. Neoliberal ideology has 
significantly influenced institutional arrangements in New Zealand since the 1980s through the 
New Public Management system and the churn, resulting in managerialism – a shift to people 
managers from technical or subject matter experts – and a focus on key performance indicators 
to measure success (Kelsey 1995; Larner 2003; Harvey 2005; Mazzucato 2021). However, as 
the literature (Holling 1973; Cutter 2008; Cutter 2015) and this study have established, not all 
sources of value for resilience are quantifiable. The findings of this research reflect insights 
from the literature which emphasise the importance of qualitative approaches for resilience 
analysis (Holling 1973; Carpenter et al. 2001; Brown 2014; Cretney 2016; Kaika 2017; 
Hallegatte and Engle 2019). Overall, this study has extended our understanding of social 
resilience by demonstrating the importance of intangible sources of value and reaffirming 
qualitative analysis as a key approach.  
 
This thesis argues that the neoliberal shift has reduced the government’s capacity and capability 
to respond effectively to adverse events, particularly those that are less frequent or novel such 
as the earthquake or M. Bovis. The results of this research established strong empirical evidence 
that neoliberalised institutions failed to account for sources of intangible value – adaptability 
and linking social capital – during the earthquake and M. Bovis responses. Consequently, this 
resulted in additional stress placed on farmers which negatively affected their adaptability and 
social resilience. In contrast, the response to the drought through the Rural Support Trust 
provided an example of an institutional response led by an organisation that recognised 
intangible sources of value during the response. This reduced farmer stress, increased 
adaptability and generated positive resilience outcomes. Stress has been shown to have a 
negative effect on decision-making capacity (Shields et al. 2016), which affected adaptive 
capacity and management, both of which are identified as key factors for resilience (Gunderson 
and Holling 2002, Walker et al. 2004). The contrast between the outcomes of the earthquake 
and M. Bovis responses, compared to the drought response, provides strong evidence that 
negative consequences can result from a failure to acknowledge intangible capital during 
adverse event responses. Crucially, the Rural Support Trust has not faced the same neoliberal 
restructuring pressures which government-led response agencies had, which suggests that 




Additionally, an insight from cognitive psychology – what you see is all there is – reveals how 
decision-makers will rarely account for what they know they do not know when making 
decisions (Kahneman 2012). The focus on evidence-based policy managed through targets and 
indicators privileges quantifiable sources of value (such as the economy and infrastructure) 
that can be ‘seen’ or ‘known’, while neglecting intangible sources of value (such as linking 
social capital and adaptability). A key contribution of this study has been to provide a NZ 
perspective on the outcomes of neoliberal reforms on adverse event responses, which shows 
that an inability to account for intangible phenomena has resulted in negative outcomes. 
Cognitive psychology provides a theoretical explanation of the mechanism by which this 
occurs.  
 
This thesis further argued that multi-capital frameworks – such as the Living Standards 
Framework – provide a strong foundation upon which to address operational challenges for 
social resilience. A key benefit of multi-capital frameworks is that they place intangible factors 
alongside tangible factors, enhancing visibility, which helps to systematically address the 
cognitive bias illustrated by Kahneman (2012) by ensuring that policy makers and practitioners 
‘know’ to consider them. The LSF also provides practical value for policy makers and 
practitioners. One respondent described how they used the LSF to engage more effectively 
with government - social and human capital concepts provided the basis for the examination 
of ideas which would have been previously unrecognised. This study has extended our 
understanding of the relationship between SES resilience thinking and multi-capital 
frameworks, showing that the two approaches are complementary and that the LSF is a useful 
tool for conceptualising and accounting for the intangible aspects of resilience.  
 
The literature also examined the connections between social and human capital (Pretty and 
Ward 2001; Walker et al. 2004; OECD 2010; Roberts and Lacey 2014; Sharma 2014), and the 
results of this research suggest that both concepts are related and reinforce each other in a 
symbiotic relationship. The establishment of linking social capital between lead response 
agencies and the affected community was critical in enabling adaptive capacity and adaptive 
management at the local and institutional level. In turn, adaptive capacity and management at 
the local and institutional level was required in order to establish linking social capital. 
Additionally, resilience at the central government institutional level is shown to have a direct 
impact on resilience at the community level. The results of this research reinforce the holistic 
interdependent nature of resilience (Gunderson and Holling 2002; Walker et al. 2004), and 
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demonstrates that the four capitals are symbiotic and cannot adequately be described in 
isolation of one another (Figure 5.9). 
 
Methodologically, the research design involved a vertical analysis with perspectives sought 
from those who were affected, those who responded, and those who organised the response. 
Respondents across all three groups provided unique insights which would have been 
impossible to draw from a more traditional horizontal analysis. The snowball sampling 
technique also provided significant value, for example one farmer participant led to contact 
with a regional expert, which then led to a central government official, who introduced a key 
informant at the highest levels of government. Conversations with leaders, including the Mayor 
of the Hurunui, provided significant value both in understanding the relationship between local 
government and central government, as well as in the identification of agencies and individuals 
to target for interviews. Many informants would not have been accessible through formal 
channels. A key contribution of this study has been to demonstrate the effectiveness of vertical 
research design, which shows that perspectives from stakeholders at different scales are key to 
the holistic understandings which SES resilience thinking emphasises.  
6.3 – Implications and areas for further research 
The results of this research have important implications for research, policy and practice. 
Theoretically, this study has demonstrated that accounting for intangible sources of value in 
institutional decision-making processes is fundamental for good outcomes. The qualitative 
methodological approach revealed that there were intangible social and human capital drivers 
in every single response that were difficult to capture using existing quantitative 
methodologies. Biases in human judgements result in essential sources of value being ignored 
or overlooked. The results of this research show that when these factors were taken into account 
by the institutional responses to the three adverse events in the Hurunui, good outcomes 
resulted, and when they were not, negative outcomes prevailed. This has significant 
implications for future academic research designed to advance our current understanding of 
resilience measurement, suggesting that additional efforts need to be directed towards 
incorporating qualitative insights into resilience analysis.  
 
This inability to measure key sources of value also has significant implications for policy and 
practice. Neoliberal hegemony has shaped much of the structure of the current public service 
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which has resulted in institutional policy design, such as adverse event responses, requiring 
quantifiable indicators to ‘measure success’. The results of this research suggest that 
institutions – policy and practice – need to focus on qualitative knowledge production 
alongside existing quantitative methodologies. The Living Standards Framework, alongside, 
social and human capital concepts, provide a strong foundation upon which to build.  
 
From an operational perspective, another key conclusion is that paying for the maintenance of 
desirable stable states is far more economically and socially efficient than risking the shift into 
an undesirable state and having to rebuild lost capacity. Respondents described the loss of 
MPI’s Rural Policy Unit as having a significant negative impact on institutional capacity for 
adverse event responses. In general, the lack of institutional consideration given to intangible 
value can result in the unintended loss of stocks of linking social capital and institutional 
knowledge. Participants, and the literature (Scheffer et al. 2001), describe the maintenance of 
these capital stocks as being far more economically and socially efficient than having to rebuild 
lost capacity.  
 
There are limitations to the current research which have highlighted the need for future research 
endeavour. The literature (Durlauf 1999) refers to a ‘dark side’ of social capital, where strong 
group ties (such as those described by bonding social capital) can lead to ‘group think’ and an 
inability to adapt to a changing environment.  While there were some hints of this occurring in 
the Hurunui community following the earthquake, there was not enough data to draw any 
significant conclusions and so these factors were not discussed. Further research is required to 
gain a much more detailed understanding of social capital in an adverse event context, 
especially potential negative effects.  
 
Additionally, this research examined a single type of farming community in a diverse region 
with vertical analysis focusing on their relationship with institutions. The results of this 
research at the local level only speak for the community interviewed, and not the wider district 
more generally. It would be interesting to observe whether the pre-existing strength of 
community that sheep and beef farmers in the Hurunui had are also present with dairy farming, 
and whether this is the norm in New Zealand, or an outlier. Many academics have described 
the strong community resilience of rural communities in New Zealand, and in the Hurunui their 
relationships and resilience played a significant role in their ability to respond collectively to 
the adverse events. Not all communities will necessarily have the same sense of community or 
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capacity to do this, which could compromise the ability of response agencies to establish 
effective linking social capital. Additionally, as Cutter (2015) notes, quantitative indicators 
such as the social deprivation index are not sufficient for making judgements about the strength 
of communities. Further research is required to gain a more nuanced understanding of social 
and human capital, as well as the complexities for establishing linking social capital post-event. 
6.4 – Final reflections  
Institutions play a fundamental role in shaping the societal processes which affect resilience at 
national, regional and local scales. In turn, ideology plays an important role in shaping the 
institutional arrangements which generate and maintain resilience outcomes. For the last 
several decades, neoliberal ideology has played a significant role in reshaping the institutional 
processes which generated and maintained the social resilience outcomes described in this 
research. The results of this research present a strong case for structural changes in institutional 
arrangements in order to incorporate intangible factors into decision-making processes.  
 
The rapidly escalating onset of anthropogenic climate change, alongside existing hazard risks, 
entail a strong focus on resilience to adverse events in the future. Over the next decade there 
are likely to be significant opportunities which can be leveraged in order to push for structural 
change in the institutional processes generate and maintain social resilience outcomes in New 
Zealand and around the world. David Harvey (2005) reflected that in order for an idea to 
become hegemonic, it must be simple enough for it to seem obvious to all who hear it. The 
idea that we need to take intangible sources of value into account into in our institutional 
decision-making processes using social and human capital concepts is intuitive, but it is also 
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Community Disaster Resilience: 
The Impact of Institutional Arrangements 
INFORMATION  SHEET  FOR  PARTICIPANTS (GROUP 1) 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet carefully 
before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate, we thank you.  If 
you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for 
considering our request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
 
This research is part of the Resilience to Nature’s Challenges National Science Challenge. 
Resilience to Nature’s Challenges is a government-funded program which focuses on 
transforming New Zealand’s approach to dealing with the natural hazards, including 
earthquakes and climate related hazards.  
 
This research is being undertaken as part of a PhD research project by David Wither, supervised 
by Dr. Caroline Orchiston and Professor Etienne Nel (University of Otago). 
 
It investigates recent adverse events and their impact on rural communities in the Hurunui, 
particularly in regard to the effectiveness of the response from regional and national 
organisations and government agencies, including Rural Support Trust, local councils, 
Federated Farmers, and the Ministry of Primary Industries.  
 
What Type of Participants are being sought? 
 
This research targets three different groups of people.  
Farm households in the Hurunui that have been affected by recent adverse events (drought, 
earthquake, flooding etc). 
1. Local government and organisations that work to support Group 1. 
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2. Central government agencies and other organisations that create policy and offer 
support to groups 1 and 2 during and after adverse events.  
3. This research seeks to interview approximately 10-15 participants per group. 
Recruitment for each group will occur by referral of people already known in each area. 
Participants should have lived in the area for at least two years and have experienced the recent 
adverse events in the area. Participants should also be above the age of 18.  
 
What will Participants be Asked to Do? 
 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be interviewed by David Wither for 
approximately one hour. There is no formal set of questions, but the general line of questioning 
will involve your experiences of recent adverse events, and the impact that government and 
organizational responses have had on your business and household. There is particular interest 
as to the effectiveness the governments and other organizations responses, both good and bad, 
and how this has affected both your recovery from the previous events, as well as your ability 
to prepare for future events.  
 
Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any disadvantage 
to yourself of any kind. 
 
What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it? 
With your consent, interviews will be recorded using an audio recorder, after which they will 
be transcribed for further analysis. Recordings will then be destroyed. No personal information 
will be collected, apart from contact details used to schedule the interviews.  The only people 
that will have access to this data are the student researcher and his supervisors.  
 
The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only those mentioned above will 
be able to gain access to it. Data obtained as a result of the research will be retained for at least 
5 years in secure storage. Any personal information such as contact details will be destroyed 
at the completion of the research. 
 
The results of the project will be published in academic journals and presented at conferences, 
and will be available in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every 
attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity. 
 
Due to the small number of participants in each group, and the size of the community, it may 
be possible for others in the community to identify your responses. On the consent form you 
will be given an option to review the transcript of your interview and make any changes you 
feel necessary or to remove any parts that you do not wish to be used in the research.  
 
This project involves an open-questioning technique. The general line of questioning includes 
your experiences of natural hazards, and your experiences of government and organisational 
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responses to them. The precise nature of the questions which will be asked have not been fully 
determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the interview develops.  
Consequently, although the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee is aware of the 
general areas to be explored in the interview, the Committee has not been able to review the 
precise questions to be used. 
 
In the event that the line of questioning does develop in such a way that you feel hesitant or 
uncomfortable you are reminded of your right to decline to answer any particular question(s) 
and also that you may withdraw from the project at any stage without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
 
Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project? 
 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
 
What if Participants have any Questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to 
contact either:- 
David Wither and Dr. Caroline Orchiston 
Centre for Sustainability   Centre for Sustainability 
03 479 3928  03 479 9244 
david.wither@postgrad.otago.ac.nz  caroline.orchiston@otago.ac.nz 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you 
have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee 
through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email 
gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated 
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Community Disaster Resilience: 
The Impact of Institutional Arrangements 
INFORMATION  SHEET  FOR  PARTICIPANTS (GROUP 2) 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet carefully 
before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate, we thank you.  If 
you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for 
considering our request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
 
This research is part of the Resilience to Nature’s Challenges National Science Challenge. 
Resilience to Nature’s Challenges is a government-funded program which focuses on 
transforming New Zealand’s approach to dealing with the natural hazards, including 
earthquakes and climate related hazards.  
 
This research is being undertaken as part of a PhD research project by David Wither, supervised 
by Dr. Caroline Orchiston and Professor Etienne Nel (University of Otago). 
 
It investigates recent adverse events and their impact on rural communities in the Hurunui, 
particularly in regard to the effectiveness of the response from regional and national 
organisations and government agencies, including Rural Support Trust, local councils, 
Federated Farmers, and the Ministry of Primary Industries.  
 
What Type of Participants are being sought? 
 
This research targets three different groups of people.  
1. Farm households in the Hurunui that have been affected by recent adverse events 
(drought, earthquake, flooding etc). 
2. Local government and organisations that work to support Group 1. 
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3. Central government agencies and other organisations that create policy and offer 
support to groups 1 and 2 during and after adverse events.  
This research seeks to interview approximately 10-15 participants per group. Recruitment for 
each group will occur by referral of people already known in each area. 
 
Participants should have played a role in the community’s response to recovery from natural 
hazard events such as the recent drought and earthquakes. Participants should also be above 
the age of 18. 
 
What will Participants be Asked to Do? 
 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be interviewed by David Wither for 
approximately one hour. There is no formal set of questions, but the general line of questioning 
will involve your experiences of recent natural hazards (if any), and your reflections on the 
impact you think your organization’s response has had within the local community. There is 
particular interest as to the effectiveness the governments and other organizations responses, 
both good and bad, and how this has affected both your recovery from the previous events, as 
well as your ability to prepare for future events.  
 
Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any disadvantage 
to yourself of any kind. 
 
What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it? 
With your consent, interviews will be recorded using an audio recorder, after which they will 
be transcribed for further analysis. Recordings will then be destroyed. No personal information 
will be collected, apart from contact details used to schedule the interviews.  The only people 
that will have access to this data are the student researcher and his supervisors.  
 
The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only those mentioned above will 
be able to gain access to it. Data obtained as a result of the research will be retained for at least 
5 years in secure storage. Any personal information such as contact details will be destroyed 
at the completion of the research. 
 
The results of the project will be published in academic journals and presented at conferences, 
and will be available in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every 
attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity. 
 
Due to the small number of participants in each group, and the size of the community, it may 
be possible for others in the community to identify your responses. On the consent form you 
will be given an option to review the transcript of your interview and make any changes you 
feel necessary or to remove any parts that you do not wish to be used in the research.  
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This project involves an open-questioning technique. The general line of questioning includes 
your experiences of the natural hazards (if any), and your experiences of how your organisation 
has responded to them.  The precise nature of the questions which will be asked have not been 
fully determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the interview develops.  
Consequently, although the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee is aware of the 
general areas to be explored in the interview, the Committee has not been able to review the 
precise questions to be used. 
 
In the event that the line of questioning does develop in such a way that you feel hesitant or 
uncomfortable you are reminded of your right to decline to answer any particular question(s) 
and also that you may withdraw from the project at any stage without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
 
Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project? 
 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
 
What if Participants have any Questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to 
contact either:- 
David Wither and  Dr. Caroline Orchiston 
Centre for Sustainability   Centre for Sustainability 
03-479-3928  03-479-9244 
david.wither@postgrad.otago.ac.nz  caroline.orchiston@otago.ac.nz 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you 
have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee 
through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email 
gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated 




Appendix D – Information Sheet (G3) 




Community Disaster Resilience: 
The Impact of Institutional Arrangements 
INFORMATION  SHEET  FOR  PARTICIPANTS (GROUP 3) 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet carefully 
before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate, we thank you.  If 
you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for 
considering our request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
 
This research is part of the Resilience to Nature’s Challenges National Science Challenge. 
Resilience to Nature’s Challenges is a government-funded program which focuses on 
transforming New Zealand’s approach to dealing with the natural hazards, including 
earthquakes and climate related hazards.  
 
This research is being undertaken as part of a PhD research project by David Wither, supervised 
by Dr. Caroline Orchiston and Professor Etienne Nel (University of Otago). 
 
It investigates recent adverse events and their impact on rural communities in the Hurunui, 
particularly in regard to the effectiveness of the response from regional and national 
organisations and government agencies, including Rural Support Trust, local councils, 
Federated Farmers, and the Ministry of Primary Industries.  
 
What Type of Participants are being sought? 
 
This research targets three different groups of people.  
1. Farm households in the Hurunui that have been affected by recent adverse events 
(drought, earthquake, flooding etc). 
2. Local government and organisations that work to support Group 1. 
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3. Central government agencies and other organisations that create policy and offer 
support to groups 1 and 2 during and after adverse events.  
This research seeks to interview approximately 10-15 participants per group. Recruitment for 
each group will occur by referral of people already known in each area. 
 
Participants should have played a role in policy or organisational response to the Hurunui’s 
response to and recovery from natural hazard events such as the recent drought and 
earthquakes. Participants should also be above the age of 18. 
 
What will Participants be Asked to Do? 
 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be interviewed by David Wither for 
approximately one hour. There is no formal set of questions, but the general line of questioning 
will involve your experiences of your organizations responses to the recent natural hazards in 
the Hurunui, and your reflections on the impact you feel your organization response has had 
within the local community. There is particular interest as to the effectiveness the governments 
and other organizations responses, both good and bad, and how this has affected both your 
recovery from the previous events, as well as your ability to prepare for future events.  
 
Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any disadvantage 
to yourself of any kind. 
 
What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it? 
With your consent, interviews will be recorded using an audio recorder, after which they will 
be transcribed for further analysis. Recordings will then be destroyed. No personal information 
will be collected, apart from contact details used to schedule the interviews.  The only people 
that will have access to this data are the student researcher and his supervisors.  
 
The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only those mentioned above will 
be able to gain access to it. Data obtained as a result of the research will be retained for at least 
5 years in secure storage. Any personal information such as contact details will be destroyed 
at the completion of the research. 
 
The results of the project will be published in academic journals and presented at conferences, 
and will be available in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every 
attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity. 
 
Due to the small number of participants in each group, and the size of the community, it may 
be possible for others in the community to identify your responses. On the consent form you 
will be given an option to review the transcript of your interview and make any changes you 
feel necessary or to remove any parts that you do not wish to be used in the research.  
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This project involves an open-questioning technique. The general line of questioning includes 
your experiences of the natural hazards (if any), and your experiences of how your organisation 
has responded to them.  The precise nature of the questions which will be asked have not been 
fully determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the interview develops.  
Consequently, although the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee is aware of the 
general areas to be explored in the interview, the Committee has not been able to review the 
precise questions to be used. 
 
In the event that the line of questioning does develop in such a way that you feel hesitant or 
uncomfortable you are reminded of your right to decline to answer any particular question(s) 
and also that you may withdraw from the project at any stage without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
 
Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project? 
 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
 
What if Participants have any Questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to 
contact either:- 
David Wither and  Dr. Caroline Orchiston 
Centre for Sustainability   Centre for Sustainability 
03-479-3928  03-479-9244 
david.wither@postgrad.otago.ac.nz  caroline.orchiston@otago.ac.nz 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you 
have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee 
through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email 
gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated 




Appendix E – Consent Form 




COMMUNITY DISASTER RESILIENCE: 
THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
CONSENT  FORM  FOR 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  All 
my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I am free to request 
further information at any stage. 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project before its completion; 
 
3. Personal identifying information that may be on the audio recording will be destroyed 
at the conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the project depend will 
be retained in secure storage for at least five years; 
 
4.  This project involves an open questioning technique. The general line of questioning 
includes your experiences of natural hazards, and your experiences of government and 
organisational responses to them.  The precise nature of the questions which will be asked have 
not been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the interview develops. 
In the event that the line of questioning develops in such a way that I feel hesitant or 
uncomfortable I may decline to answer any particular question(s) and/or may withdraw from 
the project without any disadvantage of any kind. 
 
5. This project is funded by Resilience to Nature’s Challenges, a National Science 
Challenge hosted by GNS Science.  
 
6. The results of the project will be published and made publically available, Due to the 
small number of participants, it may be possible for others in the community to identify you. 
You will be given the opportunity to review and amend the interview transcripts after your 
interview has been completed. 
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7. I, as the participant: a) would like to review the transcripts   OR;  
 
  b) would not like to review the transcripts  OR; 
   
  c) would like to be named in the research 
 
I agree to take part in this project. 
 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 








Name of person taking consent 
 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you 
have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee 
through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email 
gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated 







Appendix F – Interview Guide 
Interview Guide 
 
Make it clear that there is a primary interest in social/community impacts  
 
Keep a list of the type of participants that I am talking to.  
 
Part 1: Experiences of recent natural hazards (generally in the last decade) 
 
- Prompt these four: Chch EQs, Drought, Kaikoura EQ, M. Bovis.  
- Ask if any others 
- What organisations did you interact with in terms of support? 
 
Four scales:  
a) Impact on them (social) 
b) Their households (social) 
c) The farm (economic?) 
d) The Community (cultural/social) 
 
Part 2: Experience of government/organisational response/support for these hazards.  
 
What worked well? What didn’t? Why? 
 
How did the government response impact on each of the different scales? 
 
Thinking back to what we talked about before, have there been any consistent issues with either 
government or organisations? 
 
During each of the hazards, what were your Problems of Living? How did the response impact 
these? (were they addressed effectively, forgotten, addressed badly, mismanaged etc) 
 
Part 3: Knowledge of upcoming challenges & the impact the prior two topics have on you 
and your household’s ability to adapt 
 
Leave it up to them, as to what’s happening.  
 
Talk through a few topics:  
1) Natural hazards (long term drought related) 
2) Short term shocks (EQ, extreme weather (cyclone, snow storm etc) 
3) Lab based animal protein 
4) Plant protein 
5) Market shocks 
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6) Farm debt. 
7) Insurance 
 
How do you plan for these things? Are there things that the government does that help or hurts? 
 
Thinking back over the last two topics, how would you like to see the way the government & 
organisations interact with you, change, in order to help you get better outcomes.  
 
What do you think farmers could do better? In general, not just you! 
 
Trust, sense of community.  
 
If Maori 
Ask if Iwi support,  
- Government 
- Organisations (RST, red cross etc) 
 
